

---

**THE PROCEEDINGS  
of  
The South Carolina  
Historical Association  
1992**

C.  
5.7  
OUTH  
92  
py 2

Officers of the South Carolina  
Historical Association  
1991-1992

*President*

Valdis O. Lumans  
University of South Carolina at Aiken

*Vice-President*

Charles H. Lesser  
South Carolina Department of Archives and History

*Secretary-Treasurer*

William S. Brockington, Jr.  
University of South Carolina at Aiken

*Executive Board Members*

Peter W. Becker  
University of South Carolina at Columbia

Denis G. Paz  
Clemson University

Marcia G. Synnott  
University of South Carolina at Columbia

---

## CONTENTS

---

Reflections on Columbus and Richard Cheney  
by John-Henry Madsen

1

The Role of the Germanic Middle  
in the Early Middle Ages  
by Ralf P. Pearson

### THE PROCEEDINGS of The South Carolina Historical Association 1992

10

The Huguenot Settlement  
by Donald W. Reynolds

15

South Carolina General Assembly Election  
1988 Campaign Finance  
by Peter V. Cangelosi

29

Reform and Reformers in South Carolina  
A Historical Perspective  
by Robert D. Taylor

35

State Government Reorganization in South Carolina  
by John Bruce Gresham, Jr.

40

The William Linneman McKelvey  
by John S. Richards

45

South Carolina's Response to Brown v. Board of Education 1954-1967  
by Thomas D. Aron

55

Being A Womanist: Black Civil Rights Leadership in the  
Chapel Hill Sealing, Wilmington, North Carolina, 1958-1972  
by Mary L. Gadsden

67

"Only One Case in Town": The South Carolina Republican Party  
by Robert G. Anderson  
by John M. Bailey, Jr.

76

The South Carolina Historical Association  
The University of South Carolina  
Columbia, SC

87

It is the policy of the South Carolina Historical Association to publish all papers presented at the Annual Meeting. The editor of the *Proceedings* disclaims any responsibility for the scholarship, statement of fact and opinion, and the conclusions of the contributors. The papers in this issue were presented in March 1991.



---

## CONTENTS

---

Reflections on Columbia and Richland County by John Hammond Moore	1
The Role of the Germanic Males in the Early Middle Ages by Kathy Pearson	10
The Huguenot Emigration From The French Perspective by Bertrand van Ruymbeke	19
South Carolina General Assembly Elections: 1988 Campaign Finance by John V. Crangle	29
Reform and Reformers in South Carolina: A Historical Perspective by Walter B. Edgar	35
State Government Reorganization in South Carolina by Cole Blease Graham, Jr.	40
The Eminent Lieutenant McKaine by Miles S. Richards	46
Georgia's Response to Brown V. Board of Education 1954-1961 by Thomas O'Brien	55
Taming A Whirlwind: Black Civil Rights Leadership in the Community Setting, Wilmington, North Carolina, 1950-1972 by John L. Godwin	67
The Only Game in Town: The South Carolina Republican Party in the Post-Reconstruction Era by Harris M. Bailey, Jr.	76
The Controversy Surrounding Mendel Rivers and His Battle with the Bottle by Will Huntley	87

The United States in the Philippines: Foreshadow of Vietnam by Joseph Taylor Stukes	95
Minutes, Annual Meeting 1991	105
Financial Statement 1991	107

# REFLECTIONS ON COLUMBIA AND RICHLAND COUNTY

**John Hammond Moore**  
**Columbia, South Carolina**

---

A year ago I discussed a single decade in the life of Columbia. Today my assignment is twenty-five decades, 1740-1990.

To begin, a little geography. The region that became Richland County in the 1780s, Richland District in the 1790s, and Richland County once more in 1868, is shaped somewhat like an arrowhead aimed prophetically perhaps at Charleston, 100 miles away. An expanse of 771 square miles, its original boundaries (which have changed little through the years) were the Wateree River to the east and the Broad and Congaree rivers to the west and south, which rolling sand hills to the north. Indians undoubtedly lived here in past centuries and they certainly hunted here in the 18th, but by that date this region was a buffer zone or a sort of no-man's land between the powerful Cherokee to the west and dwindling tribes of Congaree and Wateree to the east.

The Yemassee uprising of 1715 prompted the Congaree to move north to Rock Hill to join the Catawbias, followed by the Wateree some years later. In that war, the Cherokee hesitated, but eventually came down on the side of the settlers. With peace, the British set up the first of several trading posts or forts near the juncture of the Congaree and Broad rivers, now the site of the city of Cayce. Ostensibly this facility (often called a factory) was designed to regulate trade with the Indians, for shoddy dealings by all concerned has been a prime reason for the Yemassee affair.

Throughout the remainder of the 18th century, at least to the 1780s, neither Richland County nor Columbia existed. The action, the center of life, in this region (often called "the Congarees," which can mean pretty much whatever you want it to) was largely on the *west* bank of the Congaree and the *east* bank of the Wateree, not in the land that would become Richland County. The main trail from Charleston into Cherokee country went through Cayce, and another to the east went from Charleston to Camden, this state's first inland town, and then on to North Carolina and Virginia en route to Philadelphia. A third trail,

<sup>\*</sup>This paper was delivered as the luncheon address at the annual meeting of the South Carolina Historical Association.



## South Carolina Historical Association

less important, split off from the Cherokee path a few miles north of Cayce, crossed the Broad River, and led to the Catawbias, also connecting with Camden.

The first white men to live in this area were cowboys tending their herds of cattle and Indian traders. In their midst were occasional squatters and dirt-poor frontiersmen, but none of these folk held title to land and cannot be viewed as settlers. The first such people were German-Swiss immigrants who, in the mid-1730s, established homesteads west of the Congaree in a township known as Saxe-Gotha. By 1740 another group of whites and blacks out of North Carolina and especially Virginia were doing the same thing in what would become known as "Lower Richland," the region south of the Sumter highway. So, from the beginning, we find divisions that continue to the present day. Richland--a relatively large black population, ties to Virginia and plantation society, for "Lower Richland" would develop into a realm of huge holdings, white columns, magnolias, banjos, all the trappings dear to Margaret Mitchell fans. Lexington--far fewer blacks, small farms, and a world more Piedmont than Low Country. Through the years Richland usually has had about twice as many people as Lexington. In 1980 the totals were 270,000 to 140,000, but Lexington had only 14,000 blacks, Richland, 104,000. Earlier, in 1765, some 12,000 people were living in or near the fall line zone stretching through the Midlands of South Carolina, and another 10,000 could be found farther inland in the Piedmont. A decade later (1775), their ranks had increased nearly four-fold to an estimated 83,000, giving South Carolina a greater upland population than any other southern state.

These people, often seeking cheap land safe from incursions by Indians, French, and Spanish, provide the impulse for the Regulator movement, a campaign for local government that achieved limited success on the eve of the American Revolution. The role of the Richland County area in both struggles is far from clear. The Regulators, upwardly mobile landowners yearning for stable social conditions, certainly enjoyed support, although research by Richard Maxwell Brown indicates that the prime centers of Regulator activity were a bit farther inland, in Fairfield and Newberry counties and Camden.

As for the Revolution, divisions and wounds left by the Regulator hassle still were painfully fresh, and Robert Lambert tells us that loyalty to the crown was strong among newcomers, who undoubtedly were numerous in this area, and allegiance to King George certainly was evident among Germans living on the west bank of the Congaree. At least thirty-five men in a regiment commanded by Colonel Thomas Taylor (often called the father of Columbia) went over to the British during that struggle. Wade Hampton I, apparently thinking war had ended with the fall of Charleston in May 1780, made his peace with the British. However, within six months he was actively backing the rebel cause once more.

In the short run, the most important result of this war on the local scene was growth of a small commercial center on the west bank of the Congaree near Friday's Ferry, a community merchant Joseph Kershaw christened Granby in 1774 to honor the Marquis of Granby, an advocate of colonial rights. (Six years earlier, for the same reason, Pine Tree Hill became Camden, to pay homage to Charles Pratt, Lord Camden.) However, in the mid-1770s Kershaw got into financial difficulty, and young Wade Hampton acquired his Granby store, thus beginning his rise to prominence. Then, when the British overran the

state in 1780, FORT Granby became a center of some importance and for a time, as noted, Hampton cooperated with them. That fort, as well as a small redoubt at the eastern end of Friday's Ferry were the scene of the only organized warfare in this region. Eventually, after a siege of several weeks, the British surrendered that fort to Virginian Henry Lee, father of Robert E., in May 1781. Henry Lee, having no ties to the area, permitted the defenders to depart with considerable property seized from local farms, so enraging Thomas Sumter that he threatened to resign his command.

Thus, development of Granby had significance, as did the rise of Wade Hampton. Ronald Bridwell, in his massive Ph.D. study, notes with awe that this man apparently owned no land in 1778. A decade later, at age 32, he was a wealthy planter with several hundred slaves and various commercial ventures, and by 1805 was enjoying an annual income of \$50,000. Admittedly he was a free-booter and war profiteer who grabbed everything not nailed down and also, in 1783, he made a fortuitous marriage to a wealthy Lower Richland widow who passed away the following year, leaving him both land and slaves. This development has significance, too, for it focused Hampton's attention for the first time on the Richland side of the river, not Lexington. He quickly teamed up with Thomas Taylor and others to take full advantage of the most important result of the war on the local scene (other than independence, of course): creation of a new state capital.

The reasons for the move inland from Charleston--the first instance in modern times of a functioning bureaucracy moving to a wilderness setting--are obvious: A government closer to the people it serves, a community free of colonial associations, and a more "centrifical" place, a theme often stressed by Thomas Jefferson and his cronies. All colonial capitals except Boston, I might add, have relocated, either westward or inland.

As debate began in March 1786, there was little question that the capital would leave Charleston, yet were it would go was uncertain. However, once the "centrifical" concept won acceptance, prime contenders were Camden, the junction of the Congaree and Wateree (the southeast corner of Richland County), and Friday's Ferry near present-day Columbia. Thomas Sumter spoke up for his lands near the High Hills of the Santee, but the tale of Stateburg losing out to Columbia by a single vote apparently is false; it was not even mentioned. Shrewd Wade Hampton, representing Saxe-Gotha, never spoke for his interests; he did not have to. He had three brothers serving with him in the General Assembly, and Thomas Taylor's brother James also was there. Thus the Hamptons and Taylors could count at least five votes, plus those of most Up Country legislators.

Senator John Lewis Gervais of Ninety-Six sponsored the bill that led to creation of a town two miles square with broad streets, one of them appropriately named in his honor. Five commissioners were named to purchase that land at roughly \$4 an acre from ten property owners, among them Thomas Taylor and Wade and Richard Hampton. Taylor and Richard Hampton also were members of the purchasing commission, a cosy arrangement indeed, and perhaps a precursor of legislative practice in the decades to follow. However, it appears that, although the ten landowners suffered no loss, this was no windfall. Instead, profits were enjoyed by those who subsequently purchased choice town lots or, like the



## South Carolina Historical Association

Hamptons and Taylors, owned property on the outskirts of this new town that increased greatly in value.

The General Assembly first convened here in January 1790--a brief session, only seventeen days, and probably a rather uncomfortable time for all concerned. Poems for and against Columbia appeared in Charleston papers, the best-known being those written by Philip Freneau. Freneau was then a sea captain, who tarried in Charleston from time to time to visit his brother, secretary of state, a man adamantly opposed to the move inland, thus the poems. Freneau portrays Columbia as a sad, disheartening town with no music, sermons, balls, or oyster pies, a place where owls screech and bears break into stores. His final blast in the *Daily Advertiser* (February 5, 1790) describes the trials of a local resident during the legislative session:

Open the door, forsooth--the man is mad.  
Lodging is not so easy to be had;  
It is an article we do not trade in,  
Nor shall my bed by all the world be laid in,  
Our very garret is as full as can be,  
Push off, I say, and try your luck at *Granby*!

I must say, after dealing in generalities such as "the area that . . ." or "near the site of . . ." it is a distinct relief to have definite boundaries as well as census figures. Both county and town (Columbia became a city in 1854) have grown through the years, though rarely in spectacular fashion. Each on one occasion has registered a decline . . . the county in the 1850s, the city in the 1970s. (County figures, of course, are over-all totals and include city folk as well.) In 1850 the county had 30,243 residents; in 1860, 18,307. Its county seat, however, grew from 6,000 to 8,000 and, during the war that followed, was home to 15,000 or more, many of them government workers and refugees from the Low Country.

Several factors help to explain this decline of the 1850s: a troubled agricultural economy resulting in the sale of slaves, for the county's black population dropped from 13,000 to 11,000, and the completion of rail tracks to Charlotte in 1852 and to Greenville the following year. Thus Columbia no longer was "Dodge City," the head of the line, the spot where cattle drives ended and cotton was brought to be shipped. Just as many marketing and distributing functions moved from Charleston to Columbia when the first train pulled into the depot at Gervais and Gadsden streets in June 1842, some of those involved in such operations now went further inland. Looking ahead, the cruelest blow to the local economy was, however, completion of still other rail lines in the 1870s stretching through the Piedmont from Charlotte to Spartanburg, Greenville, Anderson, and Atlanta, tracks that created scores of mill towns and made Columbia determined to duplicate this success. The drop in Columbia's population in the 1970s--down from 113,000 to 101,000--was the result of integration and white flight to the suburbs.

By 1940 the county had 105,000 residents, a figure that doubled by 1960 and stood at 270,000 in 1980. On at least two occasions municipal efforts to inflate census totals

backfired. In 1930 city fathers mounted a successful drive to break the 50,000 mark, only to discover that, by state law, the salaries of mayor and council members automatically doubled, adding \$10,500 to the annual budget. Thirty years later the city set its sights on 100,000; it was a move that triggered incorporation (at least on paper) of six suburban neighborhoods, blunting that drive.

Although final figures for 1990 have not been released, in round numbers the county now has about 290,000 residents, with about 100,000 of them living within the city of Columbia. Together with Lexington's 170,000, this creates a metropolitan complex of 460,000 or more. In 1980, by the way, Lexington was home to twenty-eight Eskimos, twice the number found in Richland County. The upcoming census data no doubt will be equally informative.

How have these people been making a living through the years? Agriculture once was all-important, at least until World War II, when most roads leading into Columbia still had watering troughs for animals hauling wagons loaded with cotton. Now fewer than a thousand Richland residents are involved with farming, slightly more in Lexington. From earliest days local farms have produced corn, wheat, cattle, and hogs, largely for regional consumption. The principal money crops, in succession, were indigo (messy, yes, but the output of an acre could be put in an eighty-pound cask for shipment to the coast and there was a bounty in colonial times), then from 1770 to 1800, thanks to the Virginia influence, tobacco flourished, until overwhelmed by cotton, which reigned supreme into the first decades of this century.

With the creation of Columbia, a small merchant class developed, together with lawyers, a few doctors, teachers, and professors at South Carolina College, which opened in 1805. The presence of that institution led to preparatory schools, a Presbyterian seminary (perhaps to counter the influence of one Thomas Cooper), and still other institutions, such as Columbia College. This intellectual elite gave the little community a cultural milieu that visitors found charming. Historian Jared Sparks, who in the spring of 1826 toured the South hunting for Revolutionary War records, after dinner with Cooper, David McCord, William C. Preston, and other luminaries, wrote in his diary: "Since leaving Boston I have not found a more intelligent, literary & hospitable society. The college doubtless has an influence on the literary air of the place." Others in succeeding years praised Columbia's gardens, broad avenues, and elegant homes.

I should point out in passing that Columbia, though born to be seat of state government, was not the original center of county affairs. Instead, in the 1790s, adhering to centrality, that honor went to Horrell Hill, a site about ten miles east of Columbia on the way to Sumter. A courthouse was erected, but lawyers preferred Columbia, and within a few years the building became a school. County authorities built another courthouse in the center of town, a structure that was laid low by an earthquake in December 1811 and eventually was torn down and replaced by a third. The earthquake was a result of the famed New Madrid, Missouri, tremor.

In addition to a small professional class and other trappings of urban life, Columbia also developed a core of construction personnel, men who erected public buildings, the



## South Carolina Historical Association

college, asylum, private homes, the canal along the Congaree, and various railroads. In the late 1850s, for example, 375 to 500 men, 60% of them black, were working on the new capitol building; this means that about one out of every five or six adult males living in Columbia was involved with that project. By contrast, manufacturing was much less important in pre-Civil War Columbia and limited largely to necessities such as wagons and agricultural implements. Daily life had a certain rhythm; busy and active in winter when both legislators and students were here, and quiet and slow in summer when the mercury soared and well-to-do residents fled to the hills of North Carolina.

Three general themes are evident 1800 to 1860: growth of religion and temperance (so closely allied they equal a single item), organization, and "southernness." Church-centered activity, though not as pervasive as in the Up Country, became more apparent as years passed. Yet a gap exists between the ideal picture sketched by church histories and official records. By the late 1830s Columbia's Baptists (the most numerous faith) had 300 members, one-fourth white, three-fourths black. At the same time, Trinity Cathedral (Episcopal) could count 120 members, over half of them non-communicants. Most churches, it appears, were plagued by a lack of consistent leadership, with ministers and preachers coming and going with great frequency.

Nevertheless, temperance and religious fervor certainly influenced social life. Benjamin Rawls, who published a brief memoir in 1861, says, when he first came to Columbia in 1802, that any purchase at a Main Street store began with a drink supplied by the owner. Until the 1830s celebrations marking Washington's Birthday and the Fourth of July featured scores of toasts. After that time, the Sons of Temperance took over those holidays and strong drink disappeared. However, militia musters and political rallies continued to exude an odor of whiskey and peach brandy as before. Rawls also comments upon the career of Thomas Henry Egan, a young lawyer from the North, admitted to the South Carolina bar in 1800. Rawls writes that for some years Egan lived in Columbia with another man's wife and hence was known as the "Maryland stud." He notes that they finally got married "when the religious sentiment got in the ascendant."

By organizational aspects of daily life I mean not only religion, but clubs and societies, fire companies, traveling road shows, circuses (organized entertainment), and things of the sort. As for the emphasis upon southernness, I don't think that requires comment, but I will give two examples. In November of 1856, at the first state fair held in Columbia, Benjamin F. Perry, in a speech Henry Grady could have written, chastised South Carolina for its dependence upon cotton and failure to grow foodstuffs, and foster manufacturing and industry. Yet before he sat down, Perry managed to balance this criticism with a stern defense of slavery. Four years later, in the spring of 1860, a Yale undergraduate visiting Columbia came face-to-face with an amazing vision of "southernness." Scores of South Carolina students had vowed to wear only fabrics made in this state. But the supply of shoddy blue cloth turned out by the Saluda Mill in Lexington County soon was exhausted, forcing them to dress in cheap and gaudy calicos. Some, he writes, were garbed in yellow and blue, others in red patterned goods, and still others in gigantic vines and flowers. Startling indeed!

The story of the war that followed we all know well, perhaps too well. Columbia's role, except for a hectic weekend early in 1865, was limited largely to homefront activity, supplying men and material needed for combat. During the next eight decades, down to the close of another war in 1945, this community played "catch-up," if not with the nation, certainly with the Piedmont. At first the answer seemed to be rail lines and cotton mills, and by the turn of the century this city had a goodly share of both. Mills finally found a use for the old canal, converting it to hydroelectric power. But with mills came mill people, whose ranks swelled to 10,000, individuals "old" Columbia viewed as shiftless, ignorant red-necks who spurned both soap and school, people who talked of unions and, worse still, voted for Jim Tillman and Colie Blease. So, in 1910 the city inaugurated commission government: a mayor and four councilmen elected at large, replacing aldermen chosen by wards, thus diluting the mill vote.

The decades that followed--World War I, the twenties, and the Great Depression--were not times for innovation, but a brief encampment here during the Spanish-American War (Camp Fornance) lit the spark that led to Camp Jackson during world War I and Fort Jackson during World War II and after, land which since the 1960s has been within the city limits. Today that training base is home to 15,000 servicemen and women, employs 3800 civilians, and pumps \$400 million into the local economy each year.

The Depression--and I would like to pay tribute to Paul Lofton's fine dissertation on Columbia during those years--shook the faith many Americans had in industry as an economic cure-all, for they saw scores of industrial centers in chaos. They began to favor a diversified approach, not all eggs in one basket. Since 1945, aided by its geographical position and growth of state and federal programs, as well as public education at every level, Columbia has prospered greatly, enabling the community to shift rather easily from dependence upon farms and mills to distribution of goods, services of all kinds, and federal-state payrolls.

According to the 1980 census, in this metropolitan complex (Richland and Lexington counties), there were 10,000 federal workers [this does not include service personnel], 30,000 state employees, and 12,000 individuals working for local governments, a total of 52,000, compared with about 125,000 in the private sector. In the latter category, retail trade, health services, and manufacturing loom large.

Although some of these elements have been present from Columbia's earliest days--government employment and retail trade, for example--this city does seem to possess what I like to call a "double N" factor: it is neither this nor that. Almost from the outset it was home to a college, but through accidents of history it is not a college town, say like Chapel Hill or Athens. It built cotton mills and acquired a huge military base, but never became either a mill town or a "soldier" town like Fayetteville, except perhaps in wartime. Scores have dreamed of the Congaree's potential, but Columbia failed to become a river port--if anything, thanks to Lake Murray, it is now a *lake* city. It has much for a tourist to see and do, but clearly is not a prime tourist center. You may interpret this diversity as weakness or strength, depending upon your point of view.



## South Carolina Historical Association

So far, these reflections have been largely generalities, trends, and statistics. For balance I would like to introduce a handful of personalities, specifically individuals who have helped to shape present-day Columbia. I offer first two men prominent on the local scene from 1900 to 1925: banker-industrialist Edwin Robertson and black evangelist Richard Carroll. It is difficult to imagine a greater contrast. Robertson--Yale-educated, son of a Reconstruction senator, the man who built Columbia's first skyscraper (the Barringer Building, for a time the tallest structure in the Carolinas), the father of Camp Jackson, the man who consolidated utility interests that made possible Lake Murray, and built for himself atop Arsenal Hill where the VA Building now stands one of the grandest homes ever seen in this town, with six bathrooms in 1900, when only a few had one!

Carroll--born a slave in Barnwell County in 1860, son of a part-Indian mother and an unknown white father, and soon an orphan. He worked his way through Benedict and Shaw, became a Baptist Sunday School worker and a Spanish-American War chaplain, returning to Columbia in 1899 to establish an orphanage (aided by Andrew Carnegie) and, in time, was recognized as this state's "Booker T. Washington." In 1905 Carroll launched the first of his annual racial conferences where he brought together white and black leaders (including Washington himself), governors, mayors, bankers, and educators. His message, one whites liked, was simple, direct, non-political. He told whites they had the power and would rule, so be just. Pay better wages, provide better housing, treat blacks fairly, educate them. Blacks, whom he characterized as followers by nature, not leaders, were cautioned to give good service, be honest, obey the law. Carroll who had the ear of the Gonzales family and in his last years was supported by them, had no trouble getting publicity in the *State*, but, as you might suspect, he was more popular with whites than blacks, some of whom called him "the white man's pimp."

It is easy to criticize Carroll today, but in the first two decades of this century his practical approach made good sense and, I suspect, produced long-term results. His health failed in the early 1920s and he faded from view, dying in 1929, hailed by the State as a man of clear vision: "His were the ways of peace and constant endeavor . . . these are the ways that succeed." W. E. B. DuBois wrote in *Crisis* that Carroll was the type of conservative southern whites liked, yet conceded that "he was not without ideals for his race and a hard worker." What Carroll did was to establish informal ties between white and black leaders of this community--lawyers, bankers, politicians, Benedict and Allen faculty--that, it would appear, continued in decades that followed. For whatever reasons, Columbia rode out the racial storm after World War I, the Klan troubles of the 1920s, and even the integration crisis of the 1960s with relative ease, far better than many towns and cities.

Of course, I am verging into the realm of "shadow" history, and no man was more at home in that realm than Lester Bates, a self-made insurance wizard who rose from abject poverty in Hell Hole Swamp to become a city councilman in World War II and mayor from 1958 to 1970. A man of charm and humor who wanted desperately to be governor, in the 1930s Bates gained regional fame (and customers) with short speeches, jokes, gospel songs, and renditions by the "Hired Hands," a musical group featured on Station WIS. As he quipped, "Anyone can get you a speaker, but where can you get one with a quartet?"



Elected mayor by fourteen votes in 1958, he subsequently referred to himself as "Landslide Lester." Always ready to greet conventions and promote Columbia, he usually began with these words: "It is a *financial* pleasure to have you with us!" But Lester's greatest feat was peaceful transformation to integrated schools, lunch counters, and public facilities. How did he do it? Apparently through arm-twisting, cajoling, and the interaction of both formal and informal groups.

Two other individuals, both women, deserve mention. In 1901 Aiken native Matilda Evans, a graduate of Oberlin and Pennsylvania's Women's Medical College, founded Taylor Lane Hospital, a twenty-five-bed facility that also trained nurses. This city's only female physician and black, Dr. Evans built up a practice among white women that, in effect, subsidized black charity patients. She also, by contract, cared for black railroad workers and ran a truck garden and poultry farm that supplied food for her hospital. After that structure burned in 1914, she created local clinics that, in time, won financial backing of city and state governments and built a recreational center for black (Lindenwood Park) on the outskirts of the city. Although this little empire collapsed soon after her sudden death in 1935, here are the outlines of what the New Deal and subsequent federal programs would advocate.

Inspired by Dr. Evans, in the 1930s former teacher Modjeska Simkins spearheaded state-wide efforts to stem tuberculosis and other diseases threatening blacks and after 1940 moved on to the civil rights battle. As such, she became both a gadfly and a semi-ally of Lester Bates; while criticizing the mayor, she nudged him along, providing him with ammunition against those reluctant to embrace change. See what may happen, he could say, if we fail to act.

Naturally, one comes to the end of a study such as this with questions not answered. How did Bates do what he did in the 1960s? We know the broad outlines, but not the details. How did Wade Hampton I get so rich so fast? Did Thomas Taylor really say they ruined a fine plantation to make a damned poor town? How did slaves, such as the Wallace boys (a fascinating tale), escape to the North in the 1850s? And were some slaves in those same years passing for free, with the connivance of their owners? It appears they were. Why was a Union officer, a prisoner of war under guard, selling sugar to blacks in the city market one day in the fall of 1864? (A local editor asked for and got an answer from the captain of the guard detail, but it is so convoluted that I can not understand it.) Who issued a death threat to Colonel A. R. Taylor as he was trying to organize a home defense force in January 1865, adding for good measure, that if he didn't desist, his house would be burned down! And, question of question, General Sherman, did you or didn't you? Did you really orchestrate the burning of our fair city?

But, no matter how many details of Columbia's past I present, I realize that most of you, especially if you hail from Charleston or Greenville, will drive along I-26 later today firmly convinced of one fact: state capital it may be, but that city sure gets more than its rightful share of state and federal dollars!

# The Role of the Germanic Males in the Early Middle Ages

Kathy Pearson  
Emory University

---

In the ongoing exploration of the early medieval family, one central player within that family--the male head of the household--has been largely overlooked. The influence of the Christian Church and the early medieval state brought considerable changes in the traditional functions and rights of senior men within the Germanic households.

Exploration of pre-Christian Germanic social history is hampered by a lack of written primary sources. Only Caesar and Tacitus offer any real information on social customs. Between Tacitus and the early Christian writers of the fifth century, there are virtually no sources for social history. By the fifth century, Christian teachings were already reshaping families and households along medieval lines. Nevertheless, much of the earlier tradition survived well into the eighth and ninth centuries, preserved in the barbarian law codes and in property deeds recording transfers of land to the Church. In recent decades, archeology has revealed additional information about family settlement and religious practices among the Germans.

Among the early Barbarian peoples, the Bavarians offer one of the best opportunities to observe the shift from the Germanic customs governing the family to those typical of early medieval Christian states. The Bavarians were not truly converted to Christianity until the late seventh and early eighth centuries. The *Bavarian Code* ( in its surviving form ) was not compiled until 744-748. In addition to the *Bavarian Code*, other valuable evidence exists within approximately 1500 property deeds recording eighth and ninth century donations to the various dioceses and cloisters of Bavaria. Recent archeological discoveries supplement the written records and provide information not only on family settlement but on family religion as well. Bavaria's late conversion and ample supply of written and archeological evidence thus provides an excellent opportunity to observe a society in transition from Germanic tribe to early medieval state.

Early Bavarian society in the fourth through the seventh centuries was characterised by the existence of all-important extended kin groups, or *Sippen*, within which existed



smaller household units centered around a male patriarch or head of the household. The traditional functions of the *Sippen* were vested in the hands of these senior males of the kindred. In many ways, the Germanic head of the household occupied a position similar to that of the Roman *paterfamilias*, although the Germanic man's authority in matters of life and death was not as great as that of his Roman counterpart.<sup>1</sup> The head of the household held the *mundiburdium*, or legal authority, over his dependents within his household. The *mundiburdium* entitled him to arrange marriages for his children, represent the members of the household in legal actions, oversee the family property, and preside at the family's private religious rites.<sup>2</sup> The *Sippe's* importance as the primary structuring element of society began to diminish with the emergence of the Germanic kingdoms and the conversion of the various peoples to orthodox Christianity. As the function of the *Sippe* was eroded, so too was the authority of its male heads of households.

Barbarian contact with more sophisticated Roman forms of government during the chaotic invasion era of the third through the sixth centuries resulted in the development of both monarchy and the concept of the state as a people governed by a king.<sup>3</sup> Continued pressure by Roman civilization upon nascent peoples produced other responses as well, such as the production of written law. The law codes were loosely constructed along the lines of Roman models and adapted to fit the needs of individual peoples.

Germanic groups settling in the Roman Empire soon found their traditional legal practices inadequate to deal with the complications arising from settlement on land that was often already occupied by a surviving Roman population. Laws appropriate to a migratory population did not cover issues such as property disputes that emerged once a particular people became sedentary. The barbarian codes were an attempt to preserve old law that was still applicable while creating new law to cover problems arising out of settlement or conversion to a new religion. The Codes routinely noted that legal authority over the people rested in the hands of a king who created a written law that supplanted the old oral tradition.<sup>4</sup>

Both the establishment of a state under the authority of the king and the creation of written law struck a blow against traditional legal authority. Law in the pre-settlement era was a matter of oral transmission. The heads of households took action to redress wrongs committed against their dependents either through amicable settlement or blood feuds.<sup>5</sup> The proper course of action was determined by consultation with senior males within the kindred who were the individuals most likely to remember earlier precedent. Written law eliminated the need for the cultural memory of the older men of the community. The king, aided by

<sup>1</sup>David Herlihy, *Medieval Households* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 44-48.

<sup>2</sup>Herlihy, 48-49; Tacitus, *Germania*, chap. 10; Katherine Fischer Drew, *The Lombard Laws* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1973), 6-7.

<sup>3</sup>Thomas Burns, *A History of the Ostrogoths* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 18-23, provides a brief analysis of factors involved in the emergence of distinct barbarian peoples.

<sup>4</sup>See Drew, *The Lombard Laws*, preface to Rothair's *Edict*; Drew, *The Burgundian Code* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1949), preface to the *Law of Gundobad*; and Theodore John Rivers, *Laws of the Alemans and Bavarians* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1977), prologue of the *Bavarian Code*, for good examples.

<sup>5</sup>Drew, *The Lombard Laws*, 6-8; Rivers, *Laws*, 16-18.

his royal officials, took on the task of enforcing the written laws of his people and thereby usurped the authority of the heads of households in legal proceedings.<sup>6</sup> Punishment of legal offenses no longer rested entirely in the hands of the heads of households and their male kin. The shift from customary law to written law, expressly stated in the preface of the *Bavarian Code*, eliminated not only the ultimate authority of family heads in legal matters, but also subordinated them to the abstract power of the state personified by a king and his appointed officials.<sup>7</sup>

The adoption of Christianity by the Bavarians was likewise to make substantial alterations in traditional male authority. The conversion of most of Bavaria did not take place until the late seventh and early eighth centuries.<sup>8</sup> Pre-Christian Germanic religion remains shadowy. Some evidence does remain of the veneration of ancestors and the central authority of the head of the household in the family rites. Tacitus noted in the *Germania* that the senior male conducted the religious rituals practiced within his household.<sup>9</sup> Some family rites evidently centered around the veneration of ancestors. The senior male's role in conducting family religion is one familiar to us from the Romans. In both the Roman and the Germanic households, the oldest male served as the closest connection, by virtue of his age, to the venerated ancestral dead. The father of the household thus held the task of serving as the house-priest for family cultic observance.<sup>10</sup>

The archeological evidence for Bavaria reveals that the ancestral dead occupied an important place in the family consciousness. A number of early settlements in Bavaria emerged in close proximity to an earlier burial of a warrior (defined by his grave goods) suggesting that the settlement developed around the burial of an important male member of the kindred in the pre-Christian centuries.<sup>11</sup> The transition from the veneration of ancestors to the veneration of Christ and the Saints is most visible at the Western Bavarian settlement of Epolding-Mühlthal, which lay along the Isar river seven miles southwest of modern Munich. The village formed part of the hereditary property of the wealthy west Bavarian nobleman Waltrich. In 763 he founded a cloister at the nearby settlement of Schäftlarn and transferred control of Epolding-Mühlthal to the monastic community.<sup>12</sup> Part of the gift included a proprietary church or chapel built by Waltrich's forebearers.<sup>13</sup> The church that occupied the site in 763 was not the first. Recent excavations reveal that two earlier churches lay beneath the mid-eighth century structure, the earliest dating possibly to the late Roman era but certainly before the end of the seventh century. Beneath the

<sup>6</sup>Drew, *The Burgundian Code*, preface, 1-14.

<sup>7</sup>Rivers, *Laws*, prologue to the *Bavarian Code*.

<sup>8</sup>Friedrich Prinz, *Frühes Mönchtum im Frankenreich. Kultur und Gesellschaft in Gallien, den Rheinlanden und Bayern am Beispiel der monastischen Entwicklung (4. bis 8. Jahrhundert)* (Vienna: Oldenbourg, 1965), 345-360.

<sup>9</sup>Tacitus, *Germania*, chap. 10.

<sup>10</sup>H.H. Scullard, *A History of the Roman World 753 to 146 BC*, 4th ed. (London: Methuen, 1980), 392-393; and Jan de Vries, *Altgermanische Religionsgeschichte*, vol. 1, *Einleitung. Die Vorgeschichtliche Zeit. Religion der Südgermanen* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1935), 274-276, 307-314.

<sup>11</sup>Wilhelm Störmer, "Adelsgräber im frühmittelalterlichen Bayern und Ostfranken," *Zeitschrift für bayerische Landesgeschichte* 32 (1969) 748-766.

<sup>12</sup>Alois Weissthanner, ed., *Die Traditionen des Klosters Schäftlarn* (Munich: Beck, 1953), document 1.

<sup>13</sup>Weissthanner, *Schäftlarn* document 1.



earliest and smallest church was the grave of a nobleman who was approximately fifty years old at his death. This particular grave possessed a special significance for the inhabitants of the village. Other ancestral members of Waltrich's extended family were buried in a series of cemeteries together with their dependent tenants. Only the warrior was buried alone.<sup>14</sup> At Epolding-Mühlthal, the evidence indicates that the ancestral veneration of one of Waltrich's forebearers was replaced at some point no later than the end of seventh century with a chapel dedicated to the veneration of Christ. Waltrich himself no longer practiced the ancestral cult but rather dedicated himself to the Christian community that he founded at Schäftlarn.

The Church generally took a hostile view of the association of ancestral burial sites with the veneration of Christ and the Saints. The establishment of Churches over ancestral graves did not eradicate the presence of the burial itself, although in time the memory of ancestral veneration might be dimmed. The burial of noble laymen beneath a new church or within the confines of an already existing church created a potential rivalry between the veneration of ancestors and the veneration of Christ and the Saints. Merovingian and Carolingian synods alike forbade the burial of lay nobility inside the confines of existing churches.<sup>15</sup> The ancestral cult, presided over by the senior male of the family, was replaced with the cults of Christ, at whose rites a priest officiated. The senior male's proximity to the venerated dead was lost and with it authority in matters of family religion. The dead were removed from the sacred confines of the church and placed in a cemetery, well away from the intimate space devoted to the Christian mysteries.

The shift from the ancestral rites to Christian rites was not the only attack made on the religious prerogatives of the head of the household. During the eighth and ninth centuries, the Church gradually assumed control over religious foundations which lay on private property under the authority of the landowners. In Bavaria, the diocese of Freising alone was home to no less than 140 such family chapels in the eighth and ninth centuries.<sup>16</sup> These chapels were normally built in the enclosed courtyard of the family estate.<sup>17</sup> Here the Christian faith was practiced in accordance with the wishes of the head of the household. The enclosed courtyard held a special significance in early medieval society. It was the dwelling place for the family and its servants, the place of refuge for all persons on the estate, the administrative center of the property, and the center for family religious rites. Within this enclosed space, the authority of the head of the household reigned.

The Church feared that the exercise of private religious observances under the control of the family head might lead away from orthodox practice into heresy. Accordingly the bishops sought a means of terminating the head of the household's authority over the private family chapel. Before the chapel could officially function as a holy place, it had to

<sup>14</sup>Hermann Dannheimer, *Auf den Spuren der Bajuwaren. Archäologie des frühen Mittelalters in Altbayern* (Pfaffenhofen: W. Ludwig, 1987), 151-159.

<sup>15</sup>Störmer, "Adelige Eigenkirchen und Adelsgräber—denkmalpflegerische Aufgaben," *Zeitschrift für bayerische Landesgeschichte* 38 (1976), 1148.

<sup>16</sup>Störmer, "Adelige Eigenkirchen," 1145, 1151-1158.

<sup>17</sup>Störmer, "Adelige Eigenkirchen," 1145.



## South Carolina Historical Association

be consecrated by the bishop of the diocese. The act of consecration gave the bishop a certain amount of leverage in his efforts to acquire spiritual authority over the private church. The conflict between the nobleman Gunther and Bishop Virgil of Salzburg in the mid-eighth century serves as a typical case of successful coercion of a layman into surrendering his rights over private property. Gunther built a private cloister for monks on his estate in Otting with the intention of retaining control of both the property and its community of monks. When construction was finished, Gunther summoned Virgil to consecrate the cloister and install the relics. Virgil raised the question of authority over the assembled monks. When Gunther rejected Virgil's claims to religious authority over the community, Bishop Virgil then refused to consecrate the cloister until Gunther surrendered his legal rights over the foundation into the hands of the Bishops of Salzburg. Gunther lost authority over the property and over the assembled clergy of his private foundation.<sup>18</sup> His traditional authority over religious practice within his holdings was usurped by the higher authority of the local episcopate.

It was a pattern repeated over and over again as chapels were alienated from the property of the household and transferred into the hands of an outside presence--the Church. The head of the household henceforth had a rival for his authority within the intimate space of the enclosure. The head of the household thus suffered a dual blow: he lost his control of family religious practices as well as control of property lying at the heart of the estate.

The concerted efforts of church and state were to impose further changes in other legal rights of the head of the household. Among these were alterations in the ownership and transfer of property by members of the household. In early Bavaria the communal use of land, and in some cases communal ownership of land, was frequently maintained within the family.<sup>19</sup> Land rarely left family hands except through the creation of dowries for marriagable members of the family. Land lost through the provision of dowries was likely to be acquired through the reverse of the process, so that the holdings of most landowning families remained relatively stable until the eighth century. Control over family property rested in the hands of the senior male of the household.<sup>20</sup> It was his task to protect that property in court, and his consent and that of other close kin was normally necessary before any transaction involving inherited land could take place.<sup>21</sup> In this fashion holdings were partially protected from the difficulties created by partible inheritance that recognized rights of all heirs in a family upon the death of their father.<sup>22</sup>

Christianity introduced a new dependent class of clergy in whose hands rested the task of insuring the salvation of the community through their prayers. A natural desire to provide sustenance for the clergy led to numerous gifts of property to the local monastery or diocese. The large-scale transfer of land to an entity outside the kindred was alien to

<sup>18</sup>Willibald Hauenthaler, *Salzburger Urkundenbuch*, vol. 1 (Vienna, 1910), *Breves Notitiae*, chap. XIII.

<sup>19</sup>Rivers, *Laws*, 29; Drew, *The Lombard Laws*, 7.

<sup>20</sup>Rivers, *Laws*, 29; Drew, *The Lombard Laws*, 7.

<sup>21</sup>Phillipe Dollinger, *Der bayerische Bauernstand vom 9. bis zum 13. Jahrhundert*, trans. Franz Irsigler (Munich: Beck, 1982), 96-98.

<sup>22</sup>Rivers, *Laws*, the *Bavarian Code*, XV, 7-10.

traditional patterns of land ownership. The *Bavarian Code* therefore made detailed provision for the right of free Bavarians to dispose of family land by transferring it to the Church. All free persons could transfer their remaining property to the Church once they had honored the claims of their children, and no one had the right to prevent such a transfer of property, not even the Duke of Bavaria himself.<sup>23</sup> The introduction of the "spiritual heir" had two effects: it greatly curtailed earlier rights of the extended kin to family property, and it created enormous tension between the heads of households and their heirs over fair sharing of the patrimony.<sup>24</sup> After 744-748 there was no legal recourse to prevent the head of the household from bestowing one-third of his entire estate upon the Church after dividing the other two-thirds among his children. They in turn could make the same provisions from their diminished patrimony. This was to become the typical pattern of donation and inheritance for several generations of Bavarian landowners. The transfer of enormous amounts of land to the church greatly reduced a family's property. Bitter disputes eventually arose among the heads of households, their heirs, and the Church over the disposal of an ever-shrinking patrimony. A series of disputes between the diocese of Freising and members of the powerful Huosi family in the early ninth century involved the attempted recovery of properties earlier given to the diocese.<sup>25</sup> The family encountered enormous difficulties. The Church lay entirely outside the *mundiburdium* or authority of the head of the household. The family was unable to prevail in law, as its claims against the diocese were heard in ecclesiastical courts. With the introduction of the Church as a legal heir, the communal use or ownership of land was no longer practical, and the authority exercised by the head of the household over the disposal of family property was at an end. Partitioning of the patrimony into individual shares before the death of the head of the household became the accepted means of ownership, with a substantial portion of each generation's patrimony passing into the hands of the Church.<sup>26</sup>

Another function removed from the control of the head of the household was the right to determine the composition of his kindred. The heads of households in pre-Christian society had absolute control over sexual relationships within the household, the marriages of dependents, and the determination of heirs among their children.<sup>27</sup> These rights were surrendered with only the greatest reluctance even after the acceptance of the Christian faith. Control over the composition of the household and kindred was of paramount importance in insuring the continuity of a family. Synodal and conciliar acts prohibited acts of incest, bigamy, divorce, concubinage and marriage between partners of unequal social status.<sup>28</sup> Such clerical fulminations frequently fell on deaf ears. In the mid-sixth century,

<sup>23</sup>Rivers, *Laws, the Bavarian Code*, I, 1.

<sup>24</sup>Rivers, *Laws, the Bavarian Code*, XV, 10.

<sup>25</sup>Theodor Bitterauf, *Die Traditionen des Hochstifts Freising*, vol. 4 of *Quellen und Erörterungen zur bayerischen Geschichte*, new series (Aalen: Scientia, 1967 reprint of 1905 ed.), documents 19, 184-187.

<sup>26</sup>Rivers, *Laws, the Bavarian Code*, I, 1.

<sup>27</sup>Paul Veyne, ed. *A History of Private Life*, vol. 1, *From Pagan Rome to Byzantium*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), 464-479.

<sup>28</sup>Jo Ann McNamara and Suzanne Fonay Wemple, "Marriage and Divorce in the Frankish Kingdom," in Susan Mosher Stuard, ed., *Women in Medieval Society* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1974), 101-103.



Chlothar I of the Franks managed to commit virtually every sexual offense forbidden by earlier councils. His final marriage was to the Lombard princess Walderada, the widow of his nephew Theudebald. This blatant act of affine incest brought bitter protests from the Frankish bishops. When Chlothar divorced Walderada, Garibald, Duke of Bavaria, promptly made her his wife.<sup>29</sup> Her status as a once-widowed, once-divorced partner in incest did not outweigh her considerable political value for Garibald. Family structures were determined by the heads of households on the basis of necessity or desire.

Two further cases involving the ducal family of Bavaria illustrate that such behavior continued even as Christianity was establishing a firm hold in the Duchy. St. Emmeram of Regensburg suffered martyrdom in the late seventh century after he raised objections to a liaison between Uta, the Duke of Bavaria's daughter, and Sigibold, the son of a Bavarian court justice. Uta, offended by the missionary's harsh words, complained to her brother Lampert. The irate brother, acting as his sister's guardian, then murdered Emmeram.<sup>30</sup>

A slightly later incident around 725 involved Duke Grimoald of Bavaria and St. Corbianian. Grimoald married his brother's widow, committing a form of affine incest strongly prohibited from the fourth century onwards. The marriage served two purposes for Duke Grimoald. It preserved Pilitrud's widow's portion within the patrimony and continued a political link between Pilitrud's noble (possibly royal) Frankish family and the Agilolfingi dukes. Corbianian was appalled by the union, but his protests only resulted in his exile by the furious Duchess.<sup>31</sup>

Efforts by the Church to restrict options to one lifetime union between a man and a woman of unrelated lineages were enforced by the Carolingians from the mid-eighth century onwards. The Carolingian monarchs, anxious to erode the strength of other potential rival noble families, endorsed religious restrictions on the inheritance of bastards, incestuous marriages, divorce, and marriages between free and unfree and incorporated these into Carolingian law.<sup>32</sup> From the early ninth century on, the ability of the head of the household to arrange marriages or other sexual relationships was drastically curtailed by the joint force of clerical and secular law.

The Church's ability to restrict marriage is especially clear in those recorded cases where noblemen sought to marry their concubines or establish their children by a concubine as full legal heirs. The nobleman Tenil and his concubine Meripurc were the parents of a boy whom Tenil wished to make his heir. Tenil's own kin recognized his concubine as his wife despite her unfree status as a servant of the Bishop of Freising. In return for a substantial gift of property, the diocese of Freising surrendered temporary authority over Meripurc and Haguno to Tenil. At his death, the pair lost their temporary freedom and reverted to the status of servants of the diocese.<sup>33</sup> By the end of the ninth century, even the highest nobility in Bavaria could no longer recognize illegitimate children as full heirs. King

<sup>29</sup>Gregory of Tours, *History of the Franks*, trans. Lewis Thorpe (New York: Penguin, 1974), IV, 9.

<sup>30</sup>Arbeo of Freising, *Vita Haimhrammi*, ed. Bruno Krusch, MGH rerum Merov. VI, 6, 1920, chaps. 9, 14, 17-18.

<sup>31</sup>Arbeo of Freising, *Vita Corbiniani*, ed. Bruno Krusch, MGH rer. Merov. VI, 7, 1920, chap. 24.

<sup>32</sup>McNamara and Wemple, "Marriage and Divorce," 101-103.

<sup>33</sup>Bitterauf, Freising documents 450 and 489.

Carlomann of Bavaria was unable to secure the throne of Bavaria for his bastard son Arnulf despite Arnulf's undoubted political and military talents.<sup>34</sup>

By the later ninth century little was left to men of their traditional functions in Germanic society except the life of a warrior. In warfare the Carolingian male found his counterpart to the women's dangers of childbirth. The average life expectancy of men was around 39 to 40 years.<sup>35</sup> Two primary causes of death were battlefield fatalities and the related threat of infected wounds.<sup>36</sup> Few males other than clergymen survived past their fifties. The Carolingian world was one populated by relatively young men whose value lay in their strength and vigour as warriors.

A sober reminder of what life could be like for the older male in a society in which his role had been primarily reduced to his value as a warrior can be seen in a law of the Bavarian code which governed rebellion by the Duke's sons:

If a Duke's son is so proud or foolish, that he wishes to remove his father through evil-minded intention or force and wishes to take his dukedom away from him, while his father is still able to contest in a judgement, lead the army, judge the people, mount a horse manfully, and command his weapons vigorously, is not deaf or blind, and can execute the king's orders in every way; let that son know that he acted contrary to the law and that he is excluded from his father's inheritance, and that nothing of his father's property belongs to him any longer.<sup>37</sup>

A similar provision in Alemannic law specifically permitted the rebellious son to assume his father's office if he were strong enough to rule.<sup>38</sup> In effect, this endorsed rebellion of the young against the old. If the Duke could no longer physically exercise the functions of office his office ceased to protect him. He faced the prospect of ambitious and vigorous rebels set on establishing their rule in his stead. Seniority could bring hostility rather than respect.

In view of the changes occurring in the role of the male heads of households, it is not surprising that many men rejected secular society altogether and turned to the Church for refuge and protection. From the boy who faced dangers at the hands of older brothers who coveted his share of the patrimony to the old warrior in decline, men across the lifespan sought refuge in the Church. The Church further offered the opportunity to regain some measure of authority within the extended spiritual family of the religious community. The role of abbot or bishop offered the ambitious man an ample arena for his talents.

Thus the erosion of the functions of the *Sippe* in favor of the authority of Church and State radically changed the role of the senior male within the household. One by one, virtually every significant function was stripped from the head of the household by the breakdown of traditional Germanic society and the creation of the early medieval states.

<sup>34</sup>Max Spindler, ed. *Handbuch der bayerischen Geschichte*, vol. 1, *Das Alte Bayern. Das Stammesherzogtum* 2nd. ed. (Munich: Beck, 1981), 272.

<sup>35</sup>Wemple, *Women in Frankish Society: Marriage and the Cloister, 500-900* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1981), 199-201.

<sup>36</sup>For a forensic survey of early medieval society, see Alfred Czarnetzki et al., *Menschen des frühen Mittelalters im Spiegel der Anthropologie und Medizin*, exhibit catalogue, Württembergisches Landesmuseums Stuttgart (Tübingen: Gulde, 1983).

<sup>37</sup>Rivers, *Laws, the Bavarian Code*, II, 9.

<sup>38</sup>Rivers, *Laws, the Alemannic Code*, XXXV.



## South Carolina Historical Association

The plight of an elderly man was in some ways worse than that of the older woman, who had at least been trained in valuable domestic skills such as the production of cloth or beer. The elderly layman, whose absolute authority within his family had been superseded by Church and State, whose heirs wanted control of family property, whose strength was no longer adequate to withstand potential enemies--his best recourse was the protection of the Church in a world turned hostile.



# THE HUGUENOT EMIGRATION FROM THE FRENCH PERSPECTIVE

**Bertrand van Ruymbeke**  
**College of Charleston**

---

On February 18, 1562 two small vessels left the harbor of Dieppe, France. On board a handful of Huguenots were ready to admire the much talked about wonders of the New World. Most of them were sailors and soldiers whom the peace of Cateau-Cambrésis, signed between France and Spain three years earlier, had left unemployed. Their leader was a staunch Huguenot explorer named Jean Ribaut. The sponsor of this expedition, whose objective was to explore and not to settle or conquer, was Admiral Coligny. This nobleman was a nationally known Protestant leader who at that time was in high favor with the young king Charles IX. This expedition is the beginning of a fascinating story written in blood and lived in the name of freedom. Freedom to worship, to work, to raise a family--in other words freedom to live. This story has chapters to which we can give titles: French Florida, the siege of La Rochelle, the Heath grant, the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, or the French Santé. It also has its heroes: Jean Ribaut, Admiral Coligny, the Baron de Sencé, Gabriel Manigault, Daniel Huger, and Henry Laurens. This is a story full of surprises such as the promotional pamphlets written in French and only intended to attract French-speaking settlers or the hope of producing salt in the South Carolina Low Country. A story full of excitement and suspense when it deals with the way these Huguenots left France. Finally, this migration became a true trail of tears when we think of how painful it must have been for them to leave behind their beloved relatives and revered homeland. Thus, the Huguenot emigration to South Carolina was more than a mass emigration with its dates and statistics, but a struggle. It was a flight from the land of oppression to the land of liberty. Liberty--the little word that makes such a big difference.

## I. THE ROOTS OF THE EMIGRATION

The term "Huguenot" has for centuries referred to the French Protestants, but the origin of the word is controversial. As always in history when certainties can not be reached, hypotheses are their substitutes. The most common explanation has the word Huguenot derive from *Eidgenossen* which in German means sworn confederates. Initially it referred to the oath sworn by the three Forest cantons of central Switzerland. Later the term was applied to the inhabitants of Geneva, united in their struggle against the Duke of Savoy in the early 1520s. Allegedly *Eidgenossen* first became *eyguenot* and eventually, in the 1550s, took its present form Huguenot. Some historians contest this foreign origin and contend that the term Huguenot was coined to designate those in favor of the descendants of Hugues Capet, i.e., the ruling Valois dynasty as opposed to the Guise family. The Guise supporters were ultra-Catholics and added to the name Hugues the diminutive suffix *not*, that we find for example in the French nickname Jeannot, meaning "little John". Consequently, Huguenot would mean supporter of little Hugues.<sup>1</sup>

Ironically enough in the sixteenth century French Protestants were also called Lutherans, even though their creed was Calvinistic. In the seventeenth century they were referred to as the members of the *Religion Prétendue Réformée* (Self-styled Reformed Religion) as opposed to the *Réligion Catholique Apostolique et Romaine* (Roman Catholic). French Protestants were also named *parpillots*, which is the popular name of a black butterfly in Southern France. Such a nickname was an allusion to the fact that the Protestants of the first generations were always dressed in black as a sign of their religious and moral austerity.

In the early 1560s France was at peace with Spain--at last, one may say--and its colonial policy was in an embryonic stage. It was far behind her southern neighbor who already owned a huge empire on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean. France had a great potential, whether demographic with a population of 16 million people or economic. It was well situated with its numerous Atlantic ports. But it had too few statesmen concerned with overseas expansion. Admiral Coligny was one of them, but did not France need tens of such foresighted leaders? Coligny was a Huguenot, which made him suspect in the eyes of many. Nonetheless, Coligny convinced Charles IX to send an expedition to the coasts of Florida and explore them in the name of France. He was careful to obtain royal sanction even though the leaders and most of the members of that expedition were Huguenots. Coligny knew that some day a major struggle between the French Catholics and the Protestants would occur and that the losers, in this case in all likelihood the outnumbered Protestants, would need a refuge somewhere. Thus for the first time in history North America was perceived as a land of refuge for Protestant minorities. Huguenots paved the way for the Puritans and the Quakers. It was something that Cotton Mather clearly understood when,

<sup>1</sup>Gray, Janet G. "The origin of the word Huguenot," *The Sixteenth Century Journal*, 14 (Fall 1983) pp. 349-59.



a century later, he wrote that to the Huguenots fell the honor of having first regarded America as "the receptacle of the Protestant faith"<sup>2</sup>

On May 20, 1562 Jean Ribaut implanted the arms of France and built a small fort on an island protecting the harbor of Port Royal, the exact location being subject to controversy. The fort was named Charlesfort in honor of the boy king Charles IX. Two months before, while Ribaut was crossing the Atlantic, the Religious Wars had begun in France with the Massacre of Wassy. This slaughter opened the way to almost thirty years of merciless warfare between two religious groups determined to gain control of the throne. More than ever was Coligny convinced of the necessity of settling part of North America for the safety of the Huguenots. Yet Charlesfort soon disappeared and Ribaut found himself imprisoned in the Tower of London accused of trying to deceive Queen Elizabeth.<sup>3</sup> The admiral chose René Goulaine de Laudonnière, another experienced Huguenot sea captain who had been second in command in 1562, to lead a new expedition, which left Le Havre on April 22, 1564. This time the goal was not to explore, but to settle. Laudonnière selected a site for his fort near the mouth of what was then the May river (now the Saint John's river) in Northern Florida. He named it Fort La Caroline, still in honor of Charles IX.

Here begins an interesting controversy about the origin of the name Carolina. Undoubtedly the Carolinas were named after Charles II of England, but it should not be forgotten that the word Caroline was first used in that area by Laudonnière. Thus not surprisingly, in a map of North America drawn by the most famous of Louis XV's cartographers, Guillaume De l'Isle, and currently exhibited in the Museum of the New World in La Rochelle, one can find the legend "Caroline named after Charles IX, king of France." The important thing is not to know who is right and who is wrong but to remember that for centuries French people firmly believed that Carolina had been discovered and named by their compatriots. Despite the reinforcements headed by Ribaut, this attempt at settling Northern Florida failed in a sea of blood, with the Matanza Massacres in the fall of 1565. This failure was due to many reasons among which lie the lack of support from the French court, the monopoly then exerted by Spain over North America and the cruelty with which it was enforced, the mismanagement of the colony, and the lack of foresight of the settlers who relied too much on the Indians' help. To crown it all, Coligny was assassinated on August 22, 1572 and became the first victim of the Saint Bartholomew Massacre.

Nonetheless, Coligny's effort was not in vain. The name Caroline sounded magical to the ears of scores of Huguenots. Laudonnière's and Ribaut's accounts were published, soon followed by others.<sup>4</sup> French Protestants had found a place where they could emigrate, and in paving the way for others they died as martyrs. History and legend merged to maintain Huguenot interest in the land south of Virginia. Here lies probably one of the

<sup>2</sup>Chinard, Gilbert. *Les Réfugiés huguenots en Amérique*, Les Belles Lettres, Paris, 1925: p. 22.

<sup>3</sup>Lowery, Woodbery. "Jean Ribaut and Queen Elizabeth", *The American Historical Review*, April 1904; pp. 456-459.

<sup>4</sup>Ribaut's account was published in 1563, Laudonnière's in 1586, and Le Moyne's in 1591.

most intriguing aspects of our study. The appeal exerted by South Carolina to the Huguenots is deeply rooted in the collective imagination of their community.

## II. *A SIEGE, A GRANT: FROM SANCE TO HEATH*

In 1610 Henri IV was assassinated. The Huguenots lost a protector and France a great king. Under the reign of his son, Louis XIII, three Protestant rebellions occurred: 1620-1622, 1625-1626, and 1627-1629. They affected the southern (Béarn, Languedoc) and Atlantic provinces (Aunis, Saintonge, Poitou). Occasioned by specific events such as the invasion of Béarn by Louis XIII or his marriage to the Spanish infanta, they symbolize a more deeply rooted struggle between an armed minority, jealous of its privileges, and a Catholic and absolute monarchy willing to establish its authority. Those domestic wars ended in 1629, with the treaty called Grâce d'Alès. The very term "Grâce," meaning pardon in French, well shows who was the winner and more importantly who was in the wrong, at least in the eyes of the court. This peace treaty marked the end of French Protestantism as a military and political force. In the following years scores of influential noblemen converted to Catholicism in order to have access to important state positions and be nearer to the king. Others would choose to leave France.

The peak of the last war was the siege of La Rochelle, last Protestant stronghold on the Atlantic coast. La Rochelle had been a Protestant city for years and during the Religious Wars it had already undergone a siege by the royal troops in 1572-1573. But when one refers to the siege of La Rochelle in French history, it is the siege of 1627-1628 that comes to mind. One particularly thinks of the famous painting representing Richelieu as he was inspecting the dyke built around the harbor to prevent any ship from entering or leaving La Rochelle. In the summer of 1627, English troops, headed by the Duke of Buckingham, landed on the Island of Ré, located a few miles off La Rochelle. In the fall a treaty was signed between the inhabitants of the rebellious city and the Duke. But royal troops soon drove the English from the island and La Rochelle had to stand by itself. It had rebelled, expelled the priests, and signed a treaty with the enemy. This was an open challenge to the French crown. From November 1627 to March 1628 royal troops built an impressive wall seven miles long with some twenty forts. Moreover, Louis XIII decided to erect a dyke made of stone in order to close the bay. On two occasions an English fleet attempted to break the blockade, but to no avail. Huguenot reinforcements from the south were supposed to rescue their northern co-religionists, but were defeated miles away from La Rochelle.

On October 31, 1628 the city surrendered after a long siege of almost a year. La Rochelle lost about twenty thousand people, that is to say over three-fourths of its population. Famine, not fighting, had taken the largest toll. Following this dramatic defeat most Huguenots converted, but some chose exile. Antoine de Ridouet, Baron de Sancé, a prominent Protestant leader who had taken part in the rebellion, reached England before La Rochelle fell. His English protector and friend was none less than the Duke of Buckingham himself. As early as February 1628 the latter had secured Sancé a small



pension of a hundred pounds per annum.<sup>5</sup> Three months later Sancé informed the English authorities of his desire to send Huguenot settlers to North America. He intended to create a new colony that would benefit the English as well as serve as a Huguenot haven.

The English crown was interested, but Sancé was neither influential nor wealthy enough to undertake such an enterprise by himself. Thus he contacted Heath and persuaded him to obtain a grant. No later than on October 30, 1629 Heath was granted a patent that made him proprietor of a territory between thirty-one and thirty-six degrees North latitude. Due to a lack of source material, the rest remains shrouded in mystery. Were Sancé and his friends Heath's supporters or competitors? Heath also contracted two other parties, why? An agreement was drawn on May 15, 1630 concerning the settling of the northern half of Carolana by Huguenots. Why did this not result in something tangible? Lack of funds? Mistrust between the partners? Finally, why in April 1632 did Heath reach an agreement with the king specifying that only Anglicans would be admitted in Carolana? Had he become disenchanted with the Huguenot contractors?

Even though nothing came of this Carolana project, Sancé's first plan deserves a close study as it is extremely revealing of Huguenot intentions. From the very beginning Sancé's hope was to found a colony that would serve as a Huguenot haven. Thus Sancé was faithful to Coligny's designs. Same area of North America, same goal, with the difference that the Huguenots were now well aware that any attempt at settling the New World had to be done through English channels. Sancé's second idea was to base the economy of the future colony primarily on salt production, at least initially. Two reasons can account for that hope. First, salt was a very useful commodity at a time when the preservation of food was a problem. Secondly, Sancé was from the most important salt-producing area of France, namely the provinces of Aunis (location of La Rochelle), Saintonge, and Lower Poitou. He certainly hoped to get salters as potential settlers very easily and was probably familiar with salt-producing techniques. However, the question remains as to how Sancé could be so sure that the South Carolina Low Country would be ideal for salt production. On what accounts was his knowledge of the area based? Those of his Huguenot forerunners such as Ribaut or Laudonnière?

### III. REVOCATION AND EMIGRATION

On October 25, 1685 Louis XIV made a major decision that would have great cultural, social, and economic consequences. He revoked the Edict of Nantes, which a renowned French historian has labeled "wobbly, imperfect, exceptional."<sup>6</sup> Louis XIV's act must not be interpreted as a turning point in his reign, but just as a landmark. The Revocation was the logical outcome of more than twenty years of persecution. A long trail of deprivations and harassment meant to make the lives of the Protestants so miserable that conversion to Catholicism would appear as a relief. It began with petty measures such as

<sup>5</sup>Kopperman, Paul E. "The Carolina Project 1629-1640," *North Carolina Historical Review*, vol. LIX, January 1982, p. 3.

<sup>6</sup>Garrison, Janine. "Bancal, imparfait, exceptionnel: The Edict of Nantes," *Réforme*, number 2984 (23 March 1985).

the ban on psalm singing in the streets (1659), the ban on daytime funerals (1662), and the limitation of family gatherings to twelve people (1670). Soon more serious restrictions appeared and the Huguenots were no longer eligible for high civil positions such as city councilmen, aldermen, or judges (1679).<sup>7</sup> After 1680 restrictions gave way to open persecution with the use of the *dragonnades*. The royal dragoons were mounted infantrymen with muskets and pikes. These soldiers were launched in a province and given free rein in order to obtain as many conversions as possible. Protestant populations were literally terrified as torture, robbery, and rapes became widespread. This turned out to be the most brutal but most effective means to reduce Protestantism in the kingdom. But to attract new converts, Louis XIV also used more peaceful incentives such as tax exemptions for a few years or bounties paid by the Bureau of Conversions created in 1676. However, let us mention that within a few months after the royal dragoons were sent to Poitou more than thirty thousand had converted, that is more than the Bureau had garnered in three years for the entire kingdom.<sup>8</sup>

Impressed by the high number of conversions submitted to him in daily reports, Louis XIV revoked the Edict of Nantes, probably thinking that since the number of the Protestants had been dramatically reduced, it no longer concerned an important portion of his subjects. Moreover, most of the provisions contained in the Edict had been so severely restricted that all in all it had a lessened value. Therefore the Revocation is more a glorious feat than anything else, done to impress the pope and restore Louis XIV's image of the Most Christian King. The Edict of Fontainebleau, which replaced the one revoked, outlawed Protestantism and provided for extremely harsh measures for those who tried to resist the king's will. All Protestant churches had to be destroyed without delay, pastors had to convert or leave the country within fifteen days, and Huguenot schools were closed. The Protestants were denied the *jus emigrandi* or right to emigrate, except for a few influential noblemen who were even given passports. The Huguenots who chose to flee France took a great chance, as the sentence was the galley for the men and the convent for the women.

Despite those measures intended to limit the exodus, historians estimate that about two hundred thousand Huguenots left France in the twenty years following the Revocation. The French provinces were affected differently according to their geographic location--whether the access to a foreign Protestant country was easy--and to their Protestant population. Areas where Huguenots greatly outnumbered Catholics were safer and less prone to emigration. The Atlantic provinces (Aunis, Saintonge, Normandy) lost more than twenty thousand each. La Rochelle itself saw two thousand and five hundred Huguenots leave, that is to say about one half of its Protestant community. The southern provinces (Languedoc, Dauphiné) had fewer than eighteen thousand departures. Destinations, called countries of refuge, varied. England and Holland welcomed the highest number of refugees with over fifty thousand each, that is half of the total. Switzerland was regarded as a

<sup>7</sup>Van Ruymbek, Bertrand. "The Huguenots and the Early Colonization of South Carolina. The Emigration of a Persecuted Minority," (part II) *Transactions*, 1990, pp. 30-42.

<sup>8</sup>Golden, R. M. (ed.). *The Huguenot Connection: The Edict of Nantes, its Revocation and Early French Migration to South Carolina*, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, 1988: introduction p. 18.



stopover on the way to Protestant countries farther away such as Holland, Brandenburg, Denmark, and even Russia.

Getting out of France not only demanded courage and money but also shrewdness on the part of the refugees. The borders were closely watched and people were encouraged to give away Huguenots on the run. Ways of escape varied greatly according to the means of the Protestants and where they lived. The wealthiest would generously bribe guards stationed on the borders. Fees ranged from one thousand to six thousand *livres*, enormous sums of money when we consider that a wet-nurse, for example, earned only twenty-four *livres* a year. Refugees also used tricks to elude the guards. Some dressed up as local peasants and with a few oxen peacefully crossed the border to a field on the other side. Some women dressed as male servants or pretended to be the guides' wives. To outwit this last trick guards had the alleged couple lie naked in bed before authorizing them to cross the border.<sup>9</sup>

Those who lived in a port on the Atlantic coast generally were helped by foreign merchants--English or Dutch--who hid them in their ships, especially equipped with secret compartments, in return for a sum of money. James Fontaine tells us that he paid an English merchant a hundred *livres* per person to be taken to England.<sup>10</sup> But foreign ships could not land on the French coast to embark refugees, so Huguenots had to pay a smuggler to take them to a ship waiting on the high seas. This of course represented an extra expenditure and the risk to be caught. A refugee tells us how he was hidden with eleven other persons in the hold of an English ship of twenty-five tons, whose access was through a trap door placed under a sailor's bunk. Coast guards searched the boat and his son began to vomit as a they were walking right above them. Fortunately they did not hear anything suspect.<sup>11</sup> This sort of anecdote shows us the calm that such a flight required. As for the Huguenots who fled across land, mainly those from the southern or eastern provinces, they were helped by guides. Marked routes to borders with lists of inns, taverns, and private homes where they could hide were secretly circulated. A guide could earn over a thousand *livres* per trip but punishments were extremely severe. Until 1687 a guide caught helping Huguenots was sentenced to the galley, subsequently to death. Some Huguenots regarded England or Holland only as a stopover on their trips. With no hope of ever returning to France, they were ready to try their luck in the Dutch colony of South Africa or in British North America.

#### IV. SOUTH CAROLINA: A SEMI-TROPICAL HUGUENOT PARADISE?

Out of some fifty thousand Huguenots who emigrated to England, between 1500 and 2000 chose to cross the Atlantic and settle in one of the British North American colonies.

<sup>9</sup>Carr, John L. *Life in France under Louis XIV*, European Life Series, P. Quennell (ed.) Capricorn Books, New York, 1970 (1st ed 1966); p. 142.

<sup>10</sup>Fontaine, James. *Memoirs of a Huguenot Family*, Ann Maury (tr.), The Knickerbocker Press, New York, 1900, p. 114.

<sup>11</sup>Jourdan L. (4d.) "Les Emigrés de La Rochelle. Relation de la fuite de Baudouin de la Bruchardière", *Bulletin de la Société d'Histoire du Protestantisme Français*, Tome 18 (1869), p. 427.

## South Carolina Historical Association

A large majority of them--probably two-thirds--reached South Carolina either directly from England or by way of another colony. It is not always clear whether those refugees had South Carolina on their mind as a final destination in leaving their hometown in France or made up their minds only later in England. Judith Giton, who fled France in 1685 and married Peter Manigault in 1699, tells in her diary that her brother had "nothing but Carolina in his thoughts".<sup>12</sup> Others may have stopped at the Carolina Coffee House in London and made the decision there. Nonetheless there is no doubt that South Carolina exerted a strong appeal to the Huguenots, several factors accounting for it. For one, when the Huguenots began to be severely persecuted and when the Edict of Nantes was revoked, South Carolina was entering its most active period of colonization. Indeed, after 1680 the Lords Proprietors invested more funds and adopted a more effective colonial policy. Settlers were in great demand, economic opportunities were real and land--the dream of all Europeans--was plentiful. Secondly the Lords Proprietors were extremely tolerant in religious matters and promised future settlers freedom of worship. Moreover, South Carolina was not unknown to the Huguenots who had read Ribaut's or Laudonnière's accounts. The name itself evoked Fort Caroline or Charlesfort where French Protestants had died in martyrdom. Finally, emigration increased as the Huguenots left for South Carolina, knowing that there was a large number of their countrymen already settled in that colony and hoping that it would make things easier for them.

Soon the Huguenots became the target of an active advertising campaign launched by the Lords Proprietors. In their eyes the French Protestants were extremely valuable settlers. They were reputedly hard working, inexperienced in democratic rule (therefore easier to govern), fairly well educated and somewhat indebted to England for saving their lives. The Huguenots were also coveted for their expertise in wine, olive, and silk cultures. Salt industry disappeared from official texts, but probably remained in the minds of many. Those were commodities that England lacked and was forced to import from France, its economic rival. The possibility of making South Carolina a center of production for all of them appealed greatly to the English crown. From 1679 to 1685 five promotional pamphlets, written in French, were published in London and The Hague.<sup>13</sup> Three of them came out in 1686, in the year following the Revocation. Those pamphlets, whose size varied from two to more than twenty pages, described South Carolina in glowing terms. According to them the province enjoyed an ideal climate, a fertile soil, a luxurious vegetation, and some sort of democratic rule. Of course those documents did not mention the Spanish and Indian threats, the extremely hot summers, or the lethal epidemics that plagued the area. Of course, the latter may not have deterred the Huguenots of the Atlantic provinces, used to living among mosquito-infested marshes and therefore familiar with malaria.

Undoubtedly the Lords Proprietors were successful, since South Carolina attracted the highest number of Huguenots. A reasonable estimate ranges from eight hundred to a little more than a thousand for the period 1680-1710. At a time when South Carolina's

<sup>12</sup>Simons, Slann L. C. "Early Manigault Records" in *Transactions* No. 29 (1954), pp. 24-27.

<sup>13</sup>Kane, Hope F. "Colonial Promotion and Promotional Literature of Carolina 1660-1700," Unpublished Dissertation, Brown University, 1930.



population was extremely low, this constitutes an important inflow of emigrants. Baldwin's list of early settlers informs us about the French provinces from which most of the Huguenots came.<sup>14</sup> The figures indicate that 23% came from Aunis, 17% from Poitou and Normandy each, 5% from Languedoc, and only 3% from Dauphiné. The Atlantic provinces were overwhelmingly represented, which is not surprising since they had easy access to England; the inhabitants of the southern provinces, being far from the Atlantic coast, were more prone to flee to Switzerland. Among those who left the province of Aunis, 52% lived in La Rochelle and 42% were from the island of Rê. This concentration proves that the Huguenot families were connected back in France or at least knew each other. Another interesting statistic shows that 34% of the Huguenots came from Atlantic ports, the majority of them being from La Rochelle and Dieppe. Dieppe was the hometown of Jean Ribaut, the explorer who founded Charlesfort in the harbor of Port Royal. Undoubtedly his adventures were remembered in the Protestant population of this city. The very fact that most Huguenot settlers left coastal areas leads us to think that a high number of them were merchants involved in some maritime trade or sailors, and only a few worked in agriculture. This thought is corroborated by the fact that Protestantism--except for a few areas--did not penetrate the French peasantry significantly.

If we add the number of Huguenots who originated from Aunis (23%), Saintonge (10%), and Poitou (17%) we obtain 50%. Those bordering provinces can be regarded as a regional unit in terms of population and economy. In other words, following the approach that David H. Fischer chose to use in his book *Albion's Seed*, they played the same role as East Anglia for the Puritans. They all gravitated around the city of La Rochelle, which constituted a dynamic center. All these provinces had large numbers of Huguenot communities and for all the salt industry was an important aspect of their economy. The coastal sections of those three provinces are very similar, consisting of vast expanses of lowland with numerous marshes and thoroughly watered by a great number of rivers. A sort of South Carolina Low Country without the palmetto trees, the alligators (fortunately!) and the stifling heat. This indicates that for half the Huguenots who settled in South Carolina the scenery they encountered somewhat reminded them of their home, a psychological factor that must not be underestimated.

## CONCLUSION

The emigration of the Huguenots to South Carolina is a fascinating illustration of the American dream. Like a dolphin who regularly dives and surfaces, it swims across the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. In 1562 Ribaut and his men founded Charlesfort, in 1629 Sancé attempted to send salters to Carolana, and in 1680 the first organized group of Huguenot settlers arrived in Charleston. These were different people and different eras, but the idea of founding a Huguenot refuge in that part of North America was a constant objective. This characteristic adds a dreamlike, almost legendary,

<sup>14</sup>Baldwin, Agnes L. *First Settlers of South Carolina 1670-1700*, Southern Historical Press, Inc., Easley S.C., 1985.

## South Carolina Historical Association

dimension to this emigration and makes its study interesting. Interesting yet frustrating, because how will the historian ever be able to define this dimension? Figures and statistics cannot reveal what Daniel Huger or Gabriel Manigault had on their minds when they left England bound for South Carolina. How did they picture the colony? What did they expect to find? How little or how much did they know about this transatlantic Low Country? At least we know where they came from and how well most of them did in their new homeland. How can we forget that in November 1777 Henry Laurens succeeded John Hancock as President of the Continental Congress and in this way entered the pantheon of American revolutionary heroes? His ancestors had escaped persecution in order to live free, and he fought in the name of that freedom. Jean Ribaut did the same.



# **SOUTH CAROLINA GENERAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS: 1988 CAMPAIGN FINANCE**

**John V. Crangle**  
**Benedict College**

---

One of the many areas in the field of South Carolina political history which has received little attention by historians and political scientists is the history of the financing of campaigns for public office at the state and local levels. South Carolina has required the filing of campaign finance disclosure documents since 1976, but they have attracted little attention except for occasional use by journalists focusing on the campaign of a particular candidate. As a consequence little research is available on the subject.<sup>1</sup>

In 1988 the state governing board of Common Cause/South Carolina authorized me to undertake a comprehensive study of both the primary and general elections for the South Carolina General Assembly held in 1988.<sup>2</sup> The purpose of this study was very practical: the organization wanted the information in order to provide a factual and analytical basis for reviewing the state's campaign finance system which Common Cause suspected on the basis of fragmentary evidence of irregularities, inequities, and abuses, including excessive reliance on PAC and corporate contributions and the inability of non-incumbents to raise competitive amounts.<sup>3</sup>

If the study revealed the anticipated findings, then substantial evidence would be available for use as the basis for arguing that the South Carolina system of campaign financing needed to be reformed. The motivation for undertaking the research was somewhat different from that behind much of ordinary historical research.

<sup>1</sup>The South Carolina Ethics Act requires candidates for state and local office to file campaign finance disclosure forms within thirty days of primary and elections.

<sup>2</sup>Minutes of Common Cause/South Carolina board meeting, October 1988.

<sup>3</sup>Personal knowledge of author as Executive Director of Common Cause/South Carolina.

## South Carolina Historical Association

Unfortunately the information on which this research was based was deficient in several significant ways. In the first place, some of the financial disclosure forms filed by the legislative candidates were filed late, that is more than thirty days after the November 6, 1988 date of the election. Secondly, many of the disclosure forms were improperly completed, lacking essential factual information. Thirdly, many forms were confusing in that the information provided by candidates was ambiguous, unreadable, misidentified, and improperly categorized. Even worse, the forms used lacked specificity and did not require sufficiently precise identification of the sources of campaign contributions. Finally, the forms were not reviewed or audited by the Senate and House ethics committee offices to assure compliance or accuracy. As consequence the researcher was compelled to work with intolerably soft data.<sup>4</sup>

In spite of serious problems with the data base, the research disclosed a number of facts about campaign finance in the 1988 General Assembly elections which provided Common Cause with important and useful data sufficient to suggest generalizations and support a limited analysis. Even though the findings could not meet very exacting standards they were useful in meeting the objectives of the study.

The research showed that campaign finance in legislative elections is greatly affected by many candidates who raise and spend little money since they have no general election opposition. In 1988 twenty-two incumbents in the Senate had no opposition, nearly half the forty-six Senators up for reelection. Furthermore, three non-incumbents had no opposition. Primary elections, too, are often uncontested and only four incumbent senators lost their primaries. Three incumbents did not run.<sup>5</sup>

Of the fifty-nine who filed disclosure forms by the December 8, 1988 deadline, Senate candidates indicated that in both primary and general election campaigns incumbents raised much more money than non-incumbents, especially from business and political action committee sources.<sup>6</sup>

Business contributions to the nine incumbent Senate Democratic primary winners averaged \$3,906, while nineteen non-incumbent Democratic losers averaged only \$215. Business contributions to the three losing incumbent Democrats averaged \$7,950. In the general elections twenty-five incumbent winning Democrats averaged \$5,090 from business, while the three losing non-incumbent Democrats received nothing from business. These and other data clearly show a pattern of business contributors giving much larger average contributions to incumbents than to non-incumbents for the Senate. Business contributions were 12% of primary and 13% of general election contributions received by Senate candidates.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>4</sup>Campaign finance disclosure forms on file with the Senate Ethics Committee (for all Senate candidates) and the House Ethics Committee (for all Senate candidates).

<sup>5</sup>Preliminary Report on Campaign Finance of State Elections in South Carolina: 1988 elections for the General Assembly and 1986 Elections for Governor and Lt. Governor. John V. Crangle and Gerald R. Roys (Columbia, S.C.: Common Cause/South Carolina and Benedict College, 1989), p. S-2.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. S-2.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. S-3.



Business contributions in House races followed the same pattern in 1988 primary and general elections. Incumbents raised not only more business contributions on average than challengers, but averaged a larger percentage of their money from business sources than non-incumbents. For example, winning incumbent Democrats in the general election raised 10% from businesses, while winning non-incumbents raised only 4% from businesses.<sup>8</sup>

Political action contributions flowed in larger amounts to incumbents than non-incumbents. PACS poured \$413,597 into primary and general Senate campaigns, with \$291,289 to the latter. Nine winning incumbent Democrats averaged \$6,012 from PACS in primaries while nineteen losing non-incumbents averaged \$74 in the same contest. In the general elections, a similar pattern emerged with nine winning incumbent Republicans receiving \$6,916 from PACS, while the twelve losing non-incumbent Republicans averaged only \$104 from PACS. Figures for other classes of candidates evinced the same pattern of PACS favoring incumbents. PACS gave 14% of primary and 15% of general election Senate receipts.<sup>9</sup>

House candidates received large PAC contributions in 1988. In the general election winning incumbent Democrats received 31% of their contributions from PACS, while similar Republicans received 37% from PACS. However, non-incumbents received much less from PACS: winning non-incumbent Democrats received 10% from PACS and similar Republicans took 17% from PACS.<sup>10</sup>

PAC preference for incumbents was pronounced in both Senate and House races with incumbents generally receiving not only larger absolute amounts but also a larger percentage of their funds from PACS. House primaries showed a remarkable 54% of winning incumbent Democrats' and 48% of similar Republican funds from PACS. (Winning non-incumbent Democrats got 11% from PACS and similar Republicans got 33% from PACS.)<sup>11</sup>

Political party contributions for legislative campaigns for obvious reasons are limited to general elections with rare exceptions. Parties are not a major source of such campaign contributions, donating only \$24,322 to all state Senate candidates. The Republican party contributions to the nine winning Republican Senate incumbents averaged \$500, while the Democratic party averaged only \$163 to its twenty-six winning Senate candidates. The largest amount given was \$1,450 to one winning non-incumbent Republican. (The twelve losing Republican non-incumbents averaged \$832 in party funds, while the three losing non-incumbent Democrats averaged \$100.) In all, parties donated less than 1% of total Senate receipts.<sup>12</sup>

On the House side party money flowed more from Republican sources than Democrat: for example, incumbent Democrats received only 1% from their party, while Republicans received 6% of their total contributions from the party.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>8</sup>"Common Cause/South Carolina Report Bares 1988 House Campaign Funding," *Common Cause/South Carolina* Vol. 89, No. 4 (December 1989), p. 1.

<sup>9</sup>Report on Campaign Finance, pp. S-3 and S-4.

<sup>10</sup>Common Cause/South Carolina (December 1989), p. 1.

<sup>11</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 2.

<sup>12</sup>Report on Campaign Finance, pp. S-4 and S-5.

<sup>13</sup>Common Cause/South Carolina (December 1989), p. 2.

Personal money is seldom a factor in South Carolina legislative races. Among Senate general election candidates nine winning incumbent Republicans used only \$1,700 of personal money and all \$1,700 was used by a single candidate. Twenty-five winning incumbent Democrats used a total of only \$5,468 of personal funds. The only winning non-incumbent Republican used no personal funds, while eight winning non-incumbent Democrats used a total of \$3994 of personal money.<sup>14</sup>

Loans were a very insignificant part of most campaign chests and few candidates of any type borrowed funds to pay campaign expenses. However, one Senate candidate (Rose) borrowed \$33,000, while another borrowed \$80,000 (Waddell). Although candidates seldom borrow, total Senate borrowing amounted to \$125,037 (primaries) and \$381,575 (general elections). House borrowing is the exception. Loans provided a total of 17% of Senate primary and 25% of Senate general election campaign funds.<sup>15</sup>

Contributions from private persons were the largest single source of legislative campaign money in 1988. In the Senate primaries 43% (389,833) came from private sources, while \$40 (\$756,886) of general election money came from private individuals.<sup>16</sup> On the House side, winning incumbent Democrats in the general elections raised 59% from individuals, while Republican winning incumbents raised \$49 from individuals. Non-incumbents raised even more from private persons: General election winning non-incumbent Democratic representatives raised 87%, while similar Republicans raised 64%.<sup>17</sup>

Other sources of campaign resources included by Senate candidates totalled 12% of primary and 3% of general election funds. A major item in this catchall category was the estimated fair market value of in-kind services and goods donated to candidates.<sup>18</sup>

The amounts related to the 1988 campaigns are noteworthy. House candidates raised \$1,200,000 for their primaries and \$1,000,000 for the general elections.<sup>19</sup> Senate candidates raised \$903,134 for primary and \$1,896,465 for general elections.<sup>20</sup>

The ten incumbent Democrats with opposition spent \$707,536 in the general election. The five opposed incumbent Republicans spent \$245,145 in the general election. (James Waddell (D), Dist. 45 (Beaufort) spent \$163,505 as of his December 7, 1988 filing. The biggest Republican spender was John Courson (R), Dist. 20 (Richland) \$104,556.)<sup>21</sup>

Unspent campaign funds were considerable. Nine Senate winning incumbent Republicans held average surpluses of \$7,352, including \$38,475 carried over by Courson. Twenty-six winning incumbent Democratic Senators carried over average surpluses of \$15,778, including \$81,486 carried over by Sen. Isadore Lourie.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>14</sup>Report on Campaign Finance, pp. S-5 and S-6.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., pp. S-6 and S-7.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., pp. S-7 and S-8.

<sup>17</sup>Common Cause/South Carolina (December 1989), pp. 1-2.

<sup>18</sup>Report on Campaign Finance, p. 510.

<sup>19</sup>Common Cause/South Carolina (December 1989), p.1.

<sup>20</sup>Report on Campaign Finance, p. S-11.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., p. S-8.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., p. S-9.



The findings of the study clearly showed significant problems in financing legislative campaigns in South Carolina, the most serious of which was that non-incumbents were seldom able to raise sufficient funds to make them competitive with incumbents. This was so not only because incumbents tended to draw more contributions from private contributors, but even more so because of the preference shown for incumbents by large business and PAC contributors who in many instances supplied the bulk of funds raised by incumbents, whereas non-incumbents, especially challengers, raised little, if any funds, from business and PAC sources.

Political parties were not significant sources of campaign contributions in the 1988 legislative races. Candidates put little of their own money into their campaigns, indicating that in fact the specter of the rich man using his personal fortune to buy legislative office is more theoretical than real. Loans financed a few campaigns, but most candidates avoided borrowing.

The study attempted but was unable to determine the specific sources of campaign funds, because the identification of the PACS, businesses, and individuals on disclosure forms by the 1988 legislative candidates was very frequently unclear and confusing. It appears that the same contributor is often identified by various names by different candidates. Obviously a more precise system of identifying contributors is needed. Even so there is substantial evidence that certain PACS, businesses, and individuals are major sources of contributions for many candidates.

Identification of candidates by committee membership, chairmanship, sex, age, race, location or type of district, years of legislative service, and the like was not attempted. Such research probably would indicate that membership on key committees, especially their chairmanships, and urban location correlate with larger contributions. The study did not examine the uses of campaign funds, including disposition after election expenses were paid. Such research is needed, especially since South Carolina permits conversion of campaign funds to personal use. The study did not attempt to compare the financing of the 1988 legislative campaigns with the financing of similar previous campaigns as no research of any significance has been done on such previous campaigns. The study did not compare its findings with those of other states.

Initial findings were presented at The Common Cause/South Carolina conference on campaign finance reform held in Columbia on January 28, 1989, providing useful information for discussion.<sup>23</sup> The study was also published in the Common Cause/South Carolina newspaper in December 1989 which was circulated to Common Cause state members, Common Cause affiliates in other states, the members of the General Assembly, and the media.<sup>24</sup>

The Common Cause/South Carolina governing board used the study as a basis for arguing for campaign finance reform both before and after the FBI sting of July 1990. In an op-ed piece published by *The State* on January 21, 1990 Common Cause/South Carolina

<sup>23</sup>Common Cause/South Carolina Conference on Campaign Finance Reform, Marriott Hotel, Columbia, S.C., January 28, 1989.

<sup>24</sup>The media are starved for useful research on campaign finance in South Carolina. See extensive coverage in *Rock Hill Herald*, Jan. 27, 1990. Common Cause/South Carolina (December 1989), pp. 1-2.

## South Carolina Historical Association

pointed out the problems with the current system.<sup>25</sup> Three days after the FBI sting was announced Common Cause/South Carolina called a news conference at the State House at which Professor Robert J. Moore, a member of the national governing board of Common Cause and a member of the executive committee of Common Cause/South Carolina, presented the Common Cause/South Carolina agenda for reform, including a limitation of campaign contributions, prohibition of cash contributions, prohibition of contributions by corporations, labor unions, and law firms, and a ban on the conversion of campaign funds to personal use.<sup>26</sup>

The study focused on a subject seldom examined by historians and had a practical purpose. It was financed by an organization which had a well established political position, favoring campaign finance reform. Nevertheless, the use of objective historical methodology in collecting, selecting, analyzing, and presenting the research materials produced a report which had both credibility and utility not only as a basis for decision-making by the sponsoring organization but also for the media, the public, and public officials. Historians can render a public service by undertaking research in neglected areas of history where factual information and objective analysis is needed as the basis for the formulation of public policy.

<sup>25</sup>*The State*, January 21, 1989, p. 3-D.

<sup>26</sup>*The State*, July 29, 1990, p. See also coverage of the Common Cause/South Carolina proposals for campaign finance reform. *Greenville News*, July 25, 1990, p. 8A.



# REFORM AND REFORMERS IN SOUTH CAROLINA: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Walter B. Edgar  
University of South Carolina

---

For those who know the state's history, the phrase "Reform in South Carolina" might appear to be an oxymoron. Political and social reform have been far from the minds of most of the state's leaders for three centuries. Permitting the people to have any real voice in government has been something to be resisted at all costs.

The times in which we find ourselves today give rise to the need to take a brief look at the history of reform in our state. After "Operation Lost Trust," the Highway Department scandal, continuing evidence of incompetence at the Department of Social Services, not to mention the problems at the University of South Carolina, there seems to be--for the first time in South Carolina history--a genuine groundswell for major political reform.

The first attempts at political reform began in the 1780s as the Backcountry began to demand a more equitable role in state affairs. A few crumbs were tossed toward the Piedmont: the removal of the capital from Charleston to Columbia (1786) and the creation of the South Carolina College (1801). Neither of these really addressed the Backcountry's major grievance, the malapportionment of the General Assembly that gave the Low Country parishes firm control of state government. Two thirds of the state's white population resided in the Backcountry, but Backcountry voters elected only 60 of 124 representatives. St. Stephen's Parish with a white population of 226 elected three representatives; so did Edgefield with a population of 9,785 and Pendleton with a population of 8,731.<sup>1</sup>

The wrangle over reapportionment lasted from 1790 until 1808 when the "Compromise" of 1808" resulted in apportioning half of the House of Representatives according to population and half according to taxable wealth. The Backcountry got a fairer

<sup>1</sup>[Harper, Robert Goodloe], *To the People of South Carolina, by Applus* (n. p., 1972), pp. 40-42.

## South Carolina Historical Association

share of house seats. In fact, after 1808 the upper part of the state had a majority in both the House and the Senate.

This major political reform, followed two years later by universal white male suffrage, was not a triumph for democracy. Rather, it was a victory for the Low Country and its social/economic system based upon plantation slavery. The spread of cotton production into the Backcountry--and with it the expansion of slavery--not reform or idealism, made these changes in South Carolina government a reality.<sup>2</sup>

Following the Compromise of 1808, reform did not rear its head again until Reconstruction. The Constitution of 1868 with its provisions for public education, equal opportunity for all South Carolinians, and the election of statewide officeholders by the voters all were significant reforms.

Unfortunately, the way in which the Reconstruction reforms were implemented doomed most of them to a short life. The integrated University of South Carolina was closed in 1877 as soon as Wade Hampton moved into the governorship. Support for public education remained strong and until Tillman was elected, black South Carolinians received virtually equal funding for their schools.<sup>3</sup>

The rise of Benjamin Ryan Tillman has been characterized by some historians as a "reform movement."<sup>4</sup> Tillman also referred to his followers as reformers, but in reality his movement was more than simply a reformation of South Carolina society and politics. Personally, I prefer Tillman's self-image of himself as a revolutionary. In his inaugural address he boldly stated: "I . . . the exponent and leader of the revolution which brought about the change, am here to take the solemn oath of office."<sup>5</sup> Tillman was right, the historians were wrong. He was a revolutionary.

Reform and Ben Tillman is also a contradiction in terms. What did Tillman do that "reformed" South Carolina? Little if anything. Several of Tillman's major accomplishments, the Dispensary and the Constitution of 1895, can scarcely be classified as reform measures. In particular, the creation of the former made a mockery of the very notion of reform. Tillman turned a voter-approved referendum calling for prohibition into one of the slimiest cesspools of political corruption this state has seen--until the 1990s and "Bubbage."<sup>6</sup>

The racial injustice and convoluted political system that emerged from the constitutional convention of 1895 hamstrung South Carolina for nearly another century. The Jim Crow society Tillman decreed has been dismantled, but one of the basic difficulties with state government today is the unwieldy state government that is embodied in Tillman's Constitution. Tillman's partisans called themselves reformers. They were not.

<sup>2</sup>David Duncan Wallace, *The History of South Carolina* (3 vols.; New York, 1934), 2:372. Herbert Ravenel Sass, *The Story of the South Carolina Lowcountry* (3 vols.; West Columbia, SC, n.d.), 1: 161-66.

<sup>3</sup>George Brown Tindall, *South Carolina Negroes* (Columbia, 1952), pp. 214-17.

<sup>4</sup>Wallace, *The History of South Carolina*, 3:355, 562. Simkins, *Punchfork Ben Tillman*, passim.

<sup>5</sup>Francis Butler Simkins, *Punchfork Ben Tillman* (Baton Rouge, 1944), p. 170.

<sup>6</sup>Wallace, *The History of South Carolina*, 3:376, 391-92, 419-22. "Bubbage" is a term used informally by staffers of *The State* newspaper to describe "Operation Lost Trust." Author's conversations with Gil Thelen, Executive Editor; Robert Hitt, Managing Editor; and Paula Ellis, Assistant Managing Editor, 12 September 1990, 18 October 1990. Gil Thelen to the author, 19 September 1990.



Richard I. Manning did not run on a platform of reform, but his two administrations (1915-1919) are easily the most reform-oriented in the state's history. Manning was a Conservative from Sumter District, but clearly a progressive in the Woodrow Wilson tradition. During his term of office he championed the reorganization and modernization of the State Hospital for the more humane treatment of its patients. He backed legislation reorganizing the corrections system, creating workman's compensation, establishing the South Carolina Highway Department, and authorizing a local option for compulsory school attendance. Upon his recommendation, the South Carolina Tax Commission was created. It equalized assessments and effectively enforced the state's income tax laws.<sup>7</sup> Just one or two of these actions would have garnered the label "reformer" for any governor. Richard I. Manning, aristocrat though he was, reorganized, created, or reformed basic institutions of South Carolina government to provide better, more efficient services for the people of the state.

Ironically, during his governorship a group of dissident Democrats, led by Coleman L. Blease, John G. Richards, and John P. Grace, formed a group they called "Reform Democrats." Like their Tillman forebears, this group cared little about reform. It simply was opposed to the faction of the party that was in control. Fortunately for the state, unlike Tillman these so-called "Reform Democrats" failed to attract a following.<sup>8</sup>

John G. Richards, one of the "Reform Democrats" later managed to get himself elected governor. An overly pious Presbyterian, he campaigned against the immorality of the Jazz Age. In his inaugural address he declared that his administration had only one purpose, "to place South Carolina upon a pedestal where she can be proclaimed by the world as a leader in righteousness."<sup>9</sup> Richards was able to stamp out gambling, but his heavy-handed attempts to enforce the state's blue laws brought him and South Carolina only ridicule.<sup>10</sup> After Richards, reform in any sense disappears from the South Carolina scene for a quarter of a century.

James Byrnes considered himself a reformer, particularly of the state's schools. However, he was not elected as a reformer but as an individual who could best preserve the status quo. In urging passage of the three-cents sales tax to provide adequate funding for the state's schools, he counseled the General Assembly that it was the state's "duty to provide for the races substantial equality in school facilities. . . . "What the colored people want, and what they are entitled to, is equal facilities in their schools. We must see that they get them."<sup>11</sup>

Social reform came to South Carolina during the 1960s and 1970s, but the dismantling of Jim Crow was not the result of any gubernatorial candidate's platform.

<sup>7</sup>Wallace, *The History of South Carolina*, 3: 440, 456-57. Robert Milton Burts, *Richard I. Manning and the Progressive Movement in South Carolina* (Columbia, 1974), pp. 83-113, 180-203.

<sup>8</sup>Burts, *Richard I. Manning and the Progressive Movement in South Carolina*, pp. 169-79.

<sup>9</sup>Mary Katherine Davis Cann, "The Morning After: South Carolina in the Jazz Age" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of South Carolina, 1984), p. 365.

<sup>10</sup>Cann, pp. 366-68. S.R. Anderson, "Governor John G. Richards and the Blue Laws" (Unpublished M. A. thesis, University of South Carolina, 1983), pp. 32-58.

<sup>11</sup>James F. Byrnes, *All in One Lifetime* (New York, 1958), pp. 407-08.

## South Carolina Historical Association

Sometimes changes were forced from without, but under a succession of "New South" governors from Hollings through Riley significant social changes occurred. Similarly, educational reform during the same period came about without any governor (except for Riley) running on a platform espousing school reform. Nevertheless, there were several key pieces of legislation that laid the groundwork for Richard Riley and the Education Improvement Act of 1984. Robert E. McNair, using the Moody Report that he had commissioned, convinced the General Assembly to pass a penny sales tax to fund a statewide kindergarten program.<sup>12</sup>

The inequity facing students in poorer school districts led James B. Edwards to create a task force to study the problem. It recommended legislation that eventually was passed as the Education Finance Act of 1977. The State Department of Education's "Defined Minimum Program" could be offered in all school districts as the state provides proportionally more funds to poorer districts.<sup>13</sup> Statewide kindergartens, the Education Finance Act and two other pieces of legislation--the Basic Skills Assessment Act and the Educator Improvement Act--were necessary predecessors for the EIA.

Improving education was the most significant plank in Richard Riley's platform in 1982. His reelection was clearly a mandate for reform; however, his first attempts to get an education act through the General Assembly in 1983 failed. Only after he convinced key business leaders and went over the heads of the General Assembly to the people was he able to see his dream become a reality.<sup>14</sup>

Today we face a situation that earlier generations have not: the opportunity to significantly change South Carolina's antiquated system of government. Last fall Blease Graham and I wrote a series of op-ed pieces for *The State*.<sup>15</sup> Several things are unusual about that. Not that we had not thought before about South Carolina's inefficient, ineffective government, but that two academics could write essays taking on the legislative state and live to tell the story. I do not believe that we could have written such strongly worded essays ten or even five years ago. Even if we had, *The State* surely would not have printed them. And I know that we would not have gotten the reaction--most of it positive--that we have.

The essays were reprinted in weekly newspapers and from all across South Carolina, Blease, *The State* newspaper, and I received letters urging us on and, more importantly, asking what could be done.<sup>16</sup> A former state president of the League of Women Voters wrote: "The succinct article by you and Blease Graham should convince South Carolinians that there is need for a new constitution."<sup>17</sup> The widow of a former editor of *The Greenville*

<sup>12</sup>Moody Investors Services, Inc., *Opportunity and Growth in South Carolina, 1968-1985* (New York, 1968), pp. 49, 53.

<sup>13</sup>Walter B. Edgar, "Pennies for Education" in "Changes and Challenges," centennial supplement to the *the State* (Columbia), 10 March 1991.

<sup>14</sup>Interview with Russell McKinney. March 1990.

<sup>15</sup>Walter B. Edgar and Cole Blease Graham, "Crisis of Confidence," a series of op-ed essays, *The State*, 26 August 1990, p. D-2; 29 August 1990, p. A-14; 31 August 1990, p. A-18.

<sup>16</sup>Among the weekly newspapers that carried the essays was *The Marlboro Herald Advocate*, 13 September 1990, p. B-4 and 4 October 1990, p. B-14.

<sup>17</sup>Mary L. Bryan to the author, 27 August 1990.



*News* telephoned with the message "NOW is the time to act."<sup>18</sup> A Low Country man wrote: "I think this undertaking will need all the help it can get and although I have no influence in the affairs of state, I would like to help in some way."<sup>19</sup> "Great. You have called the shots as they are without pulling any punches," commented a native Columbian. "Most of us in South Carolina get so used to bad government that we no longer recognize it as being bad."<sup>20</sup>

There was also interest in state government for reform. During the last weeks of his campaign, Republican Governor Campbell began to talk about restructuring state government. So did the Democrat lieutenant governor; so did the Democrat Attorney General and the successful Republican candidates for Secretary of State and the State Superintendent of Education. "Making government more accountable" was the theme of their campaigns. Reform was not a partisan issue; it was neither Republican nor Democrat. It was just plain old South Carolina common sense. And it was a theme to which the voters responded with enthusiasm.

The term mandate is often misused. It is inappropriate with regard to the 1990 election; no candidate asked for a mandate. However, virtually every successful candidate for statewide office ran on a campaign of making government more efficient, more effective, and more accountable. That might not be a mandate, but the 1990 election results certainly indicate that there was a groundswell for reform in South Carolina.

If we want to help make history and well as just record it, we need to do all in our power to see that the last vestiges of Tillmanism--the convoluted system of government that grew out of his Constitution of 1895--become footnotes, not remain the fundamental law of South Carolina.

<sup>18</sup>Notes of a telephone conversation between Nancy Vance Ashmore Cooper of Southern Studies and Tini Freeman, 31 August 1990.

<sup>19</sup>J. McNary Spigner to the author, 13 September 1990.

<sup>20</sup>A. Mason Gibbes to the author, 27 August 1990.

# STATE GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION IN SOUTH CAROLINA

Cole Blease Graham, Jr.  
University of South Carolina

---

Although the governor is the chief executive of the American state, this office in the Southern states traditionally has been weak, both institutionally and politically. Limited formal powers have typically restricted the southern governor to little or no direct role over state administration.<sup>1</sup> South Carolina is often identified by scholars and observers as the most extreme example of a weak Southern governor.<sup>2</sup> Simultaneously, South Carolina has been almost exclusively a legislatively dominated state.

An overview of features and background of the weak formal executive in South Carolina is the underlying focus for this discussion of the state's administrative structure. This essay surveys future reorganization of state agencies from the 20th-century reform perspective of more unified executive control.

## CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL THEMES OF LEGISLATIVE DOMINANCE

The legislature in South Carolina has traditionally captured most of the executive functions. In many stages of the state's history, the governor's office has been more symbolic and honorific than functional. For example, political scientist V. O. Key noted that:

<sup>1</sup>Robert B. Highsaw, "The Southern Governor—Challenge to the Strong Executive Theme," *Public Administration Review* 19 (1959), pp. 7-11.

<sup>2</sup>See discussion by Thad L. Beyle, "Governors," in Virginia Gray, Herbert Jacob, and Kenneth N. Vines, *Politics in the American States*, 4th ed. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1983), pp. 180-221 and pp. 454-459.



South Carolina's chief executive has limited power. He controls the state constabulary. He has power of appointment to state office except many of the really important state agencies. He can grant pardons, send messages to the legislature and exercise the power of veto.<sup>3</sup>

Journalist W. D. Workman observed in 1947 that the South Carolina legislature cleverly restricted the governor from doing anything significant by authorizing the office only trivial powers and duties:

Full power and authority is given to the governor to make by proclamation such regulations as, in his opinion, may be necessary to prevent the entrance of Asiatic cholera into this state, and the spreading thereof in this state.<sup>4</sup>

Another example of general formal weakness is the fact that the governor shares the power to appoint members to administrative boards and commissions with the legislature and has sole authority for appointment in relatively few cases. Appointments to most major boards and commissions in the state are by joint legislative assembly or require legislative approval of a governor's recommendations.<sup>5</sup> In addition the state constitution requires popular election to four-year terms for three department heads (agriculture, education, and the adjutant general). Other members of the executive branch who may be appointed in states with an institutionally strong chief executive also are elected in South Carolina. They are the Comptroller General, Treasurer, Attorney General, and Secretary of State.

Additional weakness in formal executive powers stems from an arrangement through which the governor shares budget-making power as one member of a five-member board, the State Budget and Control Board.<sup>6</sup> This Board also has extensive staff and supervises other agency-wide, centralized executive functions, such as planning and personnel administration. In yet another example, the governor has little statutory power to change the organization of state government or to create or abolish offices or assign and reassign duties of administrators. The legislature plays the major role in state government

<sup>3</sup>V. O. Key, Jr. "South Carolina: The Politics of Color," in *Southern Politics in State and Nation* (New York, Knopf, 1949), p. 150. To update Key's observations, the reader should note that a State Board of Probation, Parole, and Pardon Services was created in 1941 and today operates under provisions in the State Constitution as well as state statutes.

<sup>4</sup>W. D. Workman, Jr., as quoted in V. O. Key, Jr., *Southern Politics in State and Nation*, p. 151.

<sup>5</sup>See Harold B. Birch, "South Carolina State Government Administrative Organization: The Orthodox Theory of Administration Reexamined," in L. F. Carter and D. S. Mann, *Government in the Palmetto State* (Columbia, South Carolina: Bureau of Governmental Research and Service, 1983), pp. 115-135.

<sup>6</sup>Today's State Budget and Control Board was created by the General Assembly through Reorganization Plan No. 2 in 1950. The new Board replaced the older, three-member State Budget Commission by adding two more "executive" seats (the State Treasurer and the Comptroller General) to the original members (the Governor, the Chair of House Ways and Means, and the Chair of Senate Finance). The Board is thus a "hybrid" executive with three separately elected executive members and two legislative members.

## South Carolina Historical Association

reorganization and legislative members dominate deliberations of the state's reorganization commission.

These evaluations of the institutional powers of South Carolina's chief executive do not describe a new phenomenon. Throughout the political history of the state, the governor has been lacking in formal power. For example, according to the Constitution of 1790 the governor had no veto power and was elected by the legislature for a two-year term. This practice of legislative selection of the chief executive to a brief term continued until 1860. James Banner described the pre-Civil War status of South Carolina's governor as:

... a creature of the legislature; and no matter his personal authority, once in office he was an impotent figure, lacking the powers of veto and appointment, ineligible to succeed himself after a short two year term and empowered primarily to command the militia and call special sessions. An aggressive gubernatorial aspirant might court legislative backing and, if elected, might seek to advance legislation or promote appointments; but without power or tenure, he could never be fully independent of the planter-dominated legislative majority which chose him, nor could he successfully set about creating a 'governor's party' much less a stable political organization.<sup>7</sup>

An institutionally weak governor and heavy reliance on state and local boards and commissions in South Carolina are rooted in the colonial background, were well-established by the time of post-Reconstruction governments, and continue to the present time.<sup>8</sup>

The tradition of legislative dominance in South Carolina has resulted in a politically weak chief executive and a generally fragmented state government structure. These conditions have tended to encourage legislative initiation of a new agency and legislative arrangements for its governance by a board or commission. Seldom does the legislature delegate any new responsibility to the office of the governor for the administrative control of an existing board or commission or a newly created one. A splintered administrative structure is the result.

### ADMINISTERING TODAY'S STATE GOVERNMENT

In contemporary times new state agency boards are created and old ones have been renewed and redefined by the legislature in response to new program challenges or

<sup>7</sup> James M. Banner, Jr., "The Problem of South Carolina," in *The Hofstadter Aegis: A Memorial*, Stanley Elkins and Eric McKittrick (eds.) (New York: Knopf, 1974), p. 76.

<sup>8</sup> Ralph Eisenberg, "The Logroll, South Carolina Style," in Richard T. Frost (ed.), *Cases in State and Local Government* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1961).



opportunities. More than half of South Carolina's existing statewide boards and commissions have been created or significantly revised since 1960.<sup>9</sup> The continuing proliferation of these boards gives the agency-governing structures wide variety in size, number, and composition. As a result there are over two hundred separate boards and commissions supervising diverse and fragmented departments and agencies in South Carolina today.

Organizationally the state's bureaucratic agencies are typically insulated from executive leadership regardless of size or importance. Three agencies account for over half of the comprehensively budgeted expenditures of the state: the education, social services, and highway departments, but each is organized and administered differently. The highway department uses only earmarked funds and the social services department is primarily dependent on federal funds approved by a state health and human services finance commission.

Yet there are other agencies that perform significant functions, even though they are very small and may have little, if any, state appropriations. Getting a licence to practice a profession from one of these small agencies may be just as important to physician and patient as the work of one of the largest agencies.

Observers have frequently attempted to picture the array of state agencies through an organization chart.<sup>10</sup> Even the "successful" attempts are confusing to many citizens because of the wide variety of agencies that provide services and that regulate the activities of private businesses.

### STATE REORGANIZATION EFFORTS

The efforts to reform and streamline the administrative structure of the state have been extensive, but none of them achieved the reorganization ideals of Professor J. Karl Coleman, a longtime professor of history and government at The Citadel, of University of South Carolina Law School Dean Robert Figg, or of many other reformers. Several major studies (Griffenhagen Report, 1920; the Coleman Report, 1935<sup>11</sup>; and the Preparedness for Peace Commission, 1945) advocated the classical or reform approach to state organization. These reports generally reflected the "good government" movement in America and recommended an integrated structure of state agencies in which there would be one chief and centralized authority--the governor.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>9</sup>South Carolina *Legislative Manual* (Columbia, South Carolina: South Carolina General Assembly, 1982), pp. 294-403.

<sup>10</sup>The official organization chart for state government is issued by the State Reorganization Commission.

<sup>11</sup>J. Karl Coleman, *State Administration in South Carolina* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1935).

<sup>12</sup>The "Good Government" movement is generally connected to reforms advocated by the Progressive Party in the United States. This new model added the notions of control and efficiency. The principal responsibility of public administrators was to implement policy directives sent from political decision makers. The focus of responsibility was a centralized, fairly elected chief executive.

"Good Government" advocates espoused principles by which "corrupt" governments should be reorganized. According to A. E. Buck, *The Reorganization of State Governments in the United States* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1938), pp. 14-28, these principles are:

1. Responsibility should be concentrated in the governor for the direction of administrative affairs. To accomplish this, the ballot should be shortened as most other previously elective executives became the governor's appointees and administrative functions were consolidated into a small number of departments, each guided by a single officer appointed and removable by the governor.

## South Carolina Historical Association

It would take almost a legislative revolution in South Carolina to implement these classical proposals or their contemporary variations. Many boards and commissions would have to be abolished or their functions reduced to advisory status. The Budget and Control Board would have to be redesignated as the staff arm of the executive under the direction of the governor.

To focus the appointment of administrators with organized responsibilities in specific functional areas, the numerous and scattered state agencies would have to be reconcentrated and reorganized into executive, cabinet-type agencies. No doubt overlaps and duplications, especially in management levels, would set many state employees against each other in a battle for survival in the new, streamlined structures.

Administrative reorganization in South Carolina is a reformer's dream and a bureaucrat's nightmare. But, still today, the legislature has control of state administrative organization, much like South Carolina's Commons House controlled the pace and extent of colonial reforms two centuries ago.

A state reorganization commission has existed since 1949 to broker the legislature's interest in administrative changes. Usually the commission has functioned meaningfully only for brief periods. But when it has come to life it has usually made some significant recommendations. For example, the State Reorganization Commission made the basic proposals for the establishment of the Budget and Control Board in 1950, recommended the merger of the health and pollution agencies in the early 1970s, and called for the consolidation of alcohol and drug abuse programs for more efficient administration. More recently it has made extensive studies of state government structures and operations, including a county-based demonstration of state agency service coordination.<sup>13</sup> The major elements of these recommendations and the results of these studies on specific bureaucratic programs are highly varied. Yet there are the common themes in South Carolina reorganization efforts of increased emphasis on state agency economy and cooperation and of reduced agency jealousies and inflexibilities.

2. Previously existing offices, boards, commissions, and other agencies of administration should be consolidated and their activities integrated into a few departments, each of which should be organized on the basis of the major function performed.

3. Due to division of authority and persistent absence of initiative and responsibility, boards are impractical for purely administrative work. They should be replaced by single executives. Boards ought to be used only for advisory, quasi-legislative, and quasi-judicial functions.

4. Staff services—principally budgeting, accounting and reporting, purchasing, and personnel—should be brought together in a single staff department. Personnel should be administered on the basis of the merit system. Legal advice should be available from an attorney general not elected but appointed by the governor.

5. The legislature should have an officer—an auditor independent of the executive—to serve as its checking and investigating agency to look into the financial operations of executive agencies.

6. The cabinet concept should be employed by the governor in the same manner as in the national government.

<sup>13</sup> *Human Services in South Carolina: A Report on the York County Demonstration Project* (Columbia, South Carolina: South Carolina State Reorganization Commission, 1982).



### CONCLUSIONS

In a democratic society today an executive branch is organized with two main objectives: (1) to be responsible politically and (2) to provide for the most efficient and effective administration of the government. Neither of these objectives is easily attainable if the executive branch is made up of a haphazard collection of unplanned, spread-out, uncontrolled, and uncoordinated boards, commissions, agencies, departments, divisions, and authorities.

According to the early 20th-century reform approach, the sprawling, costly state government may be reorganized so that it can function with relative unity. This will allow administrators to emphasize speedy, fair, and courteous service of deserving citizens at the most satisfactory levels of economy and efficiency. The way to get more unified performance is to establish a clear organization for administration with the popularly elected chief executive at its head. It is the governor upon whom the attention of the people can focus and from whom administrative leadership flows. By making the governor responsible for administration and by giving the office the formal authority necessary to meet comprehensive responsibilities, enhanced political accountability and improved administrative effectiveness in state government have a chance of being accomplished.

# THE EMINENT LIEUTENANT MCKAINE

Miles S. Richards  
University of South Carolina

---

At the turn of the twentieth century white supremacy was all-powerful in South Carolina. The rigid system of racial segregation known as "Jim Crow" had been implemented in the 1890s. Accordingly, most gifted young black South Carolinians born in this era sought betterment elsewhere. These émigrés included such notable figures as Kelly Miller, Benjamin E. Mays, William Pickens, and Mary McLeod Bethune. Another "exile" who departed in 1908 was Osceola Enoch McKaine of Sumter; however, unlike most of his peers he eventually returned to South Carolina and became a noted civil rights activist.<sup>1</sup>

Osceola E. McKaine was born on December 17, 1892, the eldest son of Selena McKaine [later Abraham], a self-employed laundress. He graduated in 1907 from Lincoln High School in Sumter, although he later stated that his course of study there was only the equivalent of a grammar school education. But he supplemented that early schooling with extensive personal reading.

In 1908 McKaine left his home to sojourn around North Carolina. According to his close friend Modjeska M. Simkins, McKaine gained employment out of Savannah, Georgia on a merchant freighter that ranged the waters of Latin America; "He used to claim always that it was his first chance to get out of the jungle." The ship made its final docking in Boston, Massachusetts where McKaine opted to remain. After graduating from Sumner High School (all black), McKaine attended Boston College for several terms.<sup>2</sup>

In the late summer of 1914, after conversing with some black troopers in Boston, Osceola E. McKaine decided to enlist in the army. To his great satisfaction he was assigned to the 24th Infantry Regiment in the Philippines. A year later, the regiment was recalled to North America where it was quartered in Columbus, near the Mexican border. McKaine and his regiment in 1916 were part of the American expeditionary force, commanded by General John J. Pershing, that crossed into Mexico to capture the Mexican revolutionary and sometime bandit Francisco "Páncho" Villa.

<sup>1</sup>George B. Tindall, *South Carolina Negroes, 1877-90* (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1952), p. 306.

<sup>2</sup>Oral interview conducted with Mrs. Modjeska M. Simkins of Columbia, S.C. on February 12, 1989.



In February 1917 McKaine, recently promoted to second lieutenant, was transferred to the newly formed 367th Regiment, stationed at Camp Upton on Long Island, New York. This outfit came to be known as the "Buffalo Regiment," a title with roots in American military lore. It was derived from the fact that in the frontier wars of the 1870s the Cheyenne Indians had applied the term "Buffalo soldier" to African-American cavalymen. The troops of the Buffalo Regiment were quite proud of the title. As McKaine stated in 1918: "The 367th Regiment is the only regiment in the National Army with a name, regimental swagger sticks, and a regimental song."<sup>3</sup>

During World War I he served with distinction in France. For battlefield bravery during the final Allied assault on the fortress of Metz, McKaine received a field promotion to first-lieutenant. To his relatives "Ossie" was very much of a legend, because accounts of his exploits abroad were proudly alluded to by his mother. But most members of the family did not know Osceola E. McKaine until his return home in December 1940. Interestingly, in later years he tended to avoid discussing this early period of his life.<sup>4</sup>

Following his discharge in November 1919, McKaine chose to reside in the Harlem section of New York City, where he became friendly with various noted figures of the "Harlem Renaissance," including Alan Locke and James Weldon Johnson. He also associated with many of the entertainers who worked at the chic Harlem nightspots.

In 1920 he began to edit the New York *Commoner*, a short-lived newspaper which began circulating in Harlem in the spring of 1920. The journal was of sufficient quality to gain the favorable notice of W. E. B. Dubois in *The Crisis*, the national organ of the NAACP. For a variety of reasons, though, this newspaper never became a financial success; consequently the paper went out of business in early 1923. Unfortunately, no extant copies of the *Commoner* seem to remain even in New York City.

Although McKaine found much personal uplift residing in Harlem, the paramount racism in North America was wearisome. As Ansley Abraham recalls: "Ossie was always a proud, non-conforming person and he just got tired trying to buck Jim Crowism all the time--so he looked to Europe." Certainly he recalled the comparative racial tolerance displayed by Europeans toward African-Americans. Language was no bar to McKaine's settling in Europe. By the 1930s he was fluent in four European tongues and could speak adequately in at least seven others. A failed marriage further convinced him to return to Europe in 1924.<sup>5</sup>

After traveling across the continent for some months, McKaine decided to live in Ghent, Belgium. Initially he worked as a doorman at a nightclub, "Le Perroquet." There he made useful contacts which he utilized in 1928 when he opened a rival supper club known as "Mac's Place." His partner was a white Belgian, Charles Vanderburg, who had worked with him at "Le Perroquet." Within a few years McKaine's cabaret, located on the Quai des Tonneliers, was considered the posh "in spot" for nightlife in Ghent. He personally

<sup>3</sup>Osceola E. McKaine, "The Buffaloes," *Outlook* (May 15, 1918), 19, pp. 144-147.

<sup>4</sup>Oral interview conducted with Professor Ansley A. Abraham of Tallahassee, Florida on April 10, 1989.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*

## South Carolina Historical Association

called his club the "place for nice people" and at its zenith employed over 30 persons. It was quite popular with both American tourists and expatriates. McKaine lived alone in a spacious house two doors from "Mac's Place."<sup>6</sup>

He asserted that his success in Europe owed to being an African-American. He realized that black American entertainers were quite popular with Europeans; moreover, they were partial to black music forms, such as jazz and Negro spirituals. Wherever McKaine traveled he was usually treated warmly, although he also noted that "colored migrants" from the colonial world were scorned.<sup>7</sup>

McKaine was in Ghent when the German Wehrmacht occupied the city in May 1940. Initially the Belgians accepted the German occupation with a certain resignation; however, that attitude quickly changed when the Gestapo arrived to take charge. Against his will McKaine was forced to keep open the cabaret for the benefit of the German officers. The action convinced McKaine that he must return to North America without delay. Accordingly he closed his club after persuading a longtime employee to move into his house. In the autumn of 1940 McKaine sailed from Le Havre to New York City, with South Carolina his ultimate destination.<sup>8</sup>

When he returned to Sumter in December 1940 McKaine was a virtual stranger to most townspeople. His mother had recently died and he had never met many of his relatives, although McKaine's illustrious reputation had preceded him. His first cousin, James T. McCain, has characterized him as "clean-cut in every sense of the world." There was a distinct French inflection in his deep bass speaking voice which sounded quite resonant. Above all, McCain relates, "Ossie" was an intensely private person who confided mainly in his half-brother, Professor Ferdinand Abraham of South Carolina State College.<sup>9</sup>

The cosmopolitan McKaine was an instant celebrity in Sumter; moreover, word of his arrival spread quickly among African-American circles throughout the state. McKaine was a popular lecturer all over South Carolina and he wrote articles for leading black journals, including the *Columbia Palmetto Leader*. His pieces also began to appear in such major white newspapers as the *Columbia State*.

On May 18, 1941 the *State* featured his thoughts concerning his return to Sumter. He well recalled the racial segregation that had induced his departure in 1908, acknowledging that he returned with "at least a splinter on my shoulder." Yet what McKaine had witnessed in three months certainly impressed him. He believed that there was far less Jim Crowism in Sumter than in many northern cities. McKaine regularly rode on public transportation without experiencing undue harassment. He concluded: "Yes siree, in Sumter the races understand and esteem each other as in few other places." He could

<sup>6</sup>*Osceola E. McKaine File* in the South Caroliniana Library of the University of South Carolina (Columbia). Specific information was furnished by Cicile Van Haecke of Ghent, Belgium who on August 9, 1976 interviewed Mrs. Toni Goethals, a former employee at "Mac's Place."

<sup>7</sup>*Columbia Palmetto Leader*, May 17, 1941.

<sup>8</sup>*Columbia Palmetto Leader*, May 17, 1941.

<sup>9</sup>Oral interview conducted with Dr. James T. McCain of Sumter, S.C. on January 28, 1988.



have added that the city's black leadership had been quite adept at gaining concessions from the white political structure over the years.<sup>10</sup>

It was probably inevitable that Osceola E. McKaine became involved in the civil rights efforts in his native state. In October 1939 a group of black activists had met in the basement of Benedict College Library in Columbia to form the South Carolina Conference of the NAACP. The Sumter Branch, with James T. McCain as president, was one of the six charter members of the South Carolina conference. In the summer of 1941, due to serious internal strife, the branch had temporarily disbanded.

McKaine's long absence permitted him to be unaffected by any of the local feuds; therefore, he was instrumental in drawing the fragmented leadership together. He actively participated in the April 1942 meeting that revitalized the moribund branch. James T. McCain was retained as president, while Osceola McKaine was asked to serve as executive secretary. At this conclave the branch membership voted to support a project that McKaine had been pursuing for some months.<sup>11</sup>

As he often told associates such as Modjeska Simkins, McKaine deeply resented the poor educational opportunities afforded him in South Carolina during his youth. He was dedicated to improving the scholastic conditions of black pupils in the 1940s. A basic reason for the poor prospects was that many talented black educators left the state due to salaries that were far below those of their white counterparts. White primary teachers annually earned \$1183 while their black peers gained \$713. At the secondary level, whites received \$1445 and African-Americans received only \$850. As 43% of the black students of South Carolina in the early 1940s attended rural, single-teacher schools, the salary equalization issue was of critical importance.<sup>12</sup>

Prior to McKaine's arrival, the South Carolina NAACP had contemplated initiating a pay equity suit. The all-black Palmetto State Teachers Association was also interested in filing such a litigation. But neither organization had the ready cash to fund the undertaking. Consequently a dedicated person was required to perform the necessary statewide research to document the salary disparities.

In October 1941 Osceola E. McKaine was commissioned by the Palmetto State Teachers Association to canvas the state by county and collect data on black teachers' salaries; however, McKaine was expected to absorb his own traveling expenses. He convinced the membership of the Sumter Branch to adopt salary equalization as their primary activity.<sup>13</sup>

After his initial research was finished, McKaine commenced the needed follow-up activities. For instance, he embarked on an extensive speaking tour that greatly taxed his

<sup>10</sup> Columbia State, May 18, 1941.

<sup>11</sup> *The Minute Book of the Sumter Branch of the South Carolina Conference of the NAACP*, April 12, 1942; hereafter cited as *Sumter Branch Minute Book*. The original text is in the collection of the South Caroliniana Library.

<sup>12</sup> Frank De Costa, "The Education of Negroes in South Carolina," *Journal of Negro Education* (Summer 1947), XVI, pp. 405-416; reprinted in the *Palmetto State Teachers Education News* (January 1948).

<sup>13</sup> *Sumter Branch Minute Book*, June 28, 1942.

## South Carolina Historical Association

health. He also assisted in establishing the "Teachers' Defense Fund" to collect money for a "war chest" which financed the coming court litigations. By June 1942 McKaine had convinced the executive board of the South Carolina NAACP to endorse formally the equalization crusade. He was deeply involved, moreover, in consultations with Thurgood Marshall, the chief national legal counsel of the NAACP.<sup>14</sup> The first salary equity lawsuit was won by the black teachers of Charleston in 1944; in 1945 the Columbia teachers won a similar case. These were the first civil rights legal victories won by black South Carolinians in nearly six decades.

The state NAACP made extensive use of McKaine's oratorical talents during the various statewide membership drives. He went to locales where the NAACP was not yet formally organized. A foray into Clarendon County in 1942 convinced some local black leaders to affiliate with the Sumter Branch. Among them was the Rev. Joseph A. DeLaine of Summerton, who later was instrumental in initiating the famous Clarendon County school desegregation case of *Briggs v. Elliott*.

It is often forgotten that the Clarendon County case began in 1946 as a suit meant only to secure equal school bus transportation for local black pupils. It was also a follow-up to a similar litigation effort launched in Darlington County on March 19, 1944. McKaine was the main driving force behind that early project. As he told Thurgood Marshall:

We's done dood it agin! At a meeting yesterday of the Darlington Branch [NAACP] it was moved, seconded and passed that a suit be brought for equal school bus transportation. \$140 were raised and a committee of energetic men and women was formed to work toward an immediate goal of \$1000 in thirty days. How inspiring!

He added: "Yes, I was the speaker for the occasion."<sup>15</sup> Despite these high hopes the Darlington case was aborted in 1945 for lack of adequate funds.

In the course of his work, McKaine had reason to travel often to Columbia. Through Modjeska Simkins he was introduced to John H. McCray, the editor of the Columbia *Lighthouse and Informer*, an important newspaper to many black South Carolinians. McCray had begun publishing that journal in 1938 in Charleston, calling it the *Lighthouse*. After he moved operations to Columbia McCray's paper duly assumed its longstanding title. Initially McKaine served as McCray's main agent in Sumter, as well as a regularly featured columnist. In 1943 McKaine became an associate editor and that convinced him to move to the state capital to be nearer his work.

<sup>14</sup>Minute Book of the South Carolina NAACP Executive Committee, June 15, 1942. This primary source is in the possession of Mrs. Modjeska M. Simkins.

<sup>15</sup>Oseola E. McKaine to Thurgood Marshall, March 20, 1944, *The Papers of the NAACP, 1913-1950*, Part III, Series 8.



By that point McKaine had exhausted the cash reserve that he had brought from Europe. The need for a steady source of income was met when Modjeska Simkins hired him to manage one of her liquor stores in Columbia. As she states: "Of course, by day he could preach the word to the customers who came in--then at night Ossie would pursue his serious political work."<sup>16</sup>

In February 1944 McCray and McKaine took a major step in promoting black suffrage in South Carolina. Through their paper they circulated the word that the time was ripe to build an independent black political group. Recent events had made it timely for African-American voters to challenge the white Democratic party's stranglehold on the state political process. The U.S. Supreme Court in the case of *Smith v. Allwright* (March 1944) had ruled the established all-white primary election in Texas as unconstitutional. The decision sent shock waves through the Deep South, especially the Palmetto State.

Governor Olin D. Johnston and most state legislators reacted with great fury to *Smith v. Allwright*. Johnston summoned a special session of the legislature to discuss this fresh threat to white supremacy. In contrast, McKaine called upon the South Carolina General Assembly to refrain from political speeches which tended to foment race hatred. In a letter to the *Columbia Record* he wrote: "It would be a fine contribution to better race relations if some eminent white citizens could persuade the General Assembly . . . to abstain from invidious remarks about Negroes during this period of increased racial tensions."<sup>17</sup>

Subsequently the legislature in special session (April 1944) repealed nearly 200 statutes that made specific references to state primary elections. The legislators were attempting to create the fiction that the Democratic organization was a private club with rules immune to public regulation.<sup>18</sup> While the lawmakers strove to frame what was called the "South Carolina Plan," a number of black activists, including McCray and McKaine, watched the proceedings from the public gallery. They relished the knowledge that most members of the legislature were very upset that a "Negro Democratic Party" was being formed.

On May 23, 1944 some 150 delegates from 38 counties concluded in Columbia the first state convention of a bi-racial organization now called the Progressive Democratic Party (PDP). Eighteen delegates (with two alternates) were chosen to challenge the regular state party contingent at the national Democratic convention in Chicago that July. John H. McCray, the state chairman, announced that a statewide black voter registration drive would be mounted later in the summer. As the state executive secretary, Osceola E. McKaine made the keynote speech to the convention. He supported calls for President Franklin D. Roosevelt to seek a fourth term and "continue truly democratic government in this country." He believed that the United States was about to experience a "third American Revolution." McKaine called for a political alliance between African-Americans and progressive white

<sup>16</sup> Simkins Interview, February 12, 1989.

<sup>17</sup> "Along the NAACP Battlefront," *Crisis* (March 1944), 53, p.90.

<sup>18</sup> Richard Kluger, *Simple Justice* (New York: Alfred A. Inc., 1979), pp. 300-301.

## South Carolina Historical Association

elements in order to end Jim Crowism in the Deep South. He was always a consistent advocate of grassroots black-white cooperation in achieving meaningful racial reform.<sup>19</sup>

Predictably white political leaders were quick to denounce both the actions and rhetoric of the Progressive Democrats. Senator Burnet R. Maybank of South Carolina declared that the remarks made at the convention were "so fantastic and illogical that . . . they need no comment except to say that the responsible negroes of South Carolina will not follow the leadership of agitators and troublemakers. It appears to me that nothing but trouble can come from such absurd and far-fetched thoughts that existed in Columbia." Maybank expressed "absolute confidence" that national party leaders would have "no use at all" for the PDP in Chicago.<sup>20</sup>

When the Democrats convened their national convention on July 16, 1944 in Chicago the representatives of the PDP were on hand to challenge at least eight of the eighteen delegate slots allocated to South Carolina. Contrary to their public comments, Governor Johnston and other white leaders took the Progressive Democrats quite seriously. As Judge Eugene S. Blease of Newberry wrote to Maybank: "It is my candid opinion that if the Negro delegates, or any one of them should be seated in Chicago . . . , then our entire delegation will withdraw from the convention, and . . . several other Southern States may join our delegation in that action."<sup>21</sup> Such sentiments were stressed by the regular Democrats in their national lobbying efforts against the PDP.

Although McCray and McKaine (among others) made spirited appeals at a hearing of a sub-committee of the Democratic National Committee, their request was turned down. The committee members were well aware of the threat of a southern walkout. Even though various allies were willing to champion their cause, the majority of the PDP delegation chose not to initiate a challenge that would lead to a vicious convention floor fight.<sup>22</sup>

In August the state executive committee of the PDP decided that Osceola E. McKaine should run as its candidate for the U.S. Senate in opposition to Governor Olin D. Johnston. That autumn McKaine, the first black South Carolinian to run for that office, mounted a vigorous statewide campaign. His electoral efforts dovetailed with the PDP's voter registration drives around the state. Although officially accorded 3214 votes<sup>23</sup> that November, PDP poll watchers around the state, including Modjeska Simkins and Levi Byrd, claimed he had received a tally approaching 7800. Accordingly the Progressive Democrats

<sup>19</sup> Sumter Daily Item, May 24, 1944.

<sup>20</sup> Sumter Daily Item, May 27, 1944.

<sup>21</sup> Eugene S. Blease to Burnet R. Maybank, June 16, 1944, Olin D. Johnston Gubernatorial Papers (1944), Box II, Folder 1. This collection is located at the South Carolina Department of Archives and History, Columbia, SC..

<sup>22</sup> Official Proceedings of the Democratic Party National Convention, 1944 (Chicago, Ill.) July 19-21, 1944. "Meeting of the Democratic National Committee," July 17, 1944, pp. 360-362.

<sup>23</sup> Supplemental Report of the Secretary of State: South Carolina, November 7, 1944." Official report of the electoral returns for the U.S. Senate race as determined by the South Carolina Board of State Canvassers.



produced a score of affidavits to prove that fraud and voter intimidations throughout South Carolina had made an accurate count impossible.<sup>24</sup>

At the Sumter Branch's meeting in January 1945 McKaine spoke to the membership about the recent campaign. He had just returned from Washington D.C. where he personally filed a protest against Johnston's election; however, his action received only pro forma attention from the U.S. Senate and went nowhere. McKaine stressed to his associates in Sumter that a great amount of party building had to be done in the state by the Progressive Democrats. He was concerned that various elements in the state's NAACP were hostile to the new party. He also believed that black civil rights efforts would fail without the active co-operation of white southern liberals.<sup>25</sup>

During his last two years in South Carolina McKaine maintained his affiliation with the PDP. He also continued his editorial work with the *Lighthouse and Informer*. Beginning in January 1945 he added a weekly column for the *Norfolk Journal and Guide*. At the same time McKaine served on the National Adult Advisory Board of the Southern Negro Youth Congress (SYNC) and helped arrange a youth legislature for October 1946 in Columbia.

In the summer of 1945 McKaine went on salary as a field worker with the inter-racial Southern Conference on Human Welfare (SCHW). For much of 1945-46 McKaine participated in the SCHW'S extensive regional voter registration drives. In this project, McKaine and other field operatives traveled to most of the states in the Deep South. In late 1946, though, pressing personal reasons forced Osceola E. McKaine to return to Belgium.

After World War II friends in Ghent had notified him that his properties in Ghent had come through the conflict unscathed. Loyal employees had reopened the club in his stead, but they begged McKaine to return and take charge. Quite reluctantly he sailed for Europe in early December. After his return to Ghent several dinners were held in his honor, but McKaine was disappointed that his club was not very solvent. Yet he relished residing again in his fashionable home. He stated, "Here I have all my meals prepared, my clothes brushed and pressed--even my shoes are shined." It was a "joy to live without being Jim Crowed--to have full and unadulterated freedom." McKaine had thoroughly enjoyed his participation in the American civil rights movement. The expatriate concluded: "There we live dangerously and feel our living is worthwhile--a positive dynamic existence. Never doubt I shall remain away any longer than is necessary."<sup>26</sup>

Unfortunately "Mac's Place" never managed to match its pre-war success. The old patron base had dispersed and top-flight acts were hard to book. Furthermore, the physical locals where the club was located drastically declined in quality in the 1950s. By 1955 McKaine was bankrupt and the cabaret permanently shut its doors.

<sup>24</sup> Affidavits of Modjeska M. Simkins, Levi Byrd, William L. Riley, et al. attesting to widespread vote frauds on November 7, 1944 in the U.S. senatorial contest. Drafts of these documents are in the *John H. McCray Collection* at the South Caroliniana Library.

<sup>25</sup> *Sumter Branch Minute Book*, January 28, 1945.

<sup>26</sup> Osceola E. McKaine to John H. McCray, December 29, 1946, *John H. McCray Collection*.

## South Carolina Historical Association

It was the nadir in McKaine's life. Besides the bankruptcy, his once robust health was failing. In World War I he had been exposed to poison gas which later caused him respiratory problems. The fact that he was a heavy smoker did not help that condition either. In addition he had developed a severe case of bleeding ulcers. In September 1955 McKaine renewed his passport and intended to return to North America. Late in the morning of November 17, 1955 in Brussels he was stricken with an acute attack of internal bleeding; he died shortly after being admitted to St. Pierre Hospital.<sup>27</sup>

Ferdinand Abraham arranged to bring McKaine's body back to Sumter for burial. On December 3, 1955 his military funeral was held at the Palmer Funeral Home. The main eulogy was offered by John H. McCray. At the interment in the family plot in Walker Cemetery an honor guard from Shaw Air Force Base fired a salute volley. Osceola E. McKaine--Sumter native, soldier, journalist, businessman in Europe, and civil rights activist--was laid to rest.

<sup>27</sup>U.S. Department of State: Consular Services, "Report of the Death of an American Citizen." This official report on McKaine's death was prepared by the U.S. Consulate in Antwerp, Belgium on December 12, 1955.



# GEORGIA'S RESPONSE TO BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 1954-1961

Thomas O'Brien  
Emory University

---

This paper is part of a larger literature review entitled "Georgia's Response to *Brown v. Board of Education*, 1954-1961." The larger paper, which is a synthesis of the secondary source literature, describes, explains and evaluates what is known about the Georgia response to *Brown*. The paper also identifies what is unknown about the Georgia story, and ends with suggestions for further research.

This study is limited to a brief seven-year period in a Deep Southern state during the reign of massive resistance. It was not until 1961 that two black college students and nine black children entered previously all-white institutions of learning in Georgia. These actions neither constituted an end to racism in Georgia nor did they constitute meaningful integration. Yet they were a meaningful change in a society that for three hundred years had insisted on almost total social separation of the races. Using Elizabeth Jacoway's words, this change "in terms of numbers was minimal . . . and was only accepted under extreme pressure, [yet] even this minimal softening on the fundamental issue of race constitutes an historical phenomenon worthy of careful analysis (Jacoway, p. 2).

On May 17, 1954 the U.S. Supreme Court issued *Brown v. Board of Education*, which declared that racial segregation had no place in public education. Perhaps the most aggressive immediate reaction to the school desegregation decision came from Georgia. Outgoing Governor Herman Talmadge challenged the Supreme Court to try enforcing the decision (Muse p.21; Wilhoit, 1973, p. 61). Talmadge, who had watched his father make a living on the race issue in Georgia,<sup>1</sup> asserted that *Brown* "had reduced the Constitution to

<sup>1</sup> Herman Talmadge was the son of Eugene Talmadge who served several terms as governor of Georgia.

## South Carolina Historical Association

a mere scrap of paper." (Kluger, 1976, p. 710). Soon more of the Deep South's powerful demagogues--Marvin Griffin (GA), James Eastland (MS), and Leander Perez (LA)--as well as more reasonable politicians--James Byrnes (SC), Harry F. Byrd (VA), and Richard B. Russell (GA)--joined Talmadge in a chorus of resistance (Bartley, 1969 p. 68, 325; Sherrill, 1968; Wilhoit, 1973 p. 86).

In Georgia, *Brown* strengthened the Talmadge faction's position in state politics. "Long recognized as unwavering defenders of white supremacy, the Talmadge forces now had an immediate threat to resist." (Bartley, 1970, p. 26). After Talmadge showed how politically advantageous denouncing *Brown* could be, members of his faction, competing for the job as the state's chief executive, tried to outdo each other with segregationist rhetoric (Black, 1976). Winning the office in January 1954 was staunch segregationist Marvin Griffin, who pledged in his campaign that "Come hell or high water, races will not be mixed in Georgia schools." (Wilhoit, 1973, p. 42).<sup>2</sup> Referring to those who were moderate on the school-race issue, Griffin declared that "they should be chased out of town with a brushy top sapling." (Wilhoit, 1973, p.42).

Several administrative agents of state government also took part in resisting the implementation of *Brown* (Bolster, 1972, p. 140). Encouraged by governor Griffin and the state legislature, state school officials extended the effect of the Talmadge faction's apartheid policies (Bolster, 1972, p. 140). Prior to *Brown*, Talmadge had created the Georgia Education Commission which lobbied for and, thanks to the County unit system, won approval of a state constitutional amendment that would give the lawmakers the power to close down the public schools. Shortly after *Brown*, the Georgia State Board of Education made a rule to revoke the license of any teacher who was a member of the NAACP or any related organization. The Board also ruled to revoke teacher certifications if they supported or condoned "mixed classes" (Sarratt 1966, p. 104). Also adopted by the Board was a resolution prohibiting teachers, principals, and pupils from participating in bi-racial meetings (Sarratt p. 104).

Between 1955 and 1959 the Georgia legislature passed "an avalanche of legislation designed to prevent compliance with *Brown*." (Bolster, p. 138). In 1955 the legislature passed two critical laws that reinforced the requirement that public schools close before desegregating.<sup>3</sup> One law made it a felony for any public official to spend public funds on an integrated school. Another required the governor to cut off state funds from any school that allowed the races to "mix." This legislation was only the start of the state government's effort to defy *Brown*.

In June 1955, hours after the U.S. Supreme Court called for "a prompt and reasonable start" toward integration, the national chapter of the NAACP recommended that its branch organizations petition local school boards for compliance. (Bartley, 1969, p. 82).

<sup>2</sup> Bolster, (1972, p. 137) notes that Griffin only captured 36% of the popular vote, but won the state Democratic primary because of the County unit system.

<sup>3</sup> Bolster (1972, chap. 4) and Huie (1967, chap. 4) provide complete accounts of all the massive resistance legislation passed in Georgia by the General Assembly.



That summer, Georgia's NAACP leader, William Boyd, instructed Georgia's thirty-five local chapters to petition their local school boards immediately, and to follow up with inquiries until they received a response (Bolster, 1972, p. 159). As part of the campaign, Boyd's state chapter chose to help the cities without branches. But the NAACP efforts were nearly stymied by white resistance and intimidation.<sup>4</sup> By September only eight branches had submitted petitions. (Bolster, p. 159).

Upon receiving petitions from black parents in June 1955, the Atlanta Board of Education appointed a committee to study the desegregation issue. In August the board unanimously approved the committee's resolution, which pointed out that the board was subject to the mandates of all laws and authorities, and would have to do its best to preserve the system until the conflict between federal and state law could be resolved by the proper authorities (Huie, 1967, p. 77).<sup>5</sup>

At its meeting in 1956, the all-black Georgia Education and Teachers Association (GETA) passed a resolution calling for "fair play and good will" and desegregation of the state's public schools (Sarratt, 1966, p. 105). The GETA also went on record opposing the state's private school plan, which had been set up by Talmadge prior to *Brown* in the event of federally enforced racial school desegregation.<sup>6</sup> Although the GETA did little else to support *Brown* beyond passing these organizational resolutions, its stance on the school-race issue was particularly effective in countering white assertions that blacks did not desire desegregation (Bolster, 1972, p. 149).<sup>7</sup>

Meanwhile state leaders across the South, particularly in the Deep South, cried louder for continued segregation in spite of its unconstitutionality and began to organize to defy *Brown*. In Virginia in early 1956 U.S. Senator Harry F. Byrd coined the term "massive resistance," and called for an all-out defense of white supremacy and segregation. (Bartley, 1969, p. 109, 111). Soon every Deep South state called for resolutions and passed laws to resist implementation of *Brown*. Byrd was also active in Washington, where he recruited Georgia Senators Walter George and Richard B. Russell to lead the congressional charge to defy the ruling. On 12 March 1956 Senator George, who had chaired the drafting committee, introduced the "Declaration of Constitutional Principles," better known as the "Southern Manifesto," a document that formally denounced *Brown* and resolved to reverse the decision and to resist its implementation (Killian, 1985, p. 121, Sarratt, 1966, p. 41,

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 23, below.

<sup>5</sup> The resolution also directed the superintendent to make studies on: The relationship between race and I.Q., race and achievement, race and average educational training; whether integration would impair the preservation of safety and order; whether blacks could teach whites; and extracurricular activities, PTA, etc. (Huie, 1967, p. 77,78).

<sup>6</sup> To date no scholar has located a document outlining Georgia's "private school plan." Most descriptions of the plan come from a reading of Georgia laws and constitutional amendments.

<sup>7</sup> This display of black solidarity was particularly courageous. Black teachers, perhaps, would lose the most if public schools desegregated. The chances were great that white teachers would be hired before black teachers in a bi-racial system. The influence of black teachers and their leadership role in the black community also would be diminished in a bi-racial system.

## South Carolina Historical Association

Wilhoit, 1973, p. 51-55). The declaration, drafted by Senator Russell, was signed by 101 Southern congressmen (Muse, p. 63; Sarratt, 41).<sup>8</sup>

In Georgia the state legislature adopted resolutions calling for "interposition," the impeachment of the U.S. Supreme Court Justices, and declaring the 13th and 14th amendments null and void (Muse, 1964, p.72; Sarratt, 1966, p.38; Woodward, 1974, p. 156,157; Ziegler, 1958, chap. 3). The Georgia House passed a resolution that called for a return to segregation in the armed forces (Bartley, 1969, p. 74; , 157). In 1956 the law-makers also "passed five bills designed to implement the private school amendment," including one that allowed local boards to lease any property in their control, one that made private school teachers eligible for retirement benefits, and one that made individual tuition grants from the state available to school children (Bolster, 138). Other laws and state actions were aimed at derailing the NAACP.<sup>9</sup>

Although the Deep South's public resistance to *Brown* unified during the second half of the 1950s, it only accounted for a portion of the white resistance. The decision sparked a revival of the Ku Klux Klan across the South and gave rise to alternative resistance organizations known as the Citizens Councils.

Georgia was the only state in the Deep South that did not develop a vibrant Council (McMillen p. 79; Wilhoit 1973 p. 115). Whereas Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana boasted memberships of well over 100,000 collectively, Georgia, at its peak, had fewer than 10,000 members (McMillen, 1971 p. 80). In spite of having an all-star cast of seemingly dedicated segregationists, including ex-Governor Herman Talmadge, Governor Marvin Griffin, political boss Roy Harris, and Attorney General Eugene Cook, popular support for the States' Rights Council of Georgia (SRCG) was weak (McMillen, p. 81-85). The lack of popular support for the Citizens Councils in Georgia was due, perhaps, to the existence of the county unit system, which enhanced the influence and power of local leaders and county organizations.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Wilhoit (p. 51) points to the Southern Manifesto as the starting point for a unified political position of defiance to *Brown* throughout the South. Muse (p. 63) confirms that Senator Byrd intended to use the declaration as a means of unifying the South's politicians, but he also notes that Senator George was unenthusiastic about the resolution, and that Senator Russell's final draft was not as strong as the original drafts.

<sup>9</sup> In the wake of *Brown II* Georgia state officials, notably Attorney General Eugene Cook, attacked the NAACP, and made the organization fight a battle for its survival (Bolster, 1972, p. 132). One scholar (Murphy, 1959 p. 374,378) who reviewed the Southern legal attack on the NAACP, notes that Georgia refined and tightened common law offenses of barratry (habitual stirring up of quarrels and suits), champerty (assisting in litigation with money or service in exchange for some of the proceeds of a case) and maintenance (officious intermeddling in a suit which in no way belongs to one, by maintaining or assisting a party) in a deliberate attempt to weaken the NAACP. Murphy also describes how the state revenue service harassed the Atlanta chapter in an investigation of purported income tax evasion. Bolster (p. 180) notes that Attorney General Cook aimed much of his attack on black teachers who made up much of the NAACP. Cook advised local superintendents to check the records and to fire teachers who were NAACP members. Cook also spread propaganda linking the NAACP with Communism. Cook's activities, concludes Bolster (p. 183), had a major impact on the NAACP's ability to effect change.

<sup>10</sup> McMillen (chap. 5) agrees with Bartley (1969, chap 6) that the lack of grass-roots support in Georgia was not related to a softening on the issue of race. Noting that Georgia was the "cradle of the Klan" and the "political habitat of such symbols of racial bigotry as Tom Watson and Eugene Talmadge," McMillen contends that white Georgians were every bit as racist and intolerant of social change as their white neighbors in Mississippi and Alabama. McMillen and Bartley argue that Georgia failed to organize a resistance movement because leaders of the movement tended to be political bosses who already had an influential voice in state government. In effect, the SRCG was superfluous. What both scholars overlook is how the county-unit system magnified the power of the state's rural political leaders and their constituents. A true reading of the popular opinion in Georgia, though very difficult to assess, would be more moderate than either scholar



Striving for respectability, the Citizens Council attempted to appeal to business and professional men and shunned the lower-status whites (Sarratt, 1966 p. 302). Lower-status resisters and those rejected by the Citizen Council in turn joined the Ku Klux Klan (Sarratt p. 302; Wilhoit p. 101-103).

By late 1956 the anti-semitic, anti-catholic, anti-black Klan reorganized under the leadership of Atlanta spray-painter Lee Edwards. Edwards claimed his group, the U.S. Klans, the legitimate successor of the Invisible Empire, and established active organizations in all the states surrounding Georgia and in Arkansas (Bartley, 1969 p. 202-203). In spite of this interstate revival, the Klan failed to promote competent leaders or to unify. Splinter organizations became common across the South and were symptomatic of organizational defects in the movement.

Although the Klan did not dominate Georgia during the period of massive resistance, the Invisible Empire was an intimidating force to be reckoned with. (Wilhoit, 1973 p. 110).<sup>11</sup> For the Klan *Brown* served not as a cause but as an excuse for hate. The Klan was responsible for many notorious bombings, beatings, murders, cross burnings, hooded marches, etc. during the post-*Brown* period. Although these acts terrified the minority groups, they did not attract support from the white majority. The news media, politicians, and local community leaders kept a running attack on the Klan (Bartley, 1969, p. 206). Most status-conscious politicians and community elites, many of whom were quite comfortable with Jim Crow, distanced themselves from the violent, predominately working-class Klan. As a result, Klansmen were often denied charters and the use of public facilities.<sup>12</sup>

In the face of open governmental and private resistance, the Atlanta chapter of the NAACP shifted from a petition strategy to litigation. On 11 January 1958, almost four years after *Brown*, the parents of 28 black children filed a suit in federal court charging the Atlanta School Board with operating a racially segregated system (Bolster, 1972, p. 161; Huie, 1967, p. 76,77). The case, *Latimer v. Calhoun*, moved through the courts slowly and was not officially attended to until June 1959.

By 1958 the NAACP was not the only organization in Atlanta that opposed the state government's resistance policy (Hornsby, 1982, p. 129,133). In late 1958 an organization of moderate white professionals and middle-class women formed, and called themselves Help Our Public Education (HOPE) (Bolster, p. 152; Hornsby, p.129). HOPE set a simple goal: To keep all the public schools open (Bolster, p. 152). HOPE deliberately steered clear of the issue of segregation while enthusiastically promoting the open schools movement

indicates.

<sup>11</sup>With this in mind, it is remarkable that—in spite of the racist rhetoric from the Georgia state government, the tradition of the Klan in Atlanta, and the eight Klan-like factions that survived in Atlanta and Georgia in the late 1950s (Sarratt, 1966, p. 304)—the schools peacefully desegregated at all in 1961. Perhaps there were other forces at work.

<sup>12</sup> Bartley (1969 p. 206) contends there was an "element of psychological and tactical expediency in the public attack on the Klan. Neobourbons could assault 'extremists' including both the NAACP and the Klan and thus strengthen their conservative positions." Wilhoit (1973, p. 110) disagrees with Bartley's analysis. Wilhoit maintains that the actions of the Klan were detrimental to the conservative position because the Klan brought "about a degradation of the South's traditional conservatism by equating tradition with mindless fanaticism and total reaction."

## South Carolina Historical Association

(Bolster, 152-155; Sarratt, 1966, p. 315). By year's end HOPE initiated a small amateur political movement that won letters of support from 417 city doctors, 312 clergy, and most of the faculties from Emory University and Agnes Scott College (Bolster, p. 152).

HOPE's activities had not only succeeded in capturing the attention of Atlanta's professionals, they were also noticed by Governor Ernest Vandiver, who had in 1958 won the state's highest office with the campaign pledge "No, not one [black will school with whites]." (Harmon & Dannenbaum, 1989, p. 22). By mid-December 1958 Vandiver stated, "I have no patience with those who are now coming out in the open and demanding that the races be mixed in the classrooms in the schools of Georgia, contrary to the laws and the constitution of this state." (Bartley, 1990, p. 214,215). Angered by Atlanta's white moderates, Vandiver ranted that they were "running up the flag of surrender over the capital city and displaying a defeatist spirit." (Bartley, 1990, p. 215).

By early January 1959 Vandiver had his first opportunity as governor to live up to his campaign promise to prevent school desegregation. Three years earlier, two black students had been denied admission to the all-white university system (Bolster, p. 163). The Atlanta branch of Georgia State College rejected the students because they did not meet a new admission requirement--signatures from two alumni from that college. When two white alumni "[stood] with the applicants, ready to testify to their moral character," the black students were again denied admission because the two white alumni had graduated from a different campus in the university system (Bolster, p. 164). In November 1956 the local NAACP filed a suit in federal court.<sup>13</sup> On 9 January 1959 a federal district court ruled that the admission requirement to Georgia State College violated due process (Bolster, 164). But, before the college could admit the students, Governor Vandiver suspended registration indefinitely (Bolster, p. 164, 165). Over the next few days Vandiver, with the cooperation of the legislature, pushed through a thinly veiled law prohibiting admission of students who were over the age of twenty-one (Bolster, p. 165). Since the black students were over twenty-one, they were excluded. Vandiver had put a plug in the massive resistance dike, but the barrier was showing signs of collapse.

In June 1959, after waiting seventeen months, Atlanta's NAACP finally got a hearing in federal district court in the *Calhoun* case (Bolster, p. 161; Huie, p. 29). During the trial Vandiver warned that if the courts ordered desegregation he would have no choice but to close down the public schools. Attempting to shift the burden of school-race issue onto the shoulders of the judiciary, the governor expressed hope that "the federal courts will not force the closing of a single school." (Sarratt, p. 235). After hearing testimony, Judge Frank Hooper<sup>14</sup> issued an order enjoining the Atlanta School Board from operating a segregated

<sup>13</sup> Bolster (p. 162-165) does not mention the name of this case or the presiding district court judge. He is the only scholar who identifies the case.

<sup>14</sup> Hooper, a former Georgia legislator, was no stranger to civil rights cases. He presided over a case that originated in 1952 involving a black student denied admission to the University of Georgia Law School. The student, Horace Ward, went into the armed forces before his case came to trial. Upon his release from the military in 1956 he was again rejected at UGA, but entered Northwestern Law School. In 1957 Hooper ruled against Ward on the grounds that he did not reapply to UGA in 1956. Hooper also ruled the case moot since Ward was already in law school (Bolster, p. 163).



system. Hooper then declined to set a fixed date for compliance, opting instead, like *Brown II*, to allow the board "reasonable time" to comply (Huie, 1967, p. 30,31). He did, however, order the board to submit a desegregation plan by 1 December 1959 (Huie, p. 31).

Concomitantly, with all attention focused on the *Calhoun* litigation that summer, two black Atlanta college students, encouraged by the local NAACP, started a relatively quiet campaign against segregated higher education in Georgia. On 15 July 1959 Charlayne Hunter (who would go on to be an anchor on the McNeil/Lehrer Newshour) and Hamilton Holmes (who would later become a successful physician in Atlanta) applied for admission at the University of Georgia (Bolster, p. 165). After a quick rejection because of "limited facilities," the students reapplied in August for the winter term, only to be told that applications were not being accepted for future quarters (Bolster, p. 165). That fall Hunter returned to Wayne University in Detroit, and Holmes attended Morehouse College in Atlanta. Both students, however, continued to inform the university that they desired to transfer, and continued to ask for advice on the application process (Bolster, p. 165; Trillin, 1964, p. 4).

By 1960 many of Atlanta's younger, more determined blacks were frustrated by the glacial progress toward desegregation and were actively searching for alternative methods to bring about change. As membership in the Georgia NAACP fell, this new and more militant mood spread quickly in the black community. (Bartley, 1990, p. 216; Hampton, 1986; Hein, 1972; Hornsby, 1982). By the start of the decade alternative black organizations that preferred direct action emerged to challenge the NAACP's court-oriented, gradualist methods. (Bartley, 1990, p. 216-217).

The arrival of Martin Luther King Jr., the acknowledged leader of the civil rights movement,<sup>15</sup> in Atlanta in February 1960 (Sarratt, p. 326) no doubt added fuel and focus to the direct action campaign. Having accepted co-pastorship with his father at the Ebenezer Baptist Church (Bartley, 1990, p. 217), King moved to Atlanta at a time when the old guard was giving way to the new in the black civil rights movement. His presence augmented Atlanta's emerging direct action movement, while also temporarily creating a rift in the black community (Bartley, 1983, p. 197).<sup>16</sup>

In 1959 Hooper handled another civil rights case that originated in 1957, when 20 black ministers from Atlanta boarded Atlanta's buses, occupied "white" seats, and were later arrested (Bolster, 171). Typical of Hooper's civil rights cases, litigation moved slowly. Hooper ruled in favor of the ministers, but gave no injunctive relief (Bolster, 172).

Hooper would play a pivotal role in public school desegregation in Georgia. Most explanations of his actions are favorable (Peltason, 1961; Muse, 1964; Sarratt, 1966), but Bolster's account (1972, chap 4) raises the suspicion that Hooper may have been more interested in deliberation than speed.

<sup>15</sup> In late 1955 and 1956 Martin Luther King Jr. emerged as the "spiritual and symbolic leader" of the civil rights movement during the year-long, black boycott of city buses in Montgomery, Alabama (Muse, p. 52; Sarratt, p. 324). The boycott was triggered by actions of a black NAACP secretary named Rosa Parks—who courageously refused to give up her bus seat to a white passenger. Park's action gave King his first opportunity to test his theory of non-violent protest (Sarratt, p. 325). King's methods were quite different from the NAACP's legal campaign in fundamental ways. The movement stressed non-violent mass protest, persuaded participants that it was their duty to protest, and assured participants that God was on their side (Hampton, 1986).

<sup>16</sup> In the 1950s Atlanta's established black leadership had maintained "generally effective control over the emerging black protest" (Bartley, 1983 p. 196). Unlike blacks from other cities, Atlanta's blacks had developed a political alliance with the white municipal power structure and business community (Hein, 1972; Hornsby, 1982; Plank & Turner, 1987). Through bloc voting and "wheeling and dealing" at City Hall (Hornsby, 1982, p. 124), blacks had become—since 1946—a major political force in Atlanta (Plank & Turner, 1987; Racine, 1969).

## South Carolina Historical Association

As head of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), King sought not only the desegregation of schools, but also the elimination of all racial restrictions (Sarratt p. 284). King's leadership ignited the entire black community, not only in Atlanta and the South, but nationwide, and served to help blacks and many whites recognize and demand their rights as U.S. citizens. In 1959 the SCLC held its first non-violent institute at Spellman College in Atlanta (Bartley, 1983 p. 196-197). There King trained participants in the techniques of non-violent protest.

Following the lead of the successful lunch counter sit-ins that had taken place in Greensboro on 1 February 1960, two-hundred college and high-school students, many from the six black institutes of higher education in Atlanta,<sup>17</sup> staged the state's first sit-in at Rich's department store in Atlanta on 15 March 1960 (Bartley, 1990, p. 217; Bolster, p. 193; Sarratt, p. 327). Although King supported and participated in the sit-in movement (Bolster, p. 193), the campaign started independently of him and his organization (Sarratt, p. 327).<sup>18</sup> The sit-ins continued periodically for one year, and by March of 1961 the city agreed to open its lunch counters (Bolster, p. 194).

In the spring of 1960 several major developments occurred in the black and white communities across Georgia. In the wake of the sit-in movement student leaders organized the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), which established headquarters in Atlanta (Bartley, 1990, p. 220). SNCC's purpose was to pass on information about the direct action campaign to "sympathizers, friends, the press, [and] anyone who cared to find out about it." (Rose & Greenya, 1984, p. 29). Also by the spring of 1960 Charlayne Hunter and Hamilton Holmes were convinced that the University of Georgia was ignoring their inquiries for transfer. They hired NAACP attorney Donald Hollowell, who appealed their case to the Board of Regents. The Board denied the appeal on the grounds that the two had not completed the admission process by submitting to personal interviews (Bolster, p. 165). While Hunter and Holmes submitted to interviews, Hollowell filed a suit for them in federal court. The litigation began in August 1960 (Muse, 1964, p. 223).

While progress seemed glacial to the black community, HOPE and other open school advocates saw a sliver of light at the end of the tunnel. Hoopers' ruling in *Calhoun* ignited

Mayor Hartsfield moderated his position on race, and blacks did make significant progress within the "separate but equal" restriction. Since the direct action campaign of 1960 threatened this vehicle of progress, many of Atlanta's black leaders sought to control it. This was done, in part, through a black newspaper called the *Atlanta Daily World*. But with the arrival of the direct action movement, the tight control the black "bourgeois" had over the black community began to loosen (Bartley, 1983 p. 197). Bartley (p. 197) contends that the controversy this created within the black leadership was short-lived, primarily because the sit-in and demonstration movement in Atlanta was highly successful, and because it was carried out by young in-school blacks aspiring for an equal opportunity to be middle-class.

<sup>17</sup> Morehouse College, Spellman College, Clark College, Morris Brown College, Gammon Theological Seminary, and Atlanta University, collectively known as the Atlanta University Center.

<sup>18</sup> King went to Greensboro to observe the first major student sit-in (Sarratt, p. 328). In Atlanta, it was a publication by Atlanta University students in a few of the city's daily papers entitled "An Appeal for Human Rights" that provided the catalyst. The students proclaimed that they would "use every legal and non-violent means at [their] disposal to secure full citizenship rights as members of the great democracy." (Bartley, 1990, p. 217)

Bolster (p. 193) notes that the conservative *Atlanta Daily World* failed to give this movement adequate coverage or support. An alternative black paper, the *Atlanta Enquirer*, started in 1960 by student activist Julian Bond, covered the sit-ins and was a more enthusiastic supporter of the new direction that the civil rights movement took.



HOPE. The organization managed to get the state legislature to consider a local option plan that sought to keep the public schools from closing (Bolster, p. 154). But the 1960 Georgia legislature and Governor Vandiver rejected the plan, opting instead to appoint a committee to study the school-race issue (Bartley, 1969, p. 334, Bolster, p. 154)

In February, March, and April 1960 the "Committee on Schools," chaired by John A. Sibley,<sup>19</sup> went to the ten congressional districts and held hearings to find out how "the people" felt about public school desegregation. The creation of the committee was greeted with skepticism. Most Georgians probably felt that Vandiver was either attempting to build a stronger case for defiance, or attempting to shift the burden of closing the schools to another set of shoulders. Nevertheless, HOPE took the work of the commission seriously. HOPE "worked energetically to get their people, local black people and respectable white people before the committee." (Bolster, p. 154).<sup>20</sup>

By 28 April 1960 the Sibley committee had completed its study and had written a report on the findings. Sibley wrote a majority report that, though highly critical of *Brown*, supported keeping public schools open and recommended a policy that would permit local communities to proceed with public school desegregation in any manner they wanted (Bartley 1983, p. 195). Delighted with the recommendations, HOPE launched "Operation Last Chance" to win legislative support for Sibley's majority report (Sarratt, p. 315).

With all eyes on the *Calhoun* case in Atlanta, an unexpected turn of events occurred in another federal court room in Macon. On Friday, January 6, 1961 Judge William T. Bootle found that Charlayne Hunter and Hamilton Holmes would have been admitted to the University of Georgia in the fall of 1960 if they had been white (Bolster, p. 166). In a ruling that sent Attorney General Eugene Cook scrambling all weekend (Hornsby, 1982, p. 127), Bootle ordered Hunter and Holmes admitted immediately, and issued a permanent injunction against the university, preventing it from discriminating between black and white applicants (Bolster, p. 167). On Monday, January 9, 1961 Cook appealed the decision, and Bootle granted a stay of his order pending an appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals (Hornsby, p.126). But before the Attorney General could relax, Chief Judge Elbert P. Tuttle rescinded the stay (Trillin, 1964). Bootle's and Tuttle's decisive actions changed not only the time and place for the showdown, but also the level of public schooling at which desegregation would first occur in Georgia.

On January 9, 1961, three days after Bootle's ruling, Hunter and Holmes registered for classes at the University of Georgia in Athens (Bolster, p. 167, Trillin, 1964, p.51). Back in Atlanta on the same day, Vandiver, speaking to the legislature, said "we cannot abandon public education," and pointed out that he had not cut off any state aid to the university (Hornsby, 1982, p.127). Two days later, on January 11, Vandiver reversed himself, saying

<sup>19</sup> Born in 1888, Sibley grew up in Milledgeville, Georgia (Bennett, 1986, p. 18A). By the age of seventy-one he had become one of the state's most highly regarded men. He was a respected lawyer, banker, businessman, and was a leading member of the Atlanta establishment (Bartley, 1990, p. 215). It was, perhaps, Sibley's link to the business community that would moderate his position on the school-race issue.

<sup>20</sup> This effort was critical because the final report acknowledged that only forty percent of those who testified were in favor of keeping the public schools open even with segregation.

## South Carolina Historical Association

he "would deny funds to any school that desegregated," and warned the NAACP that "we are going to resist . . . again and again. We are going to exhaust any legal means and remedy available to us." (Hornsby, p 127). Georgia's policy of massive resistance hung in the balance. Although the federal judiciary had admitted two blacks to the state's revered university and enjoined the governor from cutting off state funds to the school, most of Georgia's school segregation legislation remained intact. Further, there was no guarantee that breaking the color line in higher education would translate into its disappearance at the high school or elementary level.<sup>21</sup>

The question was now starkly presented. Would Georgia abandon its public schools or its policy of massive resistance? In late January Vandiver called a joint session of the legislature. In a speech that was broadcast by radio and television, he made Georgia's choice. "Public education in Georgia will be preserved!" (Muse, p. 224). After the speech the legislature remained in session and "enacted three laws that had the effect of wiping out [Georgia's] school segregation laws" (Muse, p. 224). An era had passed.

This paper has been a brief descriptive synthesis of the secondary source literature on the rise and fall of massive resistance in Georgia. Due to a lack of time important descriptions, explanations and evaluations contained in the scholarly literature needed to be excluded. Needless to say, there are many research needs and opportunities. This author over the next twelve months will fill the gaps in the Georgia story.

<sup>21</sup> In the 1930s Charles Houston had theorized that racial desegregation in higher education would be more easily accepted by the general public than mass common school desegregation (Ravitch, 1983, p. 122). Notably, Arkansas's desegregation of two elementary school districts in 1955 did not prevent the conflagration over the 1957 desegregation of Central High School in Little Rock (Muse, 1964, p. 23).



# References

- Bartley, N.V. (1969). *The Rise of Massive Resistance; Race and Politics in the South during the 1950's*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University.
- Bartley, N.V. (1970). *From Thurmond to Wallace, Political Tendencies in Georgia, 1948-1968*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.
- Bartley, N.V. (1983). *The Creation of Modern Georgia*. Athens: University of Georgia Press.
- Bartley, N.V. (1990). *The Creation of Modern Georgia* (3rd ed.). Athens: University of Georgia Press.
- Bennett, T. (1986, October 26). "John Sibley, Savior of Schools, is Dead." *The Atlanta Journal/Constitution*. pp. 1a, 18a
- Black, E. (1976). *Southern Governors and Civil Rights, Racial Segregation as a Campaign Issue in the Second Reconstruction*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Bolster, P.D. (1972). *Civil Rights Movements in Twentieth Century Georgia*. Unpublished doctoral dissertation. University of Georgia, Athens.
- Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
- Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955)
- Calhoun v. Latimer, 377 U.S. 263 (1964)
- Dowdey, K. & Dannenbaum, J. (Producers). (1989). *Dawn's Shining Light, Ralph McGill and the Segregated South* (Cassette Recording No.31394013) Center for Contemporary Media.
- Hampton, H. (Executive Producer). (1986). *Eyes on the Prize I*. (Cassette Recording) Blackside Inc.
- Harmon, D.,& Dannenbaum, J. (1989). *Viewer Guide, Dawn's Shining Light, Ralph McGill and the Segregated South* (Cassette Recording No.31394013) Center for Contemporary Media.
- Hein, V.H. (1972). "The Image of a 'City Too Busy to Hate': Atlanta in the 1960's." *Phylon*, 33(3), 205-221.
- Hornsby, A. Jr. (1982). "A City that was Too Busy to Hate." In E. Jacoway & D. Colburn (Eds.), *Southern Businessmen and Desegregation* (pp. 121-136). Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Huie, M.H. Sr. (1967). *Factors Influencing the Desegregation Process in the Atlanta School System, 1954-1967*. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Georgia, Athens.
- Jacoway, E., & Colburn D.L. (Eds.). (1982). *Southern Businessmen and Desegregation*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana Sate University Press.
- Killian, L.W. (1985). *White Southerners*. (2nd ed.) New York: Random House.
- Kluger, R. (1976). *Simple Justice*. New York: Knopf.
- Martin, H.H. (1973). *Ralph McGill, Reporter*. Boston: Little Brown.
- McCain, R.R. (1968). "Reactions to the U.S. Supreme Court Segregation Decision of 1954." *Georgia Historical Quarterly*, 52, 371-387.
- McMillen, N.R. (1971). *The Citizens' Council, Organized Resistance to the Second Reconstruction, 1954-1964*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

South Carolina Historical Association

- Murphy, W.F. (1959). "The South Counterattacks, the Anti-NAACP Laws." *Western Political Quarterly*, 12(2), 371-390.
- Muse, B. (1964). *Ten Years of Prelude; the Story of Integration since the Supreme Court's 1954 Decision*. New York: Viking Press.
- Peltason, J.W. (1961). *Fifty-eight Lonely Men; Southern Federal Judges and School Desegregation*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World.
- Plank, D.N. & Turner, M. (1987). "Changing Patterns in Black School Politics, Atlanta, 1872-1973." *American Journal of Education*, 95(4), 584-608.
- Ravitch, D.(1983). *The Troubled Crusade; American Education, 1945-1980*. New York: Basic Books.
- Rose, T. & Greenya, J. (1984). *Black Leaders Then and Now*. Garrett Park MD: Garrett Park Press.
- Sarratt, R. (1966). *The Ordeal of Desegregation, the First Decade*. New York: Harper and Row
- Sherrill, R. (1968). *Gothic Politics in the Deep South*. New York: Grossman.
- Trillin, C. (1964). *An Education in Georgia*. New York: Viking.
- Wilhoit F.M. (1973). *The Politics of Massive Resistance*. New York: Braziller.
- Woodward, C.V., (1974). *The Strange Career of Jim Crow* (3rd ed.). New York: Oxford University Press.



# TAMING A WHIRLWIND: BLACK CIVIL RIGHTS LEADERSHIP IN THE COMMUNITY SETTING WILMINGTON, NORTH CAROLINA, 1950-1972

John L. Godwin  
University of South Carolina

---

From 1950 to 1972 the civil rights movement in Wilmington, N.C., evolved through three distinct and observable periods. After World War II black Wilmingtonians slowly took stock and by 1950-51 mounted a challenge to separate and unequal education through NAACP-sponsored litigation in U.S. District Court.<sup>1</sup> The equal treatment of black schools became the battle cry of a community that was still reluctant to enter the fray and whose perspective on the issues for years to come would be conditioned by decades of segregation and economic discrimination. As the 1950s passed, Wilmington slowly roused itself from the condition of apathy, ignorance, and stubborn adherence to tradition. From 1959 to 1963 black Wilmington began a second phase of civil rights activism, gradually mobilizing its resources on behalf of desegregation and equal rights. Organized protest through these years took place in a variety of settings.<sup>2</sup> From 1963 to 1965 old practices of segregation were swept aside in

<sup>1</sup>"Wilmington School Suit," *Wilmington Journal* 11 August 1951, Eaton Scrapbook #1, Special Collections, UNC-Wilmington; Article, *Wilmington Journal*, March 1950, Eaton Scrapbook #1; Hubert Eaton, *Every Man Should Try*, (Wilmington: Bonaparte Press, (1984), pp. 41-43. Note: Robert Norrell's *Reaping the Whirlwind, the Civil Rights Movement in Tuskegee*, (N.Y.: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1985), is a useful source, providing many insights into the civil rights movement on the local level in a particular setting.

<sup>2</sup>Eaton, *Every Man Should Try*, p. 85, pp. 154-156; Interviews: Rev. B.H. Baskerville, Wilmington, NC, 23 March 1990; Anna Burnett, Wilmington, NC, 18 November 1989; Billie Burnett, Wilmington, NC, 7 April 1990; Rev. J. Ray Butler, Winston-Salem, NC, 29 June 1990; Dan D. Cameron, Wilmington, NC, 30 November 1990; Joan Coco, Wilmington, NC, 7 September 1990; Pat Coston, Wilmington, NC, 3 June 1990.

public accommodations and in some areas of public education and local government.<sup>3</sup> But the legal disestablishment of segregation did not bring to an end all vestiges of racially separate social and institutional life. Court-ordered plans to eliminate racially identifiable schools in the years from 1968 to 1972 led to a third phase in black civil rights activism, as crisis in the schools spilled over into the community at large. When black students staged a boycott to protest school policies, rioting soon followed, which included sniper fire at police and firemen, arson, widespread vandalism and assault.<sup>4</sup> With school violence threatening to unhinge the peaceable life of the city, black leaders who had been key figures in the civil rights movement found themselves in an unlikely role as tamers of the whirlwind.

The years of the civil rights movement in Wilmington brought forward a viable black leadership that succeeded at each stage of community activism in bringing forth concessions from whites who held the reins of power. Through school equalization, organized protest, and federally ordered and enforced school desegregation, black leaders were outspoken and changed their strategies and goals in ways that ran largely parallel to the course steered by black leaders elsewhere across the nation. But the changing role played by black leadership in Wilmington can also be viewed against the changing backdrop of the community setting in which it took place. In 1950 the local economy was growing at a moderate pace.<sup>5</sup> State and local leaders had in the years from 1945 to 1949 obtained a goal they had sought for decades in the creation and funding of a State Ports Authority for the development of shipping and terminal facilities at Wilmington and Morehead City.<sup>6</sup> For Wilmington, the development of a general cargoes port contributed to an ever widening spiral of industrialization in the years ahead.<sup>7</sup> By 1965 a period of rapid expansion was under way as a variety of industries developed facilities in the Wilmington area.<sup>8</sup> For blacks it meant that the economic base that had already begun to change for the better through World War II would sustain new growth. In the areas of housing, education, and employment, black

<sup>3</sup>Stanford R. Brookshire, *North Carolina and the Negro*, Report of the North Carolina Mayors' Cooperating Committee, Editors, Wayrick, Brooks & Pitts, (Raleigh, NC, 1964), p.v. vii, ix; Eaton, *Every Man Should Try*, pp.155-157; Marjorie Megivern, *Bridge Building, The First Quarter Century: A History of the New Hanover Human Relations Commission, 1963-1988*, (Wilmington, New Hanover County Human Relations Commission, 1988), pp.4-5.

<sup>4</sup>Appellant's Brief, *Carolyn Eaton et al. v. New Hanover County Board of Education*, U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, No. 71-1890, p.5, 9; Eaton, *Every Man Should Try*, pp.104-105; Wayne King, "The Case Against the Wilmington Ten," *New York Times Magazine*, December 3, 1978, pp.160-162; Michael Myerson, *Nothing Could Be Finer*, (N.Y.: International Publishers, Inc., 1978), p. 76, 89, 104; Reverend Eugene Templeton, "Five Questions About Gregory's Involvement in the New Hanover School Crisis-1971," Spring 1971, from New Hanover County Public Schools.

<sup>5</sup>Articles, "Good Business Year Predicted," and "Bright Future Looms for Port Here," *Sunday Star News*, 26 February 1950, 14-C.

<sup>6</sup>Charles L. Landon, *The North Carolina State Ports Authority*, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1963), pp.4-9.

<sup>7</sup>"The Director Reports," *North Carolina State Ports*, Spring 1960, Vol 6, No. 2, p.16; Summer 1965, Vol 11, No. 2, p.9; "The Port Progress," Summer 1967, pp.4-5; "New Industry for Port of Wilmington," Spring 1969, p.8; "When the World Comes Calling," *Carolina Cargo*, Fall 1976, pp.12-15; *North Carolina State Ports Authority, Master Development Plan, 1986-1990*, (N.C.S.P.A., 1986), p.4.

<sup>8</sup>"DuPont Announcement Is Local Milestone," and "Wilmington An All-American City," *Sunday Star News*, 15 May 1966; "17 New Firms Have Located Here Since 1955," *Sunday Star News*, 15 May 1966, Ten-B; Diane Cobb Cashman, *Cape Fear Adventure, An Illustrated History of Wilmington*, (Woodlands Hill, CA: Windsor Publications, 1982), p.91.



Wilmington felt the impact of economic transition through the 1950s and beyond.<sup>9</sup> Signs of growth included a new generation of black leaders who migrated to the city from diverse parts of the country, ready to challenge traditional leaders whose status had been long-standing.

Among the newcomers was Hubert Eaton, a black physician who had migrated to the port city from Winston-Salem in 1943. A strong supporter of the NAACP, Eaton campaigned persistently through the years ahead on behalf of local blacks and was instrumental in the campaign for school equalization.<sup>10</sup> The Reverend Edwin E. Kirton, pastor of St. Mark's Episcopal Church, was also a significant influence among black Wilmingtonians. Originally from Trinidad, he came to Wilmington in 1951 by way of New York City where in the 1930s he had served as vice-president of the NAACP's Jamaica branch.<sup>11</sup> Kirton played an important role through the period of organized protest and developed a working relationship with white business and community leaders. The Reverend J. Ray Butler, pastor of Ebenezer Baptist Church, had come to Wilmington from Sampson County, North Carolina in 1954. His church became an important focal point for civil rights activism through the years of protest and change.<sup>12</sup>

Among the blacks of Wilmington, the most persistent and outspoken was Tom Jervay, editor of the *Wilmington Journal*. Assuming control of the paper in 1950 with his father's failing health, he moulded the *Journal* into an important force and played a leadership role within the black Business and Professional Men's Club, a group devoted largely to civil rights.<sup>13</sup> Through every phase of black community activism, the equalization of schools, organized protest, and the response to court ordered school desegregation, Jervay's voice was important to local blacks.

The drive for school equalization may have begun as early as 1948 when black teachers and principals voiced complaints that their schools had been short changed. The degree of black community participation in the campaign offers a striking parallel to the later period of civil rights protest in 1963-64. Civic clubs, Parent Teacher Associations, sororities and churches cheerfully made donations of scarce funds to pay attorneys' fees, though money frequently changed hands in secret as long as teachers,

<sup>9</sup>"Dedicated Program: Williston Senior High School," May 16, 1954, B. T. Washington, Principal, File 1 of 1, Series #6, Equalization Suit, 1950-51, Papers of Hubert Eaton, from Special Collections, UNC-Wilmington; "Segregation No Longer..." *Wilmington Morning Star*, 15 January 1984, p.1-A; The Cultural Enrichment Program Committee of the Greater Brooklyn Area Series, *A History of Our Religious Life*, (Wilmington, NC, 1976), pp.5-20; Interviews: Hubert Eaton, Wilmington, NC, 11 November 1989; Elizabeth Holmes, Wilmington, NC, 29 January 1991; T.C. Jervay, Wilmington, NC, 10 October 1990; Lana Taylor, Wilmington, NC, 8 April 1990; Bertha Todd, Wilmington, NC, 14 August 1990.

<sup>10</sup>"Wilmington, N.C. School Suit," *Wilmington Journal*, 11 August 1951, Eaton Scrapbook #1; Eaton, *Every Man Should Try*, pp.7-8, p.21, p.40, pp.45-48; Interviews: Hubert Eaton, T.C. Jervay.

<sup>11</sup>"Death-Rev. Edwin E. Kirton," *Wilmington Journal*, 16 October 1986, p.10: "If I Were A Christian," *N.Y. Amsterdam*, 14 October 1944, 28 October 1944; *N.Y. Age*, 22 September 1945: Kirton Scrapbook #1, 1927-1933, Special Collections, UNC-Wilmington.

<sup>12</sup>Interviews: Rev. B.H. Baskerville, Billie Burnett, Rev. J. Ray Butler, Pat Coston, Hubert Eaton; Floyd McKissick, Oxford, N.C., 25 June 1990; Leo Shepard, Wilmington, N.C., 8 April 1990; Lana Taylor.

<sup>13</sup>"Wilmington, N.C. School Suit," *Wilmington Journal*, 11 August 1951; *Wilmington Journal* March 1950, Eaton Scrapbook #1; "Text of Our Letters," *Wilmington Journal*, 12 October 1962; "You Can't Keep Us Down," *Wilmington Journal*, 21 March 1964, Eaton Scrapbook #1; Interviews: Carrie Artis, Wilmington, NC, 12 November 1990; Elizabeth Holmes, T.C. Jervay, Leo Shepard.

## South Carolina Historical Association

laborers, or domestics feared for their jobs should word of their activities spread to their employers. Hubert Eaton was undoubtedly the central figure in the equalization campaign. He was hampered by black fears of white retaliation as well as by black ignorance of civic affairs.<sup>14</sup> The civil rights movement for most black Wilmingtonians became first and foremost part of a process of political education. Eaton, Jervay, Kirton, Butler, and other black community leaders, although denied direct participation in the decision-making process in local government, effectively used the institutions of the black community, its clubs, its schools, its civic societies and its press, as means to educate local blacks to assume their role in the movement that was slowly building.

As editor of the *Wilmington Journal*, Tom Jervay campaigned vigorously in support of the school equalization drive and supported Eaton's board of education candidacies throughout the 1950s.<sup>15</sup> In spite of his eccentricities Jervay had long been at the center of Wilmington's black community. Unlike Jervay, Eaton viewed Wilmington blacks from the perspective of an outsider and looked upon local black elites, known as the "Cape Fear stock," as a particularly "crabbish" group whose lack of self-assertion was the result of the racial violence of 1898, when white supremacists had terrorized the city.<sup>16</sup> Though Jervay was more conservative in outlook, he was nearer in spirit to the radical publicist and closer than Eaton to the people. When victory in the equalization campaign led to the dedication of a new Williston high school, the *Journal* celebrated the achievement and gave special praise to Eaton.<sup>17</sup> In the years after the Supreme Court's *Brown* decision, when blacks were building their consensus in support of civil rights, the *Journal* became an effective instrument in support of civil rights protest.

In spite of the variety of civic and civil rights groups that flourished in Wilmington and their relative freedom to organize, the fact remains that Wilmington blacks lagged behind the blacks of areas such as Greensboro, Montgomery, or Tallahassee in mobilizing for organized protest.<sup>18</sup> Though there is some evidence of small-scale protests in Wilmington as early as 1959, well-organized protest on a large scale did not get under way until the summer of 1963.<sup>19</sup> By this time black Wilmington had already undergone

<sup>14</sup>"List of Total Receipts," File 1 of 1, Series #5, March 27, 1951 to January 14, 1952, Financial Documents, Equalization Suit, 1950-51, Papers of Hubert Eaton, from Special Collections UNC-Wilmington; Interviews: Carrie Artis, Hubert Eaton, Elizabeth Holmes.

<sup>15</sup>"Wilmington, N.C. School Suit," *Wilmington Journal*, 11 August 1951, Eaton Scrapbook #1; *Wilmington Journal* March 1950 Eaton Scrapbook #1; "Editorial," T.C. Jervay, *Wilmington Journal*, 26 May 1956, Eaton Scrapbook #1; Interview: T.C. Jervay.

<sup>16</sup>Eaton, *Every Man Should Try*, pp. 43-45; Helen B. Edmonds, *The Negro and Fusion Politics in N.C., 1898-1901*, (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 1951), p. 233; H. Leon Prather, *We Have Taken a City, the Wilmington Racial Massacre and Coup of 1898*, London: Associated University Presses, Inc., 1984), p. 88, p. 183; Interview: Hubert Eaton.

<sup>17</sup>"Editorial," T.C. Jervay, *Wilmington Journal*, 5 June 1954, Eaton Scrapbook #1; "Eaton Wins Good Citizenship Award," *Wilmington Journal*, 26 December 1953, Eaton Scrapbook #2.

<sup>18</sup>William Chafe, *Civilities and Civil Rights, Greensboro, N.C. and the Black Freedom Struggle*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 6; David Garrow, *Bearding the Cross, M.L. King and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference*, (New York: First Vintage Books, Jan. 1988), pp. 11-12; Aldon Morris, *The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement, Black Communities Organizing for Change*, (N.Y., London: Free Press, 1984), pp. 63-64.

<sup>19</sup>"Negroes State Demonstrations," *Wilmington Morning Star*, 25 May 1963; Eaton, *Every Man Should Try*, pp. 154-156; Interviews: Billie Burnett, Dan D. Cameron, Joan Coco, Pat Coston, Hubert Eaton, Leo Shepard.



a significant evolution in terms of its economic and institutional structure, but was basically operating from within the same institutional setting that it had all along through the 1950s. The black school system continued to operate until 1967-68, when the process of merger with the white school system got under way.

After 1965 the pace of change of the structure of black economic and institutional life accelerated. The 1968 closing of Williston High School, which had graduated its first class in 1923, was a major event which resounded throughout the community in the decades ahead. The closing of Community Hospital in 1967, although unaccompanied by much in the way of protest, also had a far-reaching impact. But if institutional restructuring was significant through the late 1960s, changes in black economic affairs were probably as dramatic. Although it is clear that some non-discriminatory hiring of blacks during World War II and thereafter lightened the economic burden of blacks in the 1950s, it is certain that after 1965 a rapidly changing economic horizon began to open up to Wilmington blacks.<sup>20</sup> By 1967 incoming manufacturers such as General Electric, DuPont, Hercules, and Corning Glass were in the process of completing new plants in the Wilmington area.<sup>21</sup> In some cases representatives of these plants made explicit appeals to the black community, leaving no room for doubt that they intended to make minority recruitment a part of their operation. Reverend Edwin Kirton played an important role in what might be described as a kind of "community job diplomacy," communicating directly with plant public relations managers, urging them to write to black school officials to communicate their policies.<sup>22</sup> By 1970 a significant movement of blacks away from traditional economic mainstays in laboring and domestic service type jobs was already well under way, with around 25.6% of the black workforce employed in manufacturing positions.<sup>23</sup>

Reverend J. Ray Butler perhaps came the closest of any black Wilmingtonian to an assumption of the role of the popular leader through the period of organized protest. His church had opened early on to discussions of civil rights issues, and like Reverend Kirton he praised the efforts of Martin Luther King, Jr. from the pulpit. Through the summer of 1963 Ebenezer Baptist became more frequently the locus of meetings that swelled in size until the church no longer had seating space. Floyd McKissick, who was at that time director of an NAACP youth group, preserving loose affiliation with a

<sup>20</sup>"Transportation Week Observed," *Carolina Cargo*, Summer 1979, pp. 11-12; Lawrence Lee, *New Hanover County, A Brief History*, (Raleigh, N.C.: Division of Archives and History, 2nd, 1977) pp. 88-90; Interviews: Carrie Artis, Rev. B.H. Baskerville, Dan D. Cameron, Bertha Todd.

<sup>21</sup>"DuPont Announcement Is Local Milestone," *Sunday Star News*, 15 May 1966; "When the World Comes Calling," *Carolina Cargo*, Fall 1976, pp. 12-15; Diane Cobb Cashman, *Cape Fear Adventure*, p. 91.

<sup>22</sup>Letters, from D.G. Curley, Employee & Community Relations, General Electric, to Howard O'Dell November 28, 1967; Ibid to George Talley, November 28, 1967; Ibid to Ernest Swain, November 28, 1967; Ibid to S.J. Howie, December 1, 1967; Edwin Kirton Scrapbook #18, 1969-1972, from Special Collections, UNC Wilmington; "New Industries Seek Qualified Employees," *Afro American*, 21 October 1967; Kirton Scrapbook #18, 1969-1972.

<sup>23</sup>1970 *Census of Population*, No. 35, Vol. I, *North Carolina*, Table 44, "Summary of Economic Characteristics, by Counties, 1970," U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Social and Economic Statistics Administration, Bureau of Census, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973).

## South Carolina Historical Association

variety of other active civil rights groups, sent twelve specially trained organizers to Wilmington. That summer Butler met more than once in Ebenezer Church with small cadres of youthful protesters, some of whom were McKissick's organizers, planning the non-violent demonstrations that took place with increasing popularity through July and August, tapering off gradually thereafter.<sup>24</sup> Of the four leaders, Eaton, Jervay, Butler, and Kirton, only Reverend Kirton of Saint Marks went as far as to participate in a civil rights demonstration.<sup>25</sup>

In response to the round of sit-ins in the summer of 1963, the city that was still as late as 1960 firmly resolved to resist desegregation, now saw community business leaders, the city's mayor, O.O. Allsbrook, and representatives of the Wilmington Ministerial Association come forward with the first public showing of support for civil rights aspirations. Reverend Kirton and Hubert Eaton, along with other white and black community leaders, were named to a special bi-racial committee that was appointed by the City Council as a means to ease tensions and resolve problems created by mass demonstrations.<sup>26</sup> Reverend J. Ray Butler was left out. Hubert Eaton resigned in disgust within a few months in the midst of an intensive campaign of jawboning between civil rights supporters and reluctant business leaders.<sup>27</sup> In the years from 1965 to 1968, the stage was set for the crisis that would accompany federally mandated desegregation of the New Hanover County public schools. Through the midst of the crisis, the leadership role assumed by Eaton, Jervay, Butler, Kirton, and many other blacks whose lives were touched by the process of change altered in ways that were subtle and sometimes profound. Central to this was the fact that a fundamental shift in the structure of black economic and institutional life that was already under way in the 1950s was much accelerated in the years after 1965.

In the summer of 1968, just months after the King assassination set off violence across the nation which included a full-scale riot in Wilmington, the U.S. District Court stepped in, finding the freedom of choice plan inadequate as a means to achieve a unitary system of public education in New Hanover County.<sup>28</sup> With the closing of Williston High School pursuant to a new plan, the massive reorganization of school attendance through the years from 1968 to 1972 was set in motion. The closing of Community Hospital in 1967, though achieved with few mishaps, contributed to the

<sup>24</sup>Interviews: Rev. B.H. Baskerville, Billie Burnett, Rev. J. Ray Butler, Joan Coco, Pat Coston, Hubert Eaton, Floyd McKissick; Wallace Murchison, Wilmington, N.C., 1 December 1990; Joe Nesbitt, Wilmington, N.C., 12 January 1991; Bertha Todd; William Wagoner, Wilmington, N.C., 7 September 1990; Eaton, *Every Man Should Try*, pp. 154-155.

<sup>25</sup>Interviews, *ibid*; Eaton, *Every Man Should Try*, pp. 156-157; Note: Interviews with Rev. B.H. Baskerville and Bertha Todd establish that Kirton participated in a demonstration.

<sup>26</sup>"Interracial Group Named," *Wilmington Morning Star*, 25 May 1963; "Negroes Stage Demonstrations," *Wilmington Morning Star*, 25 May 1963; Eaton, *Every Man Should Try*, pp. 154-156; Interviews: Hannah Bloch, Wilmington, N.C., 31 May 1990; Dan D. Cameron, Hubert Eaton, Wallace Murchison.

<sup>27</sup>Eaton, *Every Man Should Try*, pp. 156-157; Interviews, *ibid*; Also, Rev. B.H. Baskerville.

<sup>28</sup>Appellant's Brief, Eaton *et al*, pp. 5-9; *Wilmington Morning Star*, 11 April 1968; Larry Thomas, "The True Story Behind the Wilmington Ten," M.A. Thesis, (Chapel Hill, N.C.: UNC, 1980), p. 19. 45; Eaton, *Every Man Should Try*, pp. 97-100.



process of institutional restructuring. Institutional change, however, coincided with the slower and more subtle transition in the economic structure of the black community that was well under way as the pace of industrialization and port development hastened through these same years.

The crisis that came finally in 1971 involved many factors and a broad spectrum of issues that pertained to the operation of the schools. But undoubtedly the closing of Williston High School created a central issue which focused the general discontent of black youth and aroused full-force their capacity for resistance.<sup>29</sup> This was accomplished most effectively by Ben Chavis, an organizer brought in from the outside by the United Church of Christ's Commission for Racial Justice. Chavis had protested the closing of Charlotte's black Second Ward High School in 1968, and led resistance to school closings in other cities.<sup>30</sup> The boycott of the public schools that Chavis led and helped organize in February 1971 quickly turned to violence, leaving two dead, more than a dozen wounded, and a half million dollars in damages to property in consequence of arson and vandalism.<sup>31</sup> The crisis within the schools which followed brought high absenteeism, frequent evacuation of buildings owing to bomb threats, rioting in schools that included the storming of the corridors, assaults on students and teachers, the destruction of school property, and frequent suspensions and expulsions. Teachers in the system saw a widespread breakdown in the orderly process of instruction, extending down into the lower grades through the junior high school level at least.<sup>32</sup> Not since 1898 had Wilmington seen violence on such a scale.

It is significant that in the tumultuous world of 1971, as black leaders sought to respond to the process of school desegregation, the relationship between local and outside community leaders contrasted greatly with the peaceful and cooperative relationship that had existed during the early civil rights movement. Golden Frinks, of the New Bern chapter of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, came to Wilmington shortly after the school boycott that was led by Chavis. Describing the closing of Williston High School as "an act of destruction against the black community," he ultimately played a role that was no more constructive than that of his counterpart. Frinks encouraged black separatists to demand the reopening of Williston

<sup>29</sup>"All Black Schools Not the Solution," *Wilmington Morning Star*, 20 March 1971; *Wilmington Morning Star*, 19 March 1971; *Wilmington Morning Star* 5 February 1971; Eaton, *Every Man Should Try*, p. 103, pp. 106-107; Interviews: Carrie Artis; Diane Avery, Wilmington, N.C., 4 June 1990; Anna Burnett, Hubert Eaton, Elizabeth Holmes; Mildred Modlin, Mocksville, N.C., 28 June 1990; Wayne Moore, Wilmington, N.C., 4 April 1987; Jean Taylor, Wilmington, N.C., 14 October 1990; Bertha Todd; Florence Warren, Wilmington, N.C., 14 October 1990.

<sup>30</sup>FBI Report, "Black Panther Party," May 23, 1969, Charlotte, N.C. Office, CE 157-6171, from *FBI File: North Carolina Black Panther Party*, (Microfilm Publication, Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1986), Roll #1, Document #0019; Ibid, Document #0024-0025; Myerson, *Nothing Could Be Finer*, pp. 40-41, p. 76, p. 89, p. 104.

<sup>31</sup>Wayne King, "The Case Against the Wilmington Ten," pp. 60-62; "Uneasy Quiet Returns," *Wilmington Morning Star*, 11 February 1971; "Disturbance Toll Runs Half Million," *Wilmington Morning Star*, 11 February 1971; Myerson, *Nothing could Be Finer*, pp. 88-91.

<sup>32</sup>Statement of S.J. Howie, March 30, 1971, New Hanover County Public Schools; *Wilmington Morning Star*, 18 March 1971; *Wilmington Morning Star*, 7 & 8 February 1971; Transcript, *N.C. v. Ben Chavis et al*, N.C. Court of Appeals, 5th District, No. 745SC436, September 1972, Allen Hall, pp. 1249-1250; Interviews: Diane Avery; Heyward Bellamy, Wilmington, N.C., May 1987; C.D. Gurganus, Wilmington, N.C., 16 August 1990; May High, Wilmington, N.C., 16 August, 1990; Elizabeth Holmes, Mildred Modlin, John J. Scott, Wilmington, N.C., 13 August 1990; Jean Taylor, Bertha Todd, Florence Warren.

## South Carolina Historical Association

and threatened to stage a second boycott if the demands of the students were not met.<sup>33</sup>

By late 1971, with the boycott efforts clearly having failed, Chavis donned the garb of the clergy and organized a black nationalist religious group called the First African Congregation of the Black Messiah.<sup>34</sup> The following among black youth and a few black parents generated by Chavis and by Frinks was probably not large initially, but their emotionalism made them a potent force, serving to indicate the depths of the community divisions that had opened up among blacks. Both sounded a call for black unity at the same time that they indulged in a militant factionalism that left the black community deeply polarized.<sup>35</sup>

In March 1971, shortly after a meeting of the Wilmington-New Hanover Good Neighbor Council, the statements of Golden Frinks, who had been invited to speak, were made public. Hubert Eaton soon responded to the SCLC leader's comments on the subject of Williston High School. Now serving as vice-chairman of the N.C. Advisory Committee on Public Education, Eaton described Frinks as an outsider, without sufficient knowledge of Wilmington's educational needs to warrant his call for change. A return to separate, all-black schools, said Eaton, was not the solution to the problem blacks faced.<sup>36</sup> In early April Eaton surprised many by joining the New Hanover County board of education in an action in U.S. District Court to seek an injunction against Golden Frinks, Ben Chavis, their respective organizations, and a variety of their local supporters for interfering in the operation of the county schools.<sup>37</sup>

Edwin Kirton shared convictions similar to Eaton's about the problems in the schools. By 1971 he had occupied a string of positions on government boards such as Opportunities Incorporated, a federal agency whose local office dispensed thousands of dollars for programs such as Headstart, Job Corps, and the Neighborhood Youth Corps.<sup>38</sup> In February 1971, with the city in a state of emergency, Kirton spoke out. He warned that violence was no solution to the problems of Wilmington. He urged the county board of education to meet with representatives of the boycotting students. Calling for three days of prayer in synagogues, churches, and homes, he urged boycott proponents to find acceptable avenues through which to communicate their grievances.<sup>39</sup>

<sup>33</sup> *Wilmington Morning Star*, 19 March 1971; *Wilmington Morning Star* 20 March 1971; Eaton, *Every Man Should Try*, pp. 109-110.

<sup>34</sup> Wayne King, "The Case Against the Wilmington Ten," pp. 170-173; Myerson, *Nothing Could Be Finer*, p. 91; See also, Albert Cleague, *The Black Messiah*, (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1969), p. 126, p. 219, p. 272.

<sup>35</sup> Ben Chavis, "Open Letter to the Black Community," *Wilmington Journal*, 3 April 1971; *Wilmington Morning Star*, 19 March 1971; *Wilmington Morning Star*, 20 March 1971.

<sup>36</sup> "All Black Schools Not the Solution," *Wilmington Morning Star*, 20 March 1971; Eaton, *Every Man Should Try*, pp. 109-111.

<sup>37</sup> Eaton, *Every Man Should Try*, p. 112; Interview, Hubert Eaton.

<sup>38</sup> "Wilmington Ministerial Alliance Elects Rev. Kirton," *Afro American*, 25 December 1965; "ACC Helps Poor..." *Afro American*, 29 July 1967; "\$65,000 For Youth Program," *Wilmington Morning Star*, 6 January 1967; "1970 Man of the Year," *Wilmington Morning Star*, 31 January 1971.

<sup>39</sup> "Violence No Solution Warns Rev. Edwin E. Kirton," *Wilmington Morning Star*, 6 February 1971; "Episcopal Group Finances Advanced Tutorial Program," *Wilmington Morning Star*, 16 December 1970; Editorial, "A Gem of an Idea," *Wilmington Morning Star*, 16 December 1970; Editorial, "A Gem of an Idea," *Wilmington Morning Star*, 17 December 1970.



Kirton worked in the schools with a group of parent volunteers that included other ministers in an effort to ease tensions and restore the trust of troubled teenagers by patrolling school corridors. Sheriff's deputies were included, and in the meantime the county hired its first black deputy since the 1890s.<sup>40</sup> At Williston Junior High, one of the most troubled of the area campuses, Kirton worked frequently as an observer. When Chavis took to wearing clergyman's garb, with his followers brandishing weapons before the Black Messiah church on Castle Street, Kirton dared to voice criticism in a letter written during Christmas 1971. The pastor of St. Marks denounced "force ripe prophets," whose behavior was "a travesty on the life of Christ, who taught us the full meaning of God's love."<sup>41</sup>

In the midst of the crisis that came in the wake of federally mandated school desegregation, black leaders who had been instrumental in Wilmington's civil rights movement were thrust into a new and challenging role as community economic and institutional life altered. Figures such as Eaton, Kirton, Butler, and Jervay were only a reflection of the manifold life of the community as a whole. There were many others who worked as police officers, teachers, school principals, attorneys, or in other trades and professions. Doubtless, too, there were many who felt a profound ambivalence about the violence and turmoil that beset the city. Tom Jervay, as radical publicist for a community that was deeply fragmented, reflected the community's ambivalence by providing a sympathetic front page coverage of Chavis's activities, while proclaiming peace and good will at the same time.<sup>42</sup> Doubtless Jervay, too, harbored deep suspicions at the action of the county and the courts in the closing of Williston High School.<sup>43</sup> Jervay admired the militant Chavis enough to be amused at the uneasiness with which white reporters covered the appearances he made at his downtown headquarters. When violence came, Jervay denounced it and found himself soon at the Wilmington Police station on behalf of law enforcement with former mayor Dan Cameron.<sup>44</sup> Jervay's role was far more ambivalent than that of Eaton or Kirton, but as publisher of the *Journal* it was inevitable. As leaders of the civil rights movement they had summoned the courage and the resourcefulness of local blacks to act in their own self-interest, to advance their cause through organized protest to reform local institutions. But with far-reaching changes under way in the city, with federally mandated school desegregation implemented on the principle of racial balance, and considerable growth and change under way in the social, economic, and institutional structure of the community, they had become, perhaps out of necessity, the tamers of the whirlwind.

<sup>40</sup> Letter, S.J. Howie, Williston Jr. High to Rev. Kirton, June 28, 1971; "Church Establishes Reading Clinic," *Wilmington Morning Star*, 19 November 1971; Interview: Joe McQueen, Wilmington, N.C., 5 June 1990.

<sup>41</sup> Pastoral letter, "Christmas Greetings, 1971," St. Mark's Episcopal Church, to Parishioners and Friends, from Dr. Edwin E. Kirton, Kirton Scrapbook #20, 1970-1972.

<sup>42</sup> *Wilmington Journal*, 13 February 1971; Ibid, "An Apostle of Good Will," 13 February 1971.

<sup>43</sup> "Williston In Retrospect," *Wilmington Journal*, 9 June 1988; "A Bit of History," *Wilmington Journal*, 13 March 1986; Interview: T.C. Jervay.

<sup>44</sup> Interviews: Dan D. Cameron, T.C. Jervay.

# THE ONLY GAME IN TOWN: THE SOUTH CAROLINA REPUBLICAN PARTY IN THE POST-RECONSTRUCTION ERA

Harris M. Bailey, Jr.  
Lander College

---

"I don't know where he got them," said United States Senator Coleman L. Blease (D-SC) of the 1,123 votes cast for Calvin Coolidge (R) by South Carolinians in the Presidential Election of 1924. "I was astonished to know they were cast and shocked to know they were counted." Blease's assessment of the presidential election of 1924 and the state's Republican vote count was not uncommon among white Carolinians. To all but a handful of South Carolinians the South Carolina Republican party was nonexistent. The last Republican to serve in the South Carolina House of Representatives was John W. Bolts of Georgetown in 1900. The last Republican to represent South Carolina in the United States Congress was George Washington Murray in 1896. In statewide elections the Republican party had not been a serious political threat to the state's Democrats since the election of 1876. In the governor's race of 1892 the party fielded a slate headed by E. A. Webster which was easily outdistanced by Benjamin Ryan Tillman.<sup>2</sup>

Following the end of Reconstruction, the Republican party, (portrayed as the "negro party" and infectiously corrupt), was unable to muster enough strength to become a permanent opposition party. Outside of the state's "Black Belt," bitter factional disputes within the party blocked attempts at fusion, "a combination of minority parties to defeat a

<sup>1</sup> Numan V. Bartley and Hugh G. Graham, *Southern Politics and the Second Reconstruction*, (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1975), p. 12.

<sup>2</sup> George Brown Tindall, *South Carolina Negroes, 1877-1900*, (Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1966), p. 44.



majority party,<sup>3</sup> with disgruntled factions in the Democratic Party. To the casual observer the post-Reconstruction Republican party was an abject failure: unable to elect officials to statewide offices; unable to deliver electoral votes to the Republican presidential candidates; unable to curtail internal factional strife.

Given the dissension in the South Carolina Republican party in the years between 1876 and 1940 and its many shortcomings, was it truly a political party? The British statesman and philosopher Edmund Burke described the political party as "A body of men united for promoting by their joint endeavours the national interest upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed."<sup>4</sup> In the nineteenth century and until the middle of the twentieth century, political parties carried out five specific functions: (1) setting a political agenda, (2) establishing a network of political operatives, (3) recruiting candidates, (4) raising money and organizing campaigns, and (5) rewarding loyalty to the political agenda by operatives with patronage. On one level these functions characterized the organizational structure of the political party. At another level they described the behavior of the political organization. This article will place the post-Reconstruction Republican party in South Carolina within the context of these five functions.

### *The South Carolina Republican Party During the Bourbon Restoration*

The development of the South Carolina Republican party can be traced through five distinctive phases: phase one, the foundation of the South Carolina Republican party (1865 to 1876); phase two, the politics of accommodation, the South Carolina Republican party during the Bourbon Restoration (1877 to 1895); phase three, McKinney's "pacification policy" and the reorganization of the South Carolina Republican party (1896 to 1908); phase four, Bossism, Factionalism and Patronage, the South Carolina Republican party and the lily-white movement (1909 to 1940); and phase five, the decline of the traditional South Carolina Republican party and the birth of the modern South Carolina Republican party (1941 to 1962).

The South Carolina Republican party came into existence on March 21, 1867 at the Military Hall in Charleston, South Carolina, when delegates from nine counties formed the Union Republican party. A fourteen-member committee, formed on March 7, presented to the gathering an eleven-point party platform. The twelve blacks and two whites on the platform committee called for a system of free public education, internal improvements, land redistribution, homestead legislation, and other radical reform measures.<sup>5</sup> In the days to follow, political operatives spread out, first to the black majority Low Country and later into the upstate to organize Republican clubs. As a result of their efforts, in the November presidential election of 1868 Ulysses S. Grant obtained 57.9% (63,301 of 107,538) of the state's votes. In the special election of 1868 to seat the General Assembly, 134 of 155

<sup>3</sup>Jay M. Shafritz, *The Dorsey Dictionary of American Government and Politics*, (Chicago: the Dorsey Press, 1988), p. 238.

<sup>4</sup>Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., ed., *History of U.S. Political Parties*, Volume I, (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1973), p. xxxiv.

<sup>5</sup>W.E.B. DuBoise, *Black Reconstruction in America, 1860-1880*, (New York: Atheneum Publishers, 1977), p. 388. Eric Foner, *Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution*, (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1988), pp. 281-345.

## South Carolina Historical Association

legislators (86.4%) were Republicans. In the nine legislative sessions between 1868 and 1876, 1,174 (76.7%) Republicans were seated in the General Assembly. In the presidential elections between 1868 and 1876, the Republican party increased its turnout by 29,485 votes.<sup>6</sup> Within the artificial political bubble created by Congressional Reconstruction and maintained by military occupation, the South Carolina Republican party flourished. Yet, in this period of success and growth, the infrastructure of the party was rattled by factionalism. Joel Williamson, the author of *After Slavery*, makes the argument that internal factionalism was non-ideological in nature and that it grew out of "prejudices each (black and whites) entertained toward the other."<sup>7</sup> By 1872 the factional infighting had become politicized. The party split into two wings: The Reform (conservative) Republicans and the Regular (radical) Republicans. The Reform wing of the party took up the fight against government corruption and worked to form fusion tickets with like-minded Democrats. The Regulars, largely composed of blacks, were staunch supporters of the policies of the national party. According to Hanes Walton in *Black Republicans*, during this period the membership rolls of the party never numbered more than 4,000 individuals. The Regulars had the most stable membership pool, and they made a concerted effort to expand the party. The Reform wing was more fluid in membership. Over time, whites in the Reform wing came and went at whim.<sup>8</sup> Factionalism also took on other aspects as different groups attempted to take control of the party. This internal strife intensified in the waning days of Reconstruction.

On April 11, 1877, following the disputed election of 1876, the Republican Governor of South Carolina, Daniel Henry Chamberlain surrendered the executive office to Governor-elect Wade Hampton (D). Out of 183,388 votes cast, Hampton had defeated Chamberlain by 1,134 votes. The results of the election of 1876 and the Compromise of 1877 ended ten years of Congressional Reconstruction in South Carolina. Redemption meant the return of "Home Rule" and the triumph of white supremacy over "Negro Rule."<sup>9</sup>

Traditionally, the defeat of Chamberlain and the withdrawal of Federal troops from South Carolina have marked the end of the South Carolina Republican party and black participation in South Carolina politics. Yet, outside the mainstream of South Carolina politics, the Republican party still was a dynamic organization even if it played only a limited role in the political process.

The factionalism of Reconstruction spilled over into the post-Reconstruction period. This factional discord can be placed into three broad categories: native vs. non-native, black vs. white, and the new freedmen vs. the antebellum freedmen. Structurally, following 1876, as the party attempted to resuscitate itself, it broke off into two broad groups, non-native and native. The first group included black and white members who had migrated to the

<sup>6</sup>James Welch Patton, "The Republican Party in the South 1876-1895," in *Essays in Southern History*, ed., Melvin Green, (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1949), p. 91. Robert A. Diamond, *Congressional Quarterly's Guide to U.S. Elections*, (Washington: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1975).

<sup>7</sup>Hanes Walton, Jr. *Black Republicans: The Politics of the Black and Tan*, (Metuchen, New Jersey: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1975), p. 108.

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 104-108.

<sup>9</sup>Hampton M. Jerrell, *Wade Hampton and the Negro*, (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1949), p. 100.



state during Reconstruction. The second group was divided into various subgroups. The subgroups of native South Carolinians were antebellum freedmen, Unionists, and the remnants of the old southern Whig party. Each subgroup was further subdivided into black and white cliques. In addition the black clique was subdivided into groups representing dark- and light-skinned blacks.

In 1876, despite the loss of the governorship, Republicans maintained a slight majority in both chambers of the General Assembly. Yet as the turmoil of the 1876 election cleared, special elections and resignations reduced the Republicans to the status of a minority party. Republicans retained 35 seats in the House of Representatives and seven seats in the Senate. By 1878 only ten Republicans served in General Assembly.<sup>10</sup>

At the 1878 nominating convention of the South Carolina Republican party the delegates split into three factions. One faction wanted to field a full legislative ticket. A second faction agitated for fusion with reformist Democrats. The third and largest faction, led by Robert Smalls, carried the convention and, as a result, the party contested only congressional, legislative, and local elections. Smalls reasoned that it would serve the long-term interest of the party to rebuild from the bottom up while not alienating the newly installed Bourbon Conservatives by seeking statewide constitutional offices. As a result of the Smalls strategy, between 1878 and 1895 thirty-two Republicans served in the legislature. Of that number, thirty were blacks from the black majority counties in the Low Country.<sup>11</sup>

In the 1880s a number of external and internal political factors reoriented the state's Republican party. The most important factor was the reapportionment of 1882, which created the black majority Seventh Congressional District. William J. Cooper, Jr., in "Economics or Race: An analysis of the Gubernatorial Election of 1890 in South Carolina," writes, "Throughout the 1880's Negroes in the Black District [the Seventh Congressional District] had enjoyed a political life; they elected black legislators and black congressmen--Republicans all. Negroes outside the Black District had, with exceptions, no political life." Containing 31,152 blacks, and making up 81.6% of the population, the Seventh Congressional District became the power base of the Republican party. This district included the counties of Beaufort, Berkeley, and Georgetown. It also took in parts of Colleton, Charleston, Willimburg, Clarendon, Orangeburg, Sumter, and Richland counties. For a number of years the district was considered a "safe Congressional seat" for Republicans. According to the *Charleston News and Courier*, from 1886 to 1888 Republican turnout in the district increased by more than 1,250 votes.<sup>12</sup> In some instances dissenting factions in the Republican party fused with white Democrats to field opposition tickets to the official Republican slate of candidates. The Black District was also the site of a unique experiment in fusion politics. Under the "Georgetown Plan" certain legislative and county-wide elective offices were allocated to Democratic and Republican candidates. State Senator Bruce H. Williams, a black Republican from Georgetown, declared that the plan

<sup>10</sup>Tindall, "South Carolina Negroes, 1877-1900," pp. 309-310.

<sup>11</sup>William J. Cooper, Jr., "Economics or Race: An Analysis of The Gubernatorial Election of 1890 in South Carolina," (The South Carolina Historical Magazine, 73 October 1972), p. 210.

<sup>12</sup>William J. Cooper, Jr., *The Conservative Regime: South Carolina, 1877-1880*, (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1968), p. 104.

## South Carolina Historical Association

amounted "to a fair and equal distribution of the offices without regard to race or party affiliations."<sup>13</sup> The Georgetown Plan was extended to Beaufort and Berkeley counties.

Outside the Black District the Republican party was in total disarray. The politicized factionalism of the 1870s had deteriorated into personal attacks. The Bowen and Mackey factions grew out of a dispute between Christopher Bowen and Edmund W. M. Mackey. Bowen was responsible for having Mackey's father, A. G. Mackey, removed from the post of Collector of the Port of Charleston. At the 1890 party convention one angry delegate called Robert Smalls "a penitentiary convict."<sup>14</sup> The 1880s saw the first serious attempts by white Republicans such as Ellery M. Brayton and R. W. Memminger to "Hamptonize" the South Carolina Republican party. Appointed Collector of Revenue for South Carolina in 1880, Brayton came to the state with the "hope of building up a white Republican party."<sup>15</sup> While advocating a limited role for blacks in the party, they appealed for a wider range of white support. The "new southern republicanism" would be based on the industrialization of the state, the diversification of the state's agricultural base, and a program of immigration which would bring northern money and Republican voters to South Carolina.<sup>16</sup> These lily-white movements heightened tensions in the party.

Factional conflicts restricted the effectiveness of the party to contest elections at the state-wide level. In 1884 the party nominated a full ticket, picking Daniel T. Corbin, a white New Yorker still residing in New York, for governor and Daniel Augustus Straker, a black lawyer from Barbados, for lieutenant governor. Only Straker, a naturalized citizen and prominent Orangeburg attorney, actively campaigned for office. During the election tabulations Straker's votes were thrown out because the state of South Carolina refused to accept his documentation of citizenship.<sup>17</sup> In 1890 bickering between factions led by Brayton and E. A. Webster deadlocked the convention and prevented the party from presenting a slate. Fred Nix, a black Brayton supporter, told the delegates, "I'm as good a Republican as any man in South Carolina, but I'll go home and vote for Ben Tillman before I'll support your slate."<sup>18</sup>

The most serious threat to the political effectiveness of the South Carolina Republican party came from the South Carolina Democratic party and its control of state government institutions. The political accomplishments of the Republican party during the Bourbon Restoration, 1877 to 1895, were gradually undermined by a program of fraud, intimidation, and restrictive legislation.

The first attempts to nullify the Fifteenth Amendment in South Carolina came with the passage of the Eight Box Law in 1882. Formulated by Edward McCrady, Jr., the Eight Box Law was a literacy test which required "voters to choose by the label the proper box for

<sup>13</sup>Tindall, "South Carolina Negroes, 1877-1900," pp. 63-64.

<sup>14</sup>Patton, "The Republican Party in South Carolina, 1876-1895," p. 97. Thomas Holt, *Black Over White*, (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1977), pp. 114-116.

<sup>15</sup>Patton, "The Republican Party in South Carolina, 1876-1895," p. 98.

<sup>16</sup>Paul Lewinson, *Race, Class, and Party*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1932), p. 171.

<sup>17</sup>Lawrence Bryant, *Negro Lawmakers in South Carolina, 1868-1902*, (Orangeburg, South Carolina: South Carolina State College, 1967), p. 95.

<sup>18</sup>Patton, "The Republican Party in South Carolina, 1876-1895," p. 98.



his ballot."<sup>19</sup> Other provisions of the bill standardized the ballot. Ballots were to be printed on "plain white paper of two and a half inches wide by five inches long, clear and even cut, without ornament, designation, mutilation, symbol or mark of any kind whatever."

In the congressional elections of 1890 for the 7th Congressional seat, 7,026 votes for Thomas Miller, a black Republican, were thrown out because his ballots were "one-sixteenth of an inch shorter than required by law," and they were printed on "white paper of a distinctly yellow tinge." Miller lost the election by 477 votes.<sup>20</sup>

The Eight Box Law also outlined the mechanism for dealing with more ballots in the ballot box than names on the poll tax list. In cases of excessive balloting, "the clerk (local registrar) shall without seeing the ballots, draw therefrom and immediately destroy as many as there are in excess."<sup>21</sup> Excessive balloting was not an uncommon practice in South Carolina politics. In the election of 1880, 6,247 votes were cast in excess of the names on the poll tax list.<sup>22</sup>

In regard to voter registration, the law allowed the *local registrar* "to his satisfaction" to open the voter roll to "qualified voters" who had failed to register. McCrady, the author of the Eight Box Law, estimated that registration and education requirements would disfranchise 12,000 whites and 71,000 blacks.<sup>23</sup> With the Republican voter turnout declining with each election, in 1888 Governor John P. Richardson told a correspondent for the *News and Courier*, "We now have the rule of a minority of four hundred thousand over a majority of six hundred thousand . . . the only thing which stands today between us and their rule is a flimsy statute--the Eight Box Law--which depends for its effectiveness upon the unity of the white people."<sup>24</sup>

The rising political fortunes of the agrarian movement, led by John L. M. Irby and Benjamin Ryan Tillman, splintered the Democratic party. During the 1890s the Bourbon Conservatives pressed hard to regain control of the party and the state government from the Tillmanites. In the election of 1890 the Bourbon Conservatives bolted and fielded an opposition ticket in the general election against Tillman. Breaking with the tradition of white democratic solidarity, A. G. Haskell, the leader of the Bourbon Conservatives, made an open appeal to black voters for support. In response to Haskell's plea, a group of black civic leaders met in Columbia and debated the situation in the Democratic party. The conference recommended that blacks "for the betterment of the condition . . . vote the Haskell Ticket."<sup>25</sup> Because of the racist overtones in Haskell's appeal, the Republican party endorsed the ticket but did not actively support the candidate. Haskell, one of the primary architects of the "Red Shirt Strategy" in the election of 1876, in terms of political gains

<sup>19</sup>Tindall, *South Carolina Negroes, 1877-1900*, p. 69.

<sup>20</sup>Patton, "The Republican Party in South Carolina, 1876-1895," p. 107.

<sup>21</sup>*Ibid.*, 106.

<sup>22</sup>Patton, "The Republican Party in South Carolina, 1876-1895," p. 108.

<sup>23</sup>J. Morgan Kousser, *The Shaping of Southern Politics*, (New Haven, Massachusetts: Yale University Press, 1974), p. 145.

<sup>24</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 145.

<sup>25</sup>Tindall, *The South Carolina Negroes, 1877-1900*, p. 53.

## South Carolina Historical Association

promised nothing to potential black supporters in order to placate potential white supporters. Haskell's straightout ticket polled 14,828 votes to Tillman's 59,159 votes.<sup>26</sup>

In 1894 a dispute erupted within the ranks of the Tillmanites as Tillman's lieutenants jostled for position to succeed him as governor. John Gary Evans won the Democratic nomination for governor, but Dr. Sampson Pope bolted and ran in the general election as an independent. Pope only obtained 17,828 votes of 56,785 votes cast.<sup>27</sup> Bolstered by his strong showing at the polls (he got 30.4% of the vote), and the support he received from factions within the Republican party, Pope called "a convention of Republicans of all color" to organize for the election of 1896.<sup>28</sup>

As T. Harry Williams writes in *Romance and Realism in Southern Politics*, "there was a vestigial Republican party in almost every state that had to be constantly watched."<sup>29</sup> This "vestigial Republican party" in South Carolina and the danger of a legitimate fusion with dissident Agrarian elements and Bourbon Conservatives led to the Constitutional Convention of 1895. The major thrust of the convention was legally to eliminate the black vote by embracing a series of educational and property qualifications as well as institutionalizing fraud. The "discouragement to Negro registration" eroded the Republican base of support and eliminated it as a political factor in state politics.<sup>30</sup>

### *The Functions of A Political Party*

At the end of the Civil War South Carolina to a large extent was a "rudimentary democratic state." There had been very little two-party development in antebellum South Carolina. For South Carolina in many ways Reconstruction was Jacksonian Democracy delayed. As the franchise was extended to all male citizens in the state, the South Carolina Republican party became the great experiment in participatory democracy.

Not favored by the Founding Fathers or mandated by the Constitution, political parties developed out of political necessity. The Hamiltonian Federalists used a loose party structure to marshal support for their political agenda. The Jefferson Republicans created a centralized organization to pursue and capture political offices. As a consequence of the American constitutional structure and the expansion of the political culture in American society, political parties thrived. It was during the Jeffersonian and Jacksonian periods that the party system evolved into its specific mission.<sup>31</sup>

<sup>26</sup>Cooper, "Economics of Race: An Analysis of the Gubernatorial Election of 1890 in South Carolina," p. 211.

<sup>27</sup>Francis Butler Simkins, *The Tillman Movement in South Carolina*, (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University, 1926), p. 181-182.

<sup>28</sup>David Duncan Wallace, *South Carolina: A Short History, 1520-1948*, (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1951), p. 630.

<sup>29</sup>T. Harry Williams, *Romance and Realism in Southern Politics*, (Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1966), p. 48.

<sup>30</sup>Wallace, *South Carolina: A Short History, 1520-1948*, pp. 630-632. For a discussion of the Republican response to the 1895 Constitutional Convention, see: Randy Wellford, "Disenfranching the Black Citizens: The S.C. Constitutional Convention of 1895," in *Black Carolinians: Studies in the History of South Carolina Negroes in the Nineteenth Century*, ed., Charles W. Joyner, (Laurinburg, North Carolina: St. Andrews Presbyterian College).

<sup>31</sup>For a discussion of the Jeffersonian and Jacksonian party systems, see Richard P. McCormick, *The Second American Party System*, (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1966).



In *Parties and Politics in America*, Clinton Rossiter argued that these functions were subsidiary. The inclusive function of the party was to coalesce and control factionalism and direct that energy in the struggle for political power.<sup>32</sup> Frank J. Sorauf, *Political Parties in the American System*, divided the functions of a political party into two categories: manifest and latent. He described manifest functions as the operational activities of a party and latent functions as the philosophical and ideological underpinnings of a party.<sup>33</sup> within each party, according to Samuel J. Eldersveld, *Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis*, are a number of subgroups with their own political agendas. It is the function of the party leadership to bargain with these subgroups and find a workable compromise which merges their agendas with that of the party. These coalitions add to the party's electoral strength and the overall party structure.<sup>34</sup>

In the nineteenth century the American party system existed to execute five distinctive functions. (1) At the national level a political party established a nationwide political agenda which attracted supporters. (2) At the state and local level, a political party constructed a network of political operatives to implement its national agenda. (3) At the national, state, and local levels, a political party recruited agents/candidates for elective posts to carry out the policies and programs of the party. (4) At all levels, political parties raised money and organized the political campaigns of their candidates for office. (5) The parties rewarded loyalty to the national party and support for the party's political agenda with patronage and pork barrel at all levels.

With this as a backdrop, was the post-Reconstruction South Carolina Republican party able to perform these functions? Given the racial constraints of the day and the program of organized fear and intimidation carried on against it, the party was moderately successful.

FUNCTION 1: Did the party establish a political agenda attractive to a spectrum of supporters?

James Welch Patton argues that a key shortcoming of the party was its failure to develop an original platform addressing the needs of the state. Ousted from power, the Republican leadership clung to its reformist tradition and continued to promote the use of government as an agent of change. The party's platform was built upon its past accomplishments in the areas of public education, tax reform, and humanitarian care of the mentally ill. Despite its internal discontent the party was steadfast in its support of the institutions and programs established during the Reconstruction period. Attacking the lack of originality exhibited by the party, Patton observed that the documents and resolutions of the party were "copied" or "lifted boldly" from the platforms of Northern states or the Republican National Convention. All of this is true. But a substantial number of South Carolinians, the party's black rank and file, accepted without question the aspirations of the

<sup>32</sup>Clinton Rossiter, *Parties and Politics in America*, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1966), pp. 45-50.

<sup>33</sup>Frank J. Sorauf, *Political Parties in the American System*, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1964), pp. 2-39.

<sup>34</sup>Samuel J. Eldersveld, *Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis*, Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1964), pp. 1-23.

## South Carolina Historical Association

National Republican party. The Republican party was first and foremost the party of freedom and equality. It was the party of OPPORTUNITY and middle class values of hard work and thrift. A vast majority of the black population of South Carolina wholeheartedly embraced or aspired to these values.

FUNCTION 2: Did the party construct a network of political operatives to implement its political agenda?

The ability to survive despite the taxing odds against survival is the greatest achievement of the South Carolina Republican party. Party officials were able to construct an immense electoral pool from Freedman's Bureau contacts and the membership rolls of the statewide Union Leagues. Like missionaries, the sons and daughters of the antebellum free black families of Charleston spread out across the state and brought many Freedmen into the party. Turnout in presidential elections during the Reconstruction period grew with each election. Despite legal and illegal restrictions, Republican turnout in the "Black District" was respectable. Turnout in other areas of the state was marginal.

There was without question a continuity of leadership in the party. Men such as Martin R. Delany and Robert C. DeLarge were followed by such leaders as Robert B. Elliott and Robert Smalls. In time they were succeeded by Thomas E. Miller and William D. Crum. White political bosses such as Christopher Bowen and E. W. M. Mackey faded and were followed by Ellery M. Brayton and Webster. They, in turn, would be displaced by Joseph Tolbert and John G. Capers.

FUNCTION 3: Did the party recruit candidates for elective posts at the statewide and local level?

Much attention is attached to the fact that after 1876 at the statewide level the Republican party was not competitive. Yet in congressional, legislative, and local elections, the party was quite competitive. Between 1868 to 1900, in 75 congressional elections the Republican party fielded candidates. Turnout for congressional elections was quite high. Statewide, in 1880, 60,796 Republican votes were cast in the state's seven congressional districts. In the first election after the enactment of the Eight Box Law, the statewide congressional vote fell by over 30,000 votes, but 20,369 Republicans were still able to vote. In the three elections from 1890 to 1895 the Republican turnout in congressional elections averaged 13,414 votes. In presidential elections Republican turnout dropped off substantially after 1876, but did not fall below 10,000 votes until 1896.

FUNCTION 4: Did the party raise money and organize political campaigns?

The least successful aspect of the South Carolina Republican party was its ability to raise money. Being primarily a party of black yeomen, it lacked wealthy benefactors. Its leaders, for the most part, were underpaid federal bureaucrats who financially contributed



little to the party. To a large extent the financial base of the party was dependent upon the support of Northern political philanthropists. But philanthropists were unwilling to invest in the party's future given its political instability. In part the party's political failings were caused by the financial condition of the party. At the state convention of 1884 Chairman Robert Smalls passed the hat to solicit funds to pay the cost of cleaning the meeting hall.<sup>35</sup>

FUNCTION 5: Did the state party reward its members for their loyalty to the national party?

During most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries critics of the South Carolina Republican party have argued that it was only a conduit for federal patronage. Patton writes, "the party sank to little more than a political fiction, an aggregation of federal office holders and placemen. . . .<sup>36</sup> Shut out of higher statewide constitutional offices, appointments to the federal bureaucracy were the only means by which Republicans could serve the people in a meaningful manner. In much of the literature of the day, patronage was identified with "the pie hunt" or "easy berth" or "financial remuneration." Willard Gatewood forcefully makes the case that "a federal office provided them [black Republicans] the means to bargain with whites. . . .<sup>37</sup> The politics of patronage furthered factional disputes within the state party. The white political bosses were ruthless in their attempts to gain control of and hold onto the flow of federal patronage in the state. Black leaders argued that there was an unequal distribution of patronage in the state. Blacks, who represented the bulk of the party's political base, were, for the most part, given minor or insignificant bureaucratic posts. The patronage controversy also stimulated caste animosities within the black leadership caucus. The less influential party members accused the national party of lavishing patronage on a handful of specific black leaders and ignoring the rest of the caucus. In the long term, patronage totally saturated the ideological goals of the party. By the 1900s, Hanes Walton, Jr. notes, "the group [Black and Tan organization] made only minor attempts to enter state and local politics but emerged every four years to go to the national convention, get seated, and acquire patronage, the last being its chief objective."<sup>38</sup>

## CONCLUSION

By the turn of the century, the South Carolina Republican party had retreated from the political playing field. There would be occasional campaign sorties, but they were hollow gestures. After the disenfranchisement convention of 1895 the party was a coffer of dreams. The loyal core of black middle-class supporters desperately held onto the dreams of the past. They dreamed of the opportunity to participate on a fair and equal footing on

<sup>35</sup>Patton, "The Republican Party in South Carolina, 1876-1895," p. 101.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid., p. 96-101.

<sup>37</sup>Willard B. Gatewood, "William D. Crum: A Negro in Politics," *Journal of Negro History*, 53 October 1968, p. 305.

<sup>38</sup>Walton, "Black Republicans: The Politics of the Black and Tans," p. 114.

## South Carolina Historical Association

a level political playing field. White factions continued to dream of mobilizing large blocks of voters to capture elections or building a "respectable" white party free of "negro influence." But it is clear that the South Carolina Republican party was little more than a political shadow.

In the last two decades of the nineteenth century, party infighting at the state and national level, coupled with disenfranchisement efforts, devastated the South Carolina Republican party. Year after year, these forces ate away at the party, gradually eroding its ability to fulfill the specific functions of a political party. Leadership was the greatest failing of the state's Republican party. The leadership was unable to quash the flare-up of personal disputes in the party or control the growth of factionalism. If the leadership had adopted coalition strategies, fusion tickets with factional elements in the Democratic party might have made the party more competitive in statewide elections. While fusion politics enjoyed limited success in South Carolina at the local level, a number of factors acted as a barrier to a true statewide fusion ticket. Racial animosities and mistrust were a deterrent to coalition building. Many Republicans feared losing their political identity if they compromised and joined with breakaway Democrats. Black leaders felt that political fusion meant political displacement for the politically active black citizenry. The leadership also failed to make an impact on the state's political agenda. The black and white leadership of the party *allowed* the Democrats to dictate the content of political debate within South Carolina. Substantial questions of policy and ideology were subjugated to questions of race and, to a subliminal degree, questions of caste. The rhetoric of white supremacy and black inferiority replaced discussions of the needs and goals of public education, of basic civil and human rights, and the industrialization of the state. The state's Republican leadership was drawn into these arguments and failed to build on Reconstruction successes.

Part of the demise of the South Carolina Republican party can be blamed on the national Republican party. The inability of the national Republican party to develop a "southern strategy" or to support the South Carolina party in its struggle against disenfranchisement doomed the party. Looking back, the South Carolina Republican party can easily be characterized as "political fiction." In many instances the party failed to carry out many of the functions expected of a political party. Beyond campaigns and elections, however, although unable to provide many political needs, the South Carolina Republican party provided esteem needs. For blacks it was connection to a more triumphant past. It was one of the few institutions in the state where blacks and whites met on a semi-equal level. The party represented middle class respectability. If these factors are taken into account it is understandable why, after twenty years of political repression, black Republican activists would strongly support Eisenhower in 1952. The history of the South Carolina Republican party is a story of opportunities lost in a sea of possibilities.



# THE CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING MENDEL RIVERS AND HIS BATTLE WITH THE BOTTLE

Will Huntley  
Governor's School for Science  
and Mathematics

---

Representative Lucius Mendel Rivers' alleged drinking problem generated controversy prior to and especially after he became chairman of the House Armed Services Committee (HASC). Although his difficulties with liquor were more pronounced in his early years, they substantially subsided when he became chairman and yet, ironically, this is when they received the most print and criticism. This paper will cite some incidents which were never put into print, relate concerns by others in the Congress, and examine the charges made against Charleston's congressman regarding this problem.

As Mendel Rivers' power in congress increased, so did his problems with alcohol. Within a few years after being elected to congress in 1940, Rivers began to have trouble controlling his drinking. It was something that only certain members of his immediate family and a few intimate friends knew about for close to a decade.<sup>1</sup> Not even the congressman's sister, Madge, was aware that he was drinking to excess until 1958.<sup>2</sup>

By the mid-1950s Rivers' excessive drinking became known to others.<sup>3</sup> Ironically, Rivers' First District constituents and the people of South Carolina were the last to learn of his bouts with the bottle.<sup>4</sup> This was because whenever the Low Country lawmaker went on a drinking spree he was usually out of the state or out of the country. Rivers also was not a constant drinker. Even during the worst period of his hard drinking he would go

<sup>1</sup>Interview with Judge L. Mendel Rivers, Jr., son of the late congressman, Charleston, SC, February 26, 1986.

<sup>2</sup>Interview with Mrs. Madge Danley, sister of the late congressman, conducted by Dr. Walter J. Fraser, Charleston, SC, January 12, 1973.

<sup>3</sup>Rivers, *op. cit.*

<sup>4</sup>Confidential conversation with researcher.

## South Carolina Historical Association

about five or six months without touching a drop of liquor; once he did, though, he lost control of himself.<sup>5</sup> His binges usually lasted about two weeks.<sup>6</sup> On those rare occasions when they occurred in South Carolina, he had friends who would spirit him away to Asheville or Beaufort to dry out.<sup>7</sup>

Over a period of time some of his constituents found out about his inappropriate drunken behavior through others who had witnessed it firsthand. One constituent, who was traveling in Europe in 1957, heard from a US Army officer stationed in Germany that Rivers had gotten into some trouble in Heidelberg and it had been the officer's responsibility to help get him on a plane back home. The officer was surprised to discover that the constituent was unaware of Rivers' drinking problem which he thought most everyone in the First Congressional District knew.<sup>8</sup>

One at least one other occasion Rivers again was put on a plane which returned him to Charleston. Congressman William Jennings Bryan Dorn was at his home in Greenwood when he got a phone call from a man in Lynchburg, Virginia who told Dorn that Rivers was out cold, "buck-naked" on the floor. The man warned Dorn that "if you don't come and get him he is not going to live." Dorn immediately enlisted the help of a friend who owned a plane and they flew up to Lynchburg. After arriving they went to where Rivers was staying, carried him out, loaded him on the plane, and took off for Charleston. Prior to leaving Lynchburg, Dorn contacted people in Charleston and instructed them to meet their party at the airport and to take Rivers home.<sup>9</sup>

Rivers came close to ruining his own "Mendel Rivers Appreciation Day" which was held in Charleston in May 1958. Before getting on a plane in Washington, which was to take him and other government officials to Charleston to help celebrate, Rivers made a stop at a liquor store where he bought a large quantity of whiskey. On the flight home he began drinking and became intoxicated. Fortunately Rivers rode in a 35-car parade the next morning and just had to wave at the crowd, but in the afternoon he was to give a speech to thousands of admirers at Johnson Hagood Stadium. Underneath the stands his daughter Peggy grabbed out of his hands a bottle of bourbon he had been nipping and smashed it on the ground. It became apparent to Congressman Dorn and others that Rivers was in no condition to make a speech. Dorn advised him to tell those assembled that he was too full of emotion to speak long or adequately. He took Dorn's advice and made his speech exceptionally brief. Still, disaster almost struck as Rivers came close to falling off the podium after he finished his remarks.<sup>10</sup> The thousands who had come to hear Rivers were not aware of the real reason why he kept his speech so short.

<sup>5</sup>Rivers, *op. cit.*

<sup>6</sup>Rivers, *op. cit.* and interview with the Honorable William Jennings Bryan Dorn, former member of the House of Representatives, Greenwood, SC, March 1, 1985.

<sup>7</sup>Interview with Jack Leland, retired reporter for the *Charleston Evening Post*, Charleston, SC, June 7, 1985, and interview with Mrs. Blanche Darby Odom, sister of the later congressman, conducted by Dr. Walter J. Fraser, Charleston, SC, January 12, 1973.

<sup>8</sup>Confidential conversation with researcher.

<sup>9</sup>Dorn, *op. cit.*

<sup>10</sup>Dorn, *op. cit.*



The drinking became so bad that Mendel Rivers was considered by some in authority to be a liability to the government of the United States. In 1958 Rivers made a military inspection trip to Spain and other bases in Europe. Somehow rivers managed to wander away from military officials and could not be found. After an extensive search was conducted, he was discovered in a vineyard conversing with a drunken Spaniard in Gullah.<sup>11</sup> The team from the CIA which participated in the search was shaken, but concluded that Rivers had not inadvertently given away any American military secrets.<sup>12</sup> Fortunately for Rivers this incident was not reported to the press, but his nemesis Drew Pearson did report in one of his syndicated columns that the Low Country's lawmaker was seen chasing a nude woman down a hotel hall in Madrid.<sup>13</sup> This sorry incident made Mendel Rivers out to be a womanizer, which he was not.<sup>14</sup> It was a case where he lost the better part of himself to liquor.

There were people on the Democratic side of the aisle who had serious reservations about Mendel Rivers possibly becoming the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee due to his drinking. What had happened on the 1958 European inspection tour--being found drunk in a Spanish vineyard, chasing the nude woman down the hall in Madrid, other incidents which later happened in France and Germany, and his attempt to fire his escort officer who was trying to keep him in tow--worried Carl Vinson (D-GA), the powerful chairman of the HASC and Rivers' boss.<sup>15</sup> What complicated matters for Vinson just a few years later was the prospect that Rivers could follow him as chairman, as three members who were senior to Rivers on the HASC departed for various reasons.

In 1959 Overton Brooks (D-LA) left to become chairman of the newly formed Science and Astronautics Committee. Carl Durham (D-NC), announced he would not seek re-election in 1960. Paul Kilday (D-TX) resigned from the House in September 1961 to become a judge on the Court of Military Appeals. This upset Vinson's plans for retirement in January 1963, as Rivers was now the heir apparent. Vinson was not pleased with the prospect and evidently neither was President Kennedy. It was later learned that Kennedy made a personal presidential plea and asked Vinson not to retire and stay on as chairman. Vinson promised Kennedy that he would "run again, God willing."<sup>16</sup>

As time passed, the opposition to Charleston's congressman becoming chairman began to subside in the House. His colleagues came to realize that Rivers possessed extensive knowledge of military matters and they noticed his bouts with the bottle becoming less frequent and intense. When a young naval congressional liaison officer mentioned some of his apprehensions privately about Rivers possibly becoming chairman to Representative Frank Becker (R-NY), who served on the HASC and was held in high esteem by those in

<sup>11</sup>Gullah is a distinctive and unique blend of English and African languages which is spoken by blacks in the Lowcountry. It is a dialect few understand.

<sup>12</sup>Interview with Dr. Donald Fowler, former South Carolina Democratic Party Chairman, Columbia, SC, May 15, 1985.

<sup>13</sup>Leland, *op. cit.*

<sup>14</sup>Interview with John R. ("Russ") Blandford, former Chief Counsel to the House Armed Services Committee, Seabrook Island, SC, November 17, 1985.

<sup>15</sup>Blandford, *op. cit.*

<sup>16</sup>Charleston News and Courier, March 18, 1963, p. 1-a.

## South Carolina Historical Association

the Pentagon, the liaison officer was stunned as Becker informed him that Rivers was an individual who worked for all that he had, was a true patriot, and had a dedication to the nation's military which no one could question. Becker also told him that "Mendel Rivers is a better man drunk than most men are sober and he is never so drunk that he loses complete control." Over the course of the next few years the officer came to agree completely with Becker's assessment of Rivers.<sup>17</sup>

The one man who might have prevented Rivers from becoming chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn (D-TX), died in November 1961. Fortunately for Rivers, Rayburn was succeeded by John McCormack (D-MA). Rivers and McCormack got along famously which was definitely to Rivers' advantage. Carl Vinson began to work with his heir apparent and personally instructed him on how he ran the committee. He got Rivers to become more interested and involved in the details of various HASC activities. Mendel Rivers responded to the extra attention, learned well, and Vinson was pleased with the extraordinary progress his charge had made.<sup>18</sup> Because both McCormack and Vinson gave Charleston's congressman their personal stamp of approval to become the House Armed Services Committee's new chairman, no one in the party dared publicly oppose it.

One man outside the party who publicly opposed Rivers being chairman was the prominent muckraking columnist Drew Pearson whose column appeared in over 650 papers, almost double any other.<sup>19</sup> Pearson was the first reporter to put into print that Mendel Rivers had problems with liquor.<sup>20</sup> After Rivers assumed the chairmanship Pearson wrote about scandalous events related to Rivers' binges which had occurred years in the past, but he made them seem like they had happened only yesterday.<sup>21</sup> He unfairly branded Rivers as a common drunk and people believed him, there being little else in print to refute Pearson's allegations. (The only reporter of national prominence to refute Pearson's charges--and this was indirectly--about River's drinking was Don Oberdorfer of the *New York Times*. Oberdorfer in an August 1965 article about the Low Country lawmaker acknowledged that Rivers had been "one of the champion hell-raisers of Capitol Hill" but that he had become more subdued since he had become chairman.)<sup>22</sup> Whenever Rivers attended a party or Washington function, those people who had read Pearson's columns assumed any drink in his hand to be alcoholic.<sup>23</sup>

Mendel Rivers' office staff in Washington was angered and frustrated by Pearson's columns. One of his stories stated that when Rivers' staff came in to work on Monday

<sup>17</sup>Interview with Captain John Fitzgerald, US Navy Ret., Columbia, SC, November 10, 1985.

<sup>18</sup>Robert L.F. Sikes, *He Coon: The Bob Sikes Story*, (Pensacola, Florida: The Perdido Press, 1984), p. 451.

<sup>19</sup>"The Tenacious Muckraker," *Time*, September 12, 1969, p. 82.

<sup>20</sup>Robert Sherrill, "Drew Pearson: An Interview," *The Nation*, July 7, 1969, p. 15.

<sup>21</sup>Blandford, *op. cit.*

<sup>22</sup>Don Oberdorfer, "Rivers Delivers," *The New York Times Magazine*, August 29, 1965, p. 91.

<sup>23</sup>Interview with the Honorable Mendel Davis, former First District Congressman, North Charleston, SC, March 7, 1985.



mornings they frequently found him on the office floor with liquor bottles beside him. It was a complete fabrication. This never happened on Monday or any other day, ever.<sup>24</sup>

It was not the first unfounded charge by Person, nor would it be the last. A secretary who went to work for Rivers' Washington office in 1963 declared that all of the stories written about Charleston's congressman by Drew Pearson during her tenure with Rivers (which ended with his death in 1970) were "absolutely ridiculous" and that neither she nor any of the other staff members ever "knew one of them to be true." They also wondered where Pearson was getting his information which was so erroneous when it concerned Rivers.<sup>25</sup>

John R. Blandford, a Phi Beta Kappa graduate of Yale, was a top-ranking government bureaucrat who worked for the HASC for twenty-five years before retiring in 1972. He came to serve Carl Vinson, Mendel Rivers, and Edward Hebert as their chief counsel. One particular Pearson charge especially incensed Blandford. Pearson had written that Rivers kept sensitive top secret documents on his desk all the time and that anyone could come in and steal them when he was intoxicated. Blandford vehemently declared that this was never the case and that in his opinion it was one of Pearson's biggest lies.<sup>26</sup>

The House of Representatives was equally incensed by another allegation made by Pearson that was untrue. Rivers suffered from bursitis in his neck, shoulders, and hips, and it forced him to wear a neck brace or use a cane when it would flare up. When the pain became intolerable, he found it necessary to go to Bethesda Naval Hospital to take heat treatments and be placed in traction to lessen the discomfort he was experiencing. This was the case when he checked into Bethesda during the last days of May 1966 with excruciating pain which affected his neck and upper spine. Drew Pearson became aware of Rivers' absence, because the HASC was scheduled to convene on five separate occasions over a two-week period to approve a \$17.8 billion military procurement bill. He charged that it never did, because its chairman was

drying out from a drunk. It was so serious that the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee had to be taken to Bethesda Naval Hospital.<sup>27</sup>

He also claimed that this was not the first time Rivers had been sent to Bethesda to dry out. Pearson came to question Rivers' competency to head the HASC stating

that when nearly \$18 billion are involved [for military procurement], together with the defense of the nation, it's important to examine the

<sup>24</sup>Interview with Kathy S. Worthington, former secretary to Representative L. Mendel Rivers (Mendel Davis and Thomas Hartnett), Federal Office Building, Charleston, SC, November 20, 1985.

<sup>25</sup>Worthington, *op. cit.*

<sup>26</sup>Blandford, *op. cit.*

<sup>27</sup>Fayetteville Observer, June 13, 1966.

## South Carolina Historical Association

mental or physical instability of the man who masterminds the military law.<sup>28</sup>

Mendel Rivers happened to read this story on June 13, the day it hit the papers across the country, and got out of his sick bed so he could get the bill out of the HASC and then steer it through the House. He went to his office wearing a leather neck brace and spoke to reporters who had learned of his return. He told them that though he was still in discomfort, the pain was less severe than it had been.<sup>29</sup> He then cleared the bill out of his committee so it could go to floor of the House to be debated.

His arrival at the House was met with a long and thunderous ovation as his colleagues enthusiastically showed their support of him in the face of Pearson's charges. (Representative Richard Ichord, a Democrat from the "Show Me" state of Missouri later remarked that the standing ovation given Rivers was the "longest . . . I have ever seen given any member on the floor of the House during congressional deliberations.")<sup>30</sup> Rivers thanked the members for their acknowledgement and quipped that he was not going to go back to the hospital as it was "bad publicity."<sup>31</sup>

When the debate on the military procurement bill was about to begin, something unusual happened. Speaker of the House John McCormack took the floor and what he had to say had nothing to do with the bill:

I think this is the appropriate time, before the debate starts, to make a few remarks that are extremely justified. . . . The committee [HASC] is indeed fortunate to have as its chairman the distinguished gentlemen from South Carolina. Throughout his entire service on the committee on Armed Services he has been a bulwark of strength in the national interest and in the national defense. . . . Under his leadership . . . his committee has rendered service to our country which will go down in history as occupying the outstanding pages of legislative history of our country. . . . He has filled this important position with honor, with distinction, with ability, and with courage and dedication. . . . He is one of the greatest Americans I have ever met, and one of the outstanding legislators of my long period of service in the Congress of the United States.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>28</sup>Ibid.

<sup>29</sup>*News and Courier*, June 14, 1966, p. 1-b.

<sup>30</sup>*News and Courier*, June 19, 1966, p. 10-b.

<sup>31</sup>*News and Courier*, June 15, 1966, p. 1-b.

<sup>32</sup>*News and Courier*, June 16, 1966, p. 10-b.



More than a dozen congressmen followed McCormack and lavished praise on the Low Country lawmaker. Carl Albert (D-OK), the House Majority Leader, met with reporters and informed them that Rivers had wanted to come back on June 9, but that the Democratic leadership was aware of the pain he was suffering from bursitis and insisted he not return "until he felt better."<sup>33</sup> All of the praises and the statement by Albert were a direct refutation of Pearson's charges and his call for Rivers removal as chairman. Naturally Pearson did not report the events which transpired in response to his column concerning Rivers, and scores of Americans never learned the truth of the situation. One other unfortunate aspect of the unfounded charge was that whenever Rivers again suffered from bursitis he refused to go to Bethesda to take the necessary treatments to lessen his pain.<sup>34</sup>

Blandford and others could never figure out why Drew Pearson despised and hated Mendel Rivers so intensely, because Rivers got along well with most of the reporters who covered Capitol Hill.<sup>35</sup> A congressman who wrote his memoirs nearly fifteen years after Rivers' death offered this explanation of Pearson's attacks:

Mendel was a favorite target of liberal columnist Drew Pearson, and once Pearson opened fire on a member of Congress he usually kept the pressure on indefinitely. When he could say that he had driven a man out of Congress, it gave him added prestige. Many of us in Congress had our differences with Pearson, but his attacks on Mendel were more highly personal than most. He tried to portray Mendel as a common drunk who was a security risk, and this was altogether untrue. Mendel had a drinking problem . . . which he overcame, but he never was a security risk.<sup>36</sup>

When Pearson died in September 1969, Rivers remarked to one of his secretaries, "Well Miss Kathy, if that man goes to heaven, ain't none of us got to worry."<sup>37</sup> Pearson's columns had done their bit to make Rivers' life on earth hell. They also gave people in other parts of the country a distorted view of Rivers which was indelibly etched in their minds. What is tragic is that after becoming chairman, Rivers was an "entirely different person who met the challenge and responsibility of his new position well."<sup>38</sup> His drinking problems diminished to the point that he did not take a drink of liquor the last three years

<sup>33</sup>*News and Courier*, June 15, 1966, p. 1-b.

<sup>34</sup>Worthington, *Op. cit.*

<sup>35</sup>Blandford and Worthington, *op. cit.*

<sup>36</sup>Sikes, p. 462.

<sup>37</sup>Worthington, *op. cit.*

<sup>38</sup>Blandford, *op. cit.*

## South Carolina Historical Association

of his life.<sup>39</sup> Although Rivers had numerous and significant election and legislative victories during his lifetime, he told his sister that when he stopped drinking it was "the greatest victory he ever had."<sup>40</sup>

<sup>39</sup>Rivers, *op. cit.*

<sup>40</sup>Odom, *op. cit.*



# THE UNITED STATES IN THE PHILIPPINES: FORESHADOW OF VIETNAM

Joseph Taylor Stukes  
Francis Marion College

---

At the eve of the twentieth century, in the 110th year of its existence, the United States emerged as a full-fledged empire. Reflecting its inner indecision, the nation mixed noble aims and naked ruthlessness. It was an odd mix of opposites. In time, the noble aims were trumpeted as characteristic traits of the American Republic. In time, the naked ruthlessness was muted, even forgotten. Records of it are still there for those who would be reminded.

Most historians recognize the timely doggerel of that year. Although less than poetry perhaps, it is surely punnish and clever:

Oh, dewy was the morning  
Upon the first of May,  
And Dewey was the admiral  
Down in Manila Bay.

And dewy were the Spaniards' eyes  
Them orbs of black and blue;  
And dew we feel discouraged?  
I dew not think we dew!<sup>1</sup>

Dewey's lopsided victory over the ramshackle fleet of Spanish Admiral Patricio Montojo occurred on May Day 1898. Responding to the need for army units to occupy what

<sup>1</sup>Ironquill (Eugene Fitch Ware) in the *Topeka Daily Capital*, 3 May 1898. Quoted in Bartlett, *Familiar Quotations*, Fifteenth and 125th Anniversary Edition, (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1980), 647.

## South Carolina Historical Association

the navy had conquered, President William McKinley named Major General Wesley C. Merritt, an officer of intelligence and ability who was highly respected.<sup>2</sup> Merritt and his fellow-officers struggled with unpreparedness in San Francisco much as did his colleagues in Tampa. He finally dispatched his troops piecemeal, and the first brigade of 2,500 men steamed for the tropics in May. They wore heavy wool clothing and carried obsolete black-powder Springfield rifles, not modern Krag-Jorgensens.<sup>3</sup> A month later, similarly dressed but better armed, Merritt and the remainder of his 10,600 men followed. In time, there would be almost 100,000 men under arms in the Philippines. Escalation was irresistible; the snowball rolled downhill.

McKinley underestimated the Filipino yearning for independence. He assumed "that Filipinos, incapable of self-rule, would welcome benevolent control from outside." Consequently he instructed General Merritt that there should be no joint occupation of the Philippines with the natives. For their part, natives were simply to recognize the authority of the United States. Merritt should employ, wrote the president, "whatever means in your judgment are necessary to this end."<sup>4</sup>

Merritt's judgment was put to the test almost immediately. When he landed on 26 July 1898, he found a complex situation and advisors who were divided in their advices. Emilio Aguinaldo, respected and even loved by Filipinos despite his youth, had led the islands to declare independence from Spain nine months earlier. Events had caused him to flee briefly but had not damaged his standing. Brought back to the Philippines on the initiative of Admiral Dewey himself, Aguinaldo had fashioned a Republican Army, poorly-equipped but high-spirited. It expected to liberate Manila from the Spanish forces in a joint US-Philippine attack. *Philippine libre*, so to speak. Such it anticipated. Such was not to be.

Aguinaldo's army, brave bushwhackers rather than disciplined infantry, could not alone defeat the Spanish force which still occupied Manila. Merritt, determined to avoid a joint attack, feared that he might end up fighting both Spaniards and Filipinos. The starved and war-weary Spanish commander broke the impasse with an offer to surrender after only token resistance if the Americans would keep the Filipinos out of Manila. Privately Merritt agreed. The resulting battle of Manila on 13 August 1898 mounted just enough gunfire and casualties to satisfy the honor of both Spaniards and Americans.<sup>5</sup>

Not privy to the secret bargain, the Republican Army enthusiastically, albeit naively, entered the sham battle, capturing some city blocks and suburban areas. When later turned back by the Americans, they considered themselves betrayed. Bitterly they returned to their original trenches and began a second siege of Manila.

Following this schism, Merritt moved swiftly to effect a patchwork rapprochement while such was still possible. By proclamation, he publicized his intentions of honoring

<sup>2</sup>Merritt should have been retired in June 1898 on his 64th birthday. He was mistakenly recorded in army records as two years younger. He served on active duty until 16 June 1900, actually his 66th birthday. A brief summary of his career is in Ezra J. Warner, *Generals in Blue*, 1988 Printing, (Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 322-23).

<sup>3</sup>Brian M. Linn, *The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902*, (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 2-3.

<sup>4</sup>John Dobson, *Reluctant Expansionism, The Foreign Policy of William McKinley*, (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1988), 106-07.

<sup>5</sup>Linn, 8.



personal and religious rights. By action, he provided relief for distressed and displaced natives, restored the city's water supply, and cleaned its streets.<sup>6</sup>

But the damage had been done. Hearts hardened on both sides. When Merritt was assigned to Paris as advisor to the treaty-makers in August, he was succeeded by his second-in-command, Major General Elwell S. Otis. Otis proved to be, in his relations with Filipinos, harsh, unsympathetic, and dictatorial. In his nine-month tenure, US-Filipino relations deteriorated steadily from uneasy alliance to wary suspicion to bitter warfare.

Such deterioration in the islands was matched by a hardening of attitudes in Washington. McKinley's public statements changed from equivocation to conviction. From an intentionally ambiguous policy which kept all options open (McKinley explained this ambiguity by saying that he did not want to give away what he might later want to keep), he came to espouse publicly a policy of annexation.

Shortly after the treaty was signed in December 1898, President McKinley described his policies officially. Anxious that Filipinos bless the American Republic, he wrote that the army was not to abuse the Filipinos but to protect them, their property and rights, keep open commercial ports, and collect taxes. McKinley concluded this way:

Finally, it should be the earnest and paramount aim of the military administration to win the confidence, respect, and affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines by assuring them in every possible way that full measure of individual rights and liberties which is the heritage of free peoples, and by proving to them that the mission of the United States is one of benevolent assimilation, substituting the mild sway of justice and right for arbitrary rule.<sup>7</sup>

Meanwhile Aguinaldo had despaired of cooperation with the Americans. Even before McKinley had articulated this policy of "benevolent assimilation," Aguinaldo had rejected it. In May 1898 Aguinaldo had been encouraged by Admiral Dewey and others to see himself as co-liberator of his homeland. In June patriots had drafted a constitution for a Philippine Republic and Aguinaldo had assumed the presidency pending its adoption. In late July he announced the creation of a Republican Army composed of three "Aguinaldo regiments" supplemented by battalions raised locally in each Tagalog province. It was this so-called army which was checked by Americans as Manila fell on 13 August 1898.

Relations between the American regulars and the Filipino irregulars went from bad to worse.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, 8-9.

<sup>7</sup>McKinley to Alger (21 December 1898), *Correspondence Relating to the War With Spain*, 2: 858-59.

"Almost without exception," an American major reported to Washington, "soldiers and also many officers refer to the natives in their presence as 'niggers.' . . . Houses were searched without warrant by Americans brandishing guns; at checkpoints, it became common to knock Filipinos down at the first hint of 'disrespect,' though some Americans showed anything but respect when searching Filipino women. Shopkeepers saw their wares 'confiscated' or bought with Confederate money; sentries regularly shot at Filipinos if they did not like their looks."<sup>8</sup>

Differences between Filipinos and Americans became heated quarrels which, in turn, became bitter disputes. On 4 February 1899 a shooting incident in Manila resulted in deaths of American and Filipino soldiers.<sup>9</sup> Both sides accused the other of firing first. Regardless, the Philippine insurrection is usually dated from this incident of 4 February 1899. Clashes grew into pitched battles. The Republican Army attempted to imitate western armies. Encouraged by his capable associate Antonio Luna, Aguinaldo risked his weak forces in open battle against Otis' better-trained and better-armed Americans. Losses were overwhelming. For over a year, such fighting continued, growing more and more bloody. American forces sought confrontation and won repeated victories. The main island of Luzon was divided into four military districts. District commanders conducted action locally. Soon, Filipino resistance was at the outer edges of the island only.

In November 1899 Otis launched a three-pronged push to clear Luzon. Major General Arthur MacArthur pinned down the Filipinos in the central Luzon plain, Major General Henry W. Lawton swept to the northeast and occupied the mountain passes, preventing any retreat to the east. When the Filipinos fell back to the north, they were pincered by Brigadier General Loyd Wheaton's troops who had made an amphibious landing at Lingayen Gulf.<sup>10</sup>

This three-pronged offensive almost finished the Republican Army. Several important leaders were captured; some others voluntarily surrendered; Aguinaldo himself narrowly escaped, leaving behind his family, treasury, bodyguard, and much of his staff. As the only well-known rebel leader remaining at large, he sought safety in mountainous northeast Luzon. From there he directed a guerrilla offensive.

Otis poisoned conditions by consistently underestimating Aguinaldo's support, tenaciousness, and resoluteness. One critical historian comments this way:

<sup>8</sup>Cited in David H. Bain, *Sitting in Darkness*, (Boston: Houghton and Mifflin, 1984), 78-79.

<sup>9</sup>Graham A. Cosmas, *An Army for Empire*, (Columbia: The University of Missouri Press, 1971), 301. Also cited in Dobson, 141.

<sup>10</sup>Allan Millett and Peter Maslowski, *For the Common Defense*, (New York: The Free Press, 1984), 290-91. Also Linn, 14-15.



His heavy-handed soldier's diplomacy had done much to alienate Aguinaldo . . . in the six months leading up to the war. Once the shooting started, he deployed units with maddening inconsistency, often sending brigades to take territory at a great loss only to be withdrawn, allowing the Filipinos to reoccupy their lost ground. When the war began, Otis was shown to be hungry for publicity for his expeditionary force, but only of the right sort: pro-Republican, pro-McKinley, pro-army. His press releases made ridiculous claims of victories and used inflated battle statistics; nearly every sheet spoke of another "disastrous blow to the enemy" that would presage the imminent collapse of the "rebellion."<sup>11</sup>

Resentment towards Otis was widespread and deep: his officers grumbled among themselves, soldiers made caustic jokes, and news reporters even threatened an uprising against his arbitrary interference. He reacted by becoming stricter than ever. Conditions worsened, becoming critical.

Aguinaldo viewed the Americans of 1898-99 not as liberators but as conquerors. He regarded Americans as colonialists as had been the Spaniards earlier. Americans were worse, thought he, since they had come as liberators and stayed as conquerors. Worse still, the Americans were perfidious, proclaiming a policy called "benevolent assimilation" but practicing a policy as ruthless as the Spaniards' had been in Cuba.

While pursuing military conquest, Otis began social reconstruction as well. Recalling McKinley's directive to cause Filipinos to "bless the American Republic" by demonstrating "that the mission of the United States is one of benevolent assimilation, substituting the mild sway of justice and right for arbitrary rule," Otis instituted constructive projects similar to those which British colonialists cited with pride: roads, bridges, infirmaries, schools, telephone and telegraph lines, and so forth. Remarkable success came in the health field where traditional diseases such as cholera, smallpox, and the plague were practically eliminated and infant mortality greatly reduced.<sup>12</sup>

But this twin effort of "schoolbooks and krag" was met with more cynicism and resentment than admiration and gratitude. Its successes were less noted by the natives than the patronizing ethnocentrism and the arrogant disregard of local customs. Americans were

<sup>11</sup>Bain, 82-83.

<sup>12</sup>Millett and Maslowski, 291.

puzzled by such cold rejection. After all, this was the year that Collier's published Rudyard Kipling's widely-hailed poem. Americans felt that they were assuming the white man's burden, binding their sons to exile to serve the captives' need, engaged in socio-moral uplift of these new-caught sullen peoples, half-devil and half-child.<sup>13</sup>

The successes of the "other war" had counter-productive effects as well. They encouraged the American public to believe that the insurrection was in its dying stages, that Filipinos had been converted to progress and American humanitarianism, that the tunnel was shortening and the distant light brightening.

It was a false dawn. In May 1900 Elihu Root, the new Secretary of War, replaced General Otis with Major General Arthur MacArthur. Instead of winding down, the war simply entered a new phase. Convinced that he would never win by imitating western battle styles, Aguinaldo switched to guerrilla tactics. Such fighting came more naturally to him and his men. Military histories describe the fighting of 1900-02 in phrases which ring familiar on ears which, seven decades later, tuned in to radio and television.

In their highly-regarded textbook *For the Common Defense*, Allan Millett and Peter Maslowski describe the Philippines of 1900 in terms which might have described Vietnam in 1970:

Filipinos increasingly fought only when victory was a certainty, usually ambushing small patrols. When confronted by a superior force, the guerrillas hid their weapons and dispersed to their homes, where they greeted the Americans with a friendly smile and a hearty "Amigo!" They also engaged in sniping and sabotage, inflicted hideous tortures on prisoners, and set trailway traps such as pits filled with sharpened stakes. Soldiers quickly learned that a "pacified" area extended no further than the range of a Krag-Jorgensen.<sup>14</sup>

Those Americans who later sought Villa in Mexico or Sandino in Nicaragua or the Viet Cong in Vietnam could identify with such an enemy.

The combination of stepped-up fighting and "other war" successes prompted Aguinaldo to strike back. To counter the Americans' "policy of attraction," which was wooing some local leaders to cooperation, Filipinos turned to terrorism. Calling it "exemplary punishment of traitors," they fell viciously on those who were opting for peace with Americans rather than independence without them. To control areas, the insurgents

<sup>13</sup>Kipling's much-quoted poem, often cited as "The White Man's Burden," appeared originally in *McClure's*, Vol. XII (February 1899), 291. Its impact on contemporary imperialist thought is discussed in Bain, 78-79.

<sup>14</sup>Kipling's much-quoted poem, often cited as "The White Man's Burden," appeared originally in *McClure's*, Vol. XII (February 1899), 291. Its impact on contemporary imperialist thought is discussed in Bain, 78-79.



established shadow governments which determined penalties and administered kangaroo justice. Some victims were merely reprimanded, fined, or banished; others were mutilated or murdered; still others were buried alive or left exposed for animals to ravage. Duplicity became a lifestyle. Some natives who worked openly for the Americans by day worked secretly for the insurgents by night. Many Filipinos lived in the night and the fog.

In September 1900 the Philippine Commission, led by William Howard Taft, assumed its official duties. The Table of Organization neatly divided authority between the Commission which was to exercise legislative and non-military functions and the army which was to exercise executive and police functions. Such a jurisdictional line of authority between Taft and MacArthur was neater in theory than in practice. Not surprisingly, clashes resulted. While Taft spoke of his "little brown brothers" and the blessings of civilization, MacArthur invoked General Orders No. 100 and pressed military activity. Mutual respect prevented an open break between the two men, but tension existed and grew steadily more intense.

General Orders No. 100, originally issued during the Civil War, had gained a bit of international acceptance. It noted that war should be waged in conventional style between uniformed combatants. Partisans and guerrillas deserved little mercy, being subject to imprisonment, deportation, or execution. Armies were to respect the rights of non-combatants. However, there were two loopholes: military necessity and retaliation. Through these two loopholes slipped the frustrated and angry US army. A new war began.

The main reason this new war began in 1901 rather than earlier was that both sides had awaited the outcome of McKinley's bid for re-election in November 1900. Among the aspects of the election was the anti-imperialist issue. William Jennings Bryan, McKinley's opponent in 1900 as he had been in 1896, embraced the Democrats' stand on anti-imperialism although he chose to emphasize other issues (particularly that of silver) more than that of anti-imperialism. The election of 1900 was not a referendum on imperialism alone. One accusation made by the anti-imperialists against McKinley was that he was conducting a war of bare-faced cynical conquest that was unconstitutional since Congress had never declared war.<sup>15</sup> McKinley's re-election undercut the opposition to Philippine annexation. It dismayed the followers of Aguinaldo. The time was ripe to renew the war.

Ever determined that the Filipinos eventually accept US terms, MacArthur in early 1901 revived attempts at pacification and at close collaboration with Taft and the Philippine Commission. Each side regarded the other as misguided and as a stumbling-block. Taft and MacArthur did work towards the same end, however, accommodating friction and making progress.

In 1901, as drastic methods were used in US tactics, the war became more and more unpopular at home. An increasing number of soldiers sought re-assignment. MacArthur and Root sought to "philippinize" the war by enlisting 12,000 Filipino troops, hoping to

<sup>15</sup>The election of 1900 is covered in general in books centering on presidential elections. For an outstanding discussion of the election as it pertained to the issues of imperialism and the Philippine insurrection, see Garel Grunder and William Livezey, *The Philippines and the United States*, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1951), 76-78.

## South Carolina Historical Association

release a comparable number of Americans.<sup>16</sup> The stratagem did not work. MacArthur continued to rely on Americans as soldiers, Filipinos as scouts. It was the same as the army had done in the Indian wars.

A major breakthrough came in March 1901, one on which Americans built victory and from which Filipinos never recovered. In a daring raid in which Filipino scouts pretended to be Aguinaldo supporters, a small unit led by General Frederick Funston captured Aguinaldo himself near Palawan in northeastern Luzon. In captivity Aguinaldo was persuaded that his cause was hopeless. Within a month he issued a proclamation accepting American suzerainty and urging his compatriots to do the same.

The country has declared unmistakably  
for peace [he wrote], so be it. Enough  
of blood; enough of tears and desolation  
. . . . By acknowledging and accepting the  
sovereignty of the United States throughout  
the entire Archipelago, as I do now, without  
any reservation whatsoever, I believe that I  
am serving thee, my beloved country. May  
happiness be thine!<sup>17</sup>

Aguinaldo's capture and capitulation halted most of the Philippine resistance, but not all of it. Fighting was continued by Miguel Malvar in the province of Batangas in southwestern Luzon and by Vicente Lukban on Samar Island south and east of Luzon.

With resistance thus reduced, McKinley ordered on 1 July 1901 the final transfer of executive authority from the military establishment to the Philippine Commission, now widened to include three native Filipinos. Thus strengthened the Commission created a Philippine Constabulary, manned by Filipinos though officered by Americans. This Philippine constabulary, clearly separate from the army's scouts and each municipality's police, won quick acceptance from the population.

In the same month of July 1901 McKinley replaced MacArthur with Major General Adna R. Chaffee, a seasoned cavalryman determined to pacify the archipelago by using Krag's to create cemeteries. To bring an end to resistance on Samar Island, he assigned Brigadier General Jacob H. Smith, a tough veteran proud of his nickname of "Hell-roaring Jake." His first order was to take no prisoners.

I wish you to kill and burn. The more you kill  
and burn the better it will please me. I want all  
persons killed who are capable of bearing arms in  
actual hostilities against the United States.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>16</sup>Daniel B. Schirmer, *Republic or Empire*, (Cambridge, Mass: Schenckman Publishing Company, Inc., 1972), 227.

<sup>17</sup>Bain, 385.

<sup>18</sup>Millett and Maslowski, 295.



Those "capable of bearing arms in actual hostilities against the United States" were defined as males aged 10 or above. Although generally failing to carry out these orders literally, soldiers wrought shocking destruction and left many survivors destitute. Thus did quiet come to Samar Island. As Tacitus had once observed, "they made it a wilderness and called it peace." As an army report of a later war put it, "we pacified the village by destroying it."

While Smith tended to Samar resistance, Chaffee selected Brigadier General John Franklin Bell to tend to Batangas province. Bell called attention to General Orders No. 100 again, but he voiced reservations about respecting the rights of civilians who found themselves in harm's way. "It is an inevitable consequence of war," he acknowledged, "that the innocent must generally suffer with the guilty."<sup>19</sup> Bell saw the loopholes in General Orders No. 100 more than the other parts of that document. General Bell had his 4,000 soldiers hound the guerrillas in Batangas. Not only did the Americans kill thousands of non-uniformed people (indeed, they were all un-uniformed!) but systematically destroyed crops and livestock. As on Samar, smoke pinpointed the location of American forces.

In an attempt to halt resistance, Bell herded more than 300,000 into concentration zones, explaining the action as military necessity and making sincere attempts to alleviate the worst conditions. Comparisons with Sherman's March to the Sea during the Civil War and with Cuban conditions of five years earlier were commonplace, even reaching the United States Senate. Later studies concluded that malnutrition, poor sanitary conditions, disease, and demoralization cost as many as 11,000 Filipino lives and rendered the population susceptible to the cholera epidemic of 1902.<sup>20</sup>

Malvar finally surrendered in April 1902. Sporadic resistance continued in southern Luzon and on some outlying islands, but they were ill-organized and futile. On 4 July 1902 Theodore Roosevelt, having succeeded to the presidency following the murder of McKinley, proclaimed the rebellion over. The fighting ended.

The cost had been high. More than 125,000 US troops saw service, suffering casualties of 4,200 killed in action and 2,800 injured. Financial costs approximated \$400 million, twenty times the price paid to Spain for the 7,000 islands in 1898. As many as 20,000 Filipino fighters died, while an estimated 200,000 civilians perished due to famine, disease, and other war-related calamities.

Another casualty suffered by the United States, however, was the damage done to some of its cherished ideals: the sanctity of human rights, the concept of self-government, and the love of liberty for all. Critics of American imperialism in general and the military's ruthlessness in particular attempted to publicize the issue of American-committed atrocities. Senator George F. Hoar (R-Mass) pushed for an investigation, which, to his dismay, was referred to the Standing Committee on the Philippines, chaired by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge (R-Mass), the Senate's most determined imperialist.

<sup>19</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>20</sup>Linn, 255.

## South Carolina Historical Association

During the Senate investigation public feelings were aroused even more so than in the presidential campaign two years earlier. President Roosevelt, unsympathetic to the army and its tactics and hoping to de-fuse public opinion, ordered three courts-martial:

1. Major Littleton Waller (accused of shooting eleven defenseless Filipinos without trial on Samar);
2. Major Edwin F. Glenn (who had used the infamous water cure to extract information which led him to burn a native town of 10,000 to the ground); and
3. General Smith himself.

Waller was acquitted by his court-martial, Glenn was fined \$50, and Smith was "admonished."<sup>21</sup> So much for the mild sway of justice and right.

Meanwhile Lodge proceeded to drag out proceedings, stack the witness list, cite hundreds of cases of Philippine brutality, and keep all proceedings secret. In the mood of the times and in the aftermath of victory, the United States was not ready to muster moral indignation on behalf of non-white people 7,000 miles away.

And so the lid was closed on the annexation of the Philippine Islands and the crushing of local resistance to it. The lid closed unevenly; some snakes were left inside. They are there as a reminder for those who would be reminded.

<sup>21</sup>Schirmer, 238-39.



## MINUTES

### ANNUAL MEETING 1991

The sixty-first annual meeting of the South Carolina Historical Association convened at Columbia, South Carolina, on 2 March 1991. An estimated seventy-five members and guests of the Association attended the meeting. Following registration the membership attended a rich offering of four morning programs beginning at 9:30 a.m.

Session I, chaired by Robert J. Moore of Columbia College, focussed on "South Carolina Politics." Harris M. Bailey, Lander College, presented "The Only Game in Town: The South Carolina Republican Party in the Post-Reconstruction Era." Will Huntley, Governor's School for Science and Mathematics, discussed "The Controversy Surrounding Mendel Rivers and His Battle with the Bottle." James O. Farmer, Jr., USC at Lancaster, commented on the two papers.

Session II, chaired by William S. Brockington, Jr. of USC at Aiken, was entitled "A Historical Kaleidoscope," a rich offering of a group of widely disparate topics. Kathy Pearson, Emory University, presented "The Role of Germanic Males in the Early Middle Ages" and Bertrand van Ruymbeke, College of Charleston, offered "The Huguenot Emigration from the French Perspective." Denis Paz, Clemson University, commented on the two papers. Joseph T. Stukes, Francis Marion College, presented "The United States in the Philippines: Foreshadow of Vietnam" which was commented on by David Hess, USC at Aiken.

Session III, chaired by John B. Edmunds of USC at Spartanburg, was entitled "Politics and Reform in South Carolina." Walter B. Edgar, USC at Columbia, presented "Evolution of the Legislative State in South Carolina;" John Crangle, Benedict College, offered "South Carolina General Assembly Elections, 1988;" and Cole Blease Graham, USC at Columbia, discussed "Constitutional and Political Reform in South Carolina." A. V. Huff, Furman University, offered comments, and a lively discussion by all in attendance ensued.

Session IV, chaired by W. Calvin Smith of USC at Aiken, was entitled "The Civil Rights Movement in the South." Miles Richards, USC at Columbia, offered "The Life of Osceola McKaine;" Thomas O'Brien, Emory University, explained "Georgia's Response to Brown vs. Board of Education;" and John Godwin, USC at Columbia, presented "Taming a Whirlwind: Civil Rights Leadership in the Community Setting, Wilmington, N.C., 1950-72." Comments on the papers were offered by Joseph E. Lee, UNC at Charlotte.

Following the morning sessions the membership recessed for a luncheon at Humphreys Hall on the Columbia College Campus. While members were enjoying dessert, Robert J. Moore, Columbia College, introduced the speaker. John Hammond Moore, Columbia, delivered an entertaining talk on the topic of "Reflections on Columbia and Richland County." President William S. Brockington, Jr. thanked the speaker for his talk. Valdis O. Lumans, USC at Aiken, was recognized for his hard work at providing an excellent program for 1991. Robert Moore and Selden Smith of Columbia College were thanked for the hospitality extended to the SCHA by their institution.

After lunch the business meeting was held. President Brockington called the meeting to order. A brief Treasurer's Report was given by John Crangle, Benedict College. The Executive Board report was given by President Brockington. First, increased dues for members from \$7.50 per annum to \$10 and for libraries from \$10 per annum to \$15 were announced, while student dues are to remain at \$5 per annum. Second, a proposed slate of 1991-1992 Officers and Members of the Executive Board was introduced, voted on, and passed. The 1991-1992 officers are:

President - Valdis O. Lumans, USC at Aiken

Vice President - Charles H. Lesser, S. C. Department of Archives and History

Secretary/Treasurer - Wm. S. Brockington, Jr., USC at Aiken

Editor of THE PROCEEDINGS - Peter W. Becker, USC at Columbia

At Large - Denis G. Paz, Clemson University

At Large - Marcia G. Synnott, USC at Columbia

Finally, the sixty-second annual meeting is to be held at USC at Aiken on March 7, 1992.

There being no further business, the sixty-first annual meeting of the South Carolina Historical Association adjourned to the historic Ensor-Kenan House for refreshments, gentle libations, and delightful conversations before the journey home.



# FINANCIAL STATEMENT, 1991 South Carolina Historical Association

## CHECKING ACCOUNT:

Financial Statement, July 1, 1991	\$ 1122.04
Deposits, July 1 - December 31, 1991	\$ 1648.30
Total	\$ 2770.34

Expenditures, July 1 - December 31, 1991	
Luncheon Speaker 1991 Meeting	\$ 200.00
Printing Cost of The Proceedings	\$ 1766.36
Mailing	\$ 178.51
Journal Binding Fee	\$ 50.00
Lockbox	\$ 25.00
Other expenditures	\$ 12.20
Total	-\$ 2232.07

Total Checking Balance, December 31, 1991	\$ 538.27
---	-----------

## GENERAL SAVINGS ACCOUNTS:

The First Savings Bank [089-9974058]	\$ 682.95
NCNB [1388935]	\$ 1666.09

Total General Savings	\$ 2349.04
-----------------------	------------

## PROCEEDINGS PUBLICATION ENDOWMENT FUND:

NCNB [9127414]	\$ 2178.98
NCNB [9173896]	\$ 1368.43
Total Endowment Fund	\$ 3547.41

## HOLLIS PRIZE ACCOUNT:

The First Savings Bank [028-5761219]	\$ 521.28
The First Savings Bank [028-5761235]	\$ 781.79
The First Savings Bank [028-5766160]	\$ 263.01
Total Hollis Prize Account	\$ 1566.08

Respectfully Submitted,  
William S. Brockington, Jr.  
Secretary/Treasurer, SCHA  
January 25, 1992

